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INTRODUCTION 
On August 3, 2014, fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, ISIL, IS, 
or Da’esh) invaded the Sinjar region of northern Iraq and attacked its inhabitants, the Yazidi 
people. In the days that followed, IS fighters began selling women and girls, some as young as 
nine, at market to be held in sexual slavery. Several thousand women and girls remain in 
captivity to this day. My aim in this dissertation is to explore philosophical questions 
motivated by the sexual violence directed at the Yazidi people, by analyzing the underlying 
metaphysical, ethical, political, and legal concepts that will allow me to identify the 
responsibilities of the global community with respect to crises like the one facing the Yazidi 
women and girls.  
While the dissertation is motivated by a specific case of violence, I intend to use my 
analysis of the case and the related concepts to draw out conclusions beyond the 
circumstances of the Yazidis. Due to the wide range of disciplines that have sought to answer 
questions about how to address mass sexual slavery, including political, sociological, religious, 
feminist, activist, legal, and pragmatic responses, some have relied on assumptions about how 
we should view particular parts of the issue. I aim to break the issue down to the foundational 
questions about harm and group identity before making claims about how the international 
community should understand and address instances of mass sexual slavery. In this first chapter, 
I set up the case of the sexual slavery of Yazidi women and girls by IS fighters and introduce 
how I will use this case as an illustration and to motivate the questions explored in subsequent 
chapters. In doing so, I begin by exploring the foundations of the group of individuals known 
as IS. I then turn to the attack on and ongoing violence against the Yazidi people in particular. 
 
 2 
1.1 The Islamic State 
One terrorist group was responsible for over half of all claimed global fatalities due to 
terrorism in 2014: IS.1 The earliest iteration of IS was founded in 1999, emerging out of 
intense turmoil and unrest in the Middle East. The group has since grown into a large, 
hierarchical organization focused on governing as an Islamic State, or caliphate, across the 
borders of nation states. IS is a Salafi-jihadist group, with stated purposes of achieving 
salvation through military triumph and domination over the enemies of Islam. In June 2014, 
IS declared an Islamic State over large areas of Iraq and Syria. Today, IS claims religious and 
political authority over all Muslims in the world, and maintains (violent) territorial control 
over areas in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Sinai. Additionally, in 2015 and 2016, IS 
claimed responsibility for high-profile terrorist attacks in Turkey, France, Tunisia, Yemen, 
Brussels, and on Metrojet Flight 9268 from Egypt to Russia. As with many terrorist groups, 
the individual members may have a wide variety of reasons for having joined the group. Many 
joined as Salafi-jihadists. But others were forced or coerced into joining, either as children or 
captives or through the pressures of economic necessity.  
The purported goals of IS have a loose relationship with mainstream interpretations of 
Islam. Historically, the divine law of Islam states that its own conception of justice is the only 
correct version of justice. This results in a “universalist aspiration” for the faith, a goal of peace 
through the establishment of the correct religious doctrine all over the world.2 It is the collective 
duty of all Muslims to establish peace and justice, through Islam, all over the world.  
                                               
1  “2015 Global Terrorism Index: Deaths from Terrorism Increased 80% Last Year to the Highest Level Ever; 
Global Economic Cost of Terrorism Reached All-Time High at US$52.9 Billion,” PR Newswire, 
November 16, 2015. Boko Haram and IS were jointly responsibly for 51% of all claimed global fatalities, 
but Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to IS. 
2  Christopher A Ford, “Siyar-Ization and Its Discontents: International Law and Islam's Constitutional 
Crisis,” Texas International Law Journal 30 (1995): 500. 
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The Arabic word jihad means “to exert oneself” or in the context of Islam, “exertion of 
one’s power in Allah’s path, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word 
supreme over this world.”3 The Quran states that the duty of Muslims is to “strive for Allah 
with the striving due to Him,”4 and “believe in Allah and His Messenger and strive in the 
cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives.”5 The term jihad does not necessarily refer to 
war, because “exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path” could be achieved either peacefully or 
violently.6 The Quran calls Muslims to “declare what you are commanded and turn away from 
the polytheists”7 and to “[f]ight them until there is no [more] fitnah8 and [until] worship is 
[acknowledged to be] for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except 
against the oppressors.”9 The struggle to expand the influence of Islam was meant “to establish 
peace with justice within a secure political order,”10 but the peaceful and secure political order 
might only be established through war.  
There is an important distinction to be made between personal jihad and political 
jihad. The former, al-jihad al-akbar, refers to a personal moral struggle and is considered to 
be the “greater” jihad.11 Political jihad, or al-jihad al-a ghar, refers to an armed struggle of 
                                               
3  Richard C. Martin, “The Religious Foundations of War, Peace, and Statecraft in Islam,” in Just War and 
Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, eds. 
John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), 96-97. 
4  Quran 22:78. All quotes from the Quran are from the Sahih International American Translation. 
5  Quran 61:11. 
6  Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Clark, N.J.: The Lawbook Exchange, 2006), 55; The 
Islamic Conception of Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 164. 
7  Quran 15:94. 
8  Meaning “disruption of society.” See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sharīʻa and Islamic Criminal Justice in 
Time of War and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 218. 
9  Quran 2:193. 
10  John Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics (Lousiville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
1993), 34.  
11  Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 76. 
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the state and is known as the “lesser” jihad.12 Political jihad can be either domestic or 
international. Domestic jihad is fought against one or more of the following groups: (1) rebels 
or secessionists, (2) bandits, highway robbers, or pirates, (3) apostates, and (4) violent 
religious fanatics.13 International jihad is fought against non-Muslim states. The terms jihad 
al-kuffar (jihad against unbelievers) and jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in the path of God) are 
often used to refer to international jihad. 14  But because Muslims were historically or 
theoretically united under one state, “any jihad that occurred between the Islamic state and its 
enemies was a war between Muslims and their enemies,” and this means that not every conflict 
was motivated by lack of Muslim faith.15 Finally, there is a distinction between jihad al-daf, or 
defensive war, and jihad al-talab, which is aggressive war initiated by Muslims outside the 
Islamic State.16 
There is disagreement among scholars as to whether the duty of jihad is collective or 
individual. Al-Mawardi argued that the duty to initiate jihad is collective, while the duty 
becomes individual after hostilities have begun.17 This seems plausible in light of the various 
types of jihad: an individual may have a duty to participate in al-jihad al-a ghar (lesser, 
political jihad), but as part of what he understands to be his individual duty of al-jihad al-
akbar (greater, personal jihad). So the duty of an individual with respect to jihad could be 
seen to implicate the collective, political jihad, but might only directly involve the “religious 
                                               
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid., 77. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Asma Afsaruddin, “The Siyar Laws of Aggression: Juridical Re-Interpretations of Qur’ānic Jihād and Their 
Contemporary Implications for International Law,” in Islam and International Law: Engaging Self-Centrism 
from a Plurality of Perspectives, eds. Marie-Luisa Frick and Andreas Th Müller (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2013). 
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and legal duty” which can be fulfilled “by the heart and tongue in combatting evil and spreading 
the word of God.”18  
As a collective duty, however, jihad falls on the state. Each believer is bound to fulfill his 
duty by “the hand and sword in the sense of participation in fighting.”19 If such a “duty is 
fulfilled by a part of the community it ceases to be obligatory on others; the whole community, 
however, falls into error if the duty is not performed at all.”20 Khadduri argues that this collective 
understanding of the duty of jihad results in two main benefits: 
In the first place, it meant that the duty need not necessarily be fulfilled by all the 
believers. For the recruitment of all the believers as warriors was neither possible 
nor advisable. Some of the believers were needed to prepare food and weapons, 
while the crippled, blind, and sick would not qualify as fighters. Women and 
children were as a rule excused from actual fighting, although many a woman 
contributed indirectly to the war effort. In the second place, the imposition of the 
obligation on the community rather than on the individual made possible the 
employment of the jihad as a community and, consequently, a state instrument; its 
control accordingly, is a state, not an individual, responsibility. Thus the head of 
the state can in a more effective way serve the common interest of the community 
than if the matter is left entirely to the discretion of the individual believer.21  
 
So as a state doctrine, used to legitimate conquest, pre-emptive self-defense, and the use of force 
to promote political legitimacy,22  a decision to participate in jihad could only be made 
effectively through an Islamic state.  
The first set of questions that arises for this project relates to the ontological status of the 
group IS. Namely, what it is to be a group or an individual member of a group, which I will 
explore in Chapter Two. The religious underpinnings of Islam and whether the obligations of 
jihad are individual or collective will play a significant role in the application of this 
                                               
18  Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, 164-65. 
19  Ibid., 165. 
20  War and Peace in the Law of Islam, 60. 
21  Ibid., 61. 
22  M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-Defense to Revolutionary and Regime-
Change Political Violence,” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 10, no. 1 (2008): 62. 
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understanding of groups to IS.  I will then explore what sort of entity a terrorist group is in 
Chapter Four. We can see that the statehood of IS matters a great deal in terms of both the 
political and religious obligations of the group. The plausibility and relevance of the purported 
religious justifications for violence will be explored in Chapter Three and Chapter Five, when I 
explore harm and moral responsibility.  
1.2 August 2014 Attack on the Yazidis 
People of the Yazidi faith community have experienced widespread discrimination and 
persecution for hundreds of years. A Yazidi person must have two Yazidi parents, so one 
cannot convert to the religion, and thus marriage outside the community has been rare. The 
insular nature of the Yazidi community has allowed pervasive misunderstandings about the 
substance of the Yazidi faith to spread throughout the Arab world.23 Despite the limited 
interactions between their communities, many Yazidis and Sunni Muslims who lived in the 
Sinjar region had enjoyed friendly relations for years.24 
 When IS fighters attacked Sinjar from Iraq and Syria, they surrounded the community 
on all sides of Mount Sinjar.25 IS faced little resistance and was able to trap tens of thousands 
of Yazidis on the upper plateau of Mount Sinjar, while also capturing thousands of Yazidis 
who tried to flee.26 IS fighters immediately separated the adult males from the female and 
child captives and then began forcibly transferring their Yazidi captives into IS-controlled 
areas of Iraq, and eventually Syria as well.27 The Yazidi community was subjected to “almost 
unimaginable atrocities,” including reports “of men being killed or forced to convert; of 
                                               
23  U.N. Human Rights Council, “They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/32/CRP.2, 15 June 2016, 6, para. 19. 
24  Ibid., 6, para. 20. 
25  Ibid., 6, para. 23. 
26  Ibid., 7, paras. 25-29. 
27  Ibid., 8-10, paras. 31, 42. 
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women and girls, some as young as nine, sold at market and held in sexual slavery by IS 
fighters; and of boys ripped from their families and forced into IS training camps.”28 
 At least one group of older Yazidi women were executed shortly after the transfer of 
the women and children to the holding sites.29 Many women and girls committed or attempted 
to commit suicide.30 The remaining captured women and girls were considered the property of 
IS. Most were made available to IS fighters for individual purchase, and a small number were 
held as the “collective property of ISIS” and “distributed in groups to military bases 
throughout Iraq and Syria.”31  Once a Yazidi woman or girl had been sold to an individual IS 
fighter, she was subjected to brutal sexual violence and beatings. When women or girls tried 
to escape, they were punished with gang rape and/or the murder of their children.32 Many 
Yazidi women and girls report that they were forced to take birth control by the IS fighters, 
while others became pregnant as a result of being raped on a regular basis.33 As of June 2016, 
the U.N. Human Rights Council estimates that at least 3,200 Yazidi women and girls remain 
captives of IS. The U.N. Security Council has concluded that  
by its violent extremist ideology, its terrorist acts, its continued gross systematic 
and widespread attacks directed against civilians, abuses of human rights and 
violations of international humanitarian law, including those driven on religious 
or ethnic ground, its eradication of cultural heritage and trafficking of cultural 
property, but also its control over significant parts and natural resources across 
Iraq and Syria and its recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose 
threat affects all regions and Member States, even those far from conflict zones, 
[IS] constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and 
security.34  
 
                                               
28  Ibid., 3, para. 2. 
29  Ibid., 11, para. 48. 
30  Ibid., 12, para. 53. 
31  Ibid., 12, para. 55. 
32  Ibid., 14, paras. 67-68. 
33  Ibid., 15, paras. 69-70. 
34  U.N. Security Council, Res. 2249 [on Terrorist Attacks Perpetrated by ISIL Also Known as Da'esh], U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2249, 20 November 2015. 
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Due to the overwhelming evidence of these acts, including the sexual slavery of thousands of 
Yazidi women and girls, the U.N. and many states have determined that an ongoing genocide 
has occurred against the Yazidi people. But the international community has yet to stop the 
ongoing violence and hold IS accountable for their actions.  
The second set of questions arises from focusing on the Yazidi victims of IS. I will 
begin by assessing the ontological status of the group of Yazidi women and girls who have 
been held as sexual slaves by IS, again in light of what it is to be a group or an individual 
member of a group, and what sort of entity a group of victims is. I then turn to questions of 
harm, eventually narrowing in on the nature of the particular harm of sexual slavery. In the 
later chapters I ask about the responsibility of the international community, states, and IS with 
respect to addressing the ongoing harm and accounting for the past harms. We do not have a 
clear understanding of how to stop these atrocities, in terms of who is responsible for 
intervening and how. Based on my account of the nature of the harm and the ontological 
status of the individuals and groups involved, I will argue for a particular understanding of 
moral responsibility with respect to mass sexual slavery. 
1.3 The Challenge of the Yazidi Women and Girls 
In each chapter that follows, I address the various ways in which the sexual slavery of 
the Yazidi women and girls seems to present a challenge for the way we understand groups, 
harm, political entities, and responsibility. 
As noted above, in Chapter Two I begin by tackling the issues raised by the perpetrator 
group, IS, and the victim group, Yazidi women and girls. We can think of what it means to be 
a group or a member of a group along a spectrum between individualist and collectivist 
accounts. An individualist sees groups as reducible to their individual members, so that any 
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decisions made or actions taken are done so by individuals as individuals. Collectivism, on 
the other hand, sees groups as their own separate entities, above and beyond the individual 
members of the group. The ontological statuses of individuals are, in a sense, subsumed by the 
group entity. I adopt a view somewhere between individualism and collectivism, with respect 
to both perpetrator and victim groups, and as informed by the challenges presented by the case 
of the sexual slavery of Yazidi women and girls. 
My first task in the second chapter is to classify the organization known as IS. Here, 
we have a group that purports to act in accordance with one ideology, and as part of what the 
organization claims to be its religious duty of jihad. IS has been variously classified as a state, 
terrorist group, religious group, and a loose collective of individual fighters. The moral, legal, 
and political responsibilities of IS differ between these classifications, and IS seems to 
capitalize on this ambiguity in order to avoid any responsibilities altogether.  
The next issue arises when we consider that whichever classification we use for IS, the 
group consists of individuals who are participants in the organization’s activities. A 
perpetrator group like IS begins with a shared ideology and shared interests, and likely 
personal relationships between members of the initial group members. Members gradually 
join the group for a variety of reasons. Those who join for ideological or goal-based reasons 
quickly become full-fledged agents of the group as they build individual relationships with the 
other group members. Individuals who become members of the group through coercion or 
force will likely build relationships first in order to survive, but may become committed to the 
group beliefs due to time, proximity, and personal relationships. Each member of the group 
retains some level of moral agency, but this will vary with respect to the position within the 
group hierarchy. IS presents challenges with respect to how we should classify in-group 
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violence, perpetrated on group “members” through economic, religious, or social coercion, 
and how this might change or negate one’s membership in the perpetrator group. Considering 
what it means to be an individual member of IS allows me to rule out a purely collectivist 
view of groups, since individual agency within a group varies widely. But the group ideology 
and organizational hierarchy limit my view from dissolving into a reductionist individualism. 
With respect to the Yazidi women and girls, the identity of the group and its members 
is a more central question than group or individual agency. Virtually no one chooses to be  
part of a targeted group for the reason that it will make them an individual victim. The group 
identity of victim groups (race, gender, religion, or some combination) usually exists prior to 
the group becoming a victim group, as it does with the Yazidi women and girls. The Yazidis 
have been targeted by IS for destruction due to religious practices it sees as “devil worship.” 
So all of the Yazidi women and girls have the shared experience of being targeted based on 
their ethnic/religious identity and their sex. The main issue, then, is how to understand what it 
means to be a member of a group being harmed as part of a campaign of mass violence. Some 
part of the individuals’ experiences as part of the victim group will be shared or similar, such 
as the specific harms perpetrated. Yet other parts of victim experiences will be unique, given 
their individual circumstances of enslavement and their phenomenological experiences of the 
violence. Again, this leads me to a view of groups that recognizes both the shared and 
individual identities of group members, so that the group is something more than the 
aggregate of the individuals, but not uniform. 
The next chapter focuses on how we should understand the specific harm of mass 
sexual slavery, perpetrated against a particular group of women and girls. Killing in defense 
of one’s own life or the life of another is usually considered a just cause for killing, and so too 
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is killing in war in defense of one’s own people or another group of people. The genocidal 
murder of the Yazidi people would almost certainly be considered a just cause for 
humanitarian intervention by the international community. But the ongoing threat facing the 
Yazidi people is mass sexual slavery, and I need a conception of harm that can help establish 
whether or not it alone could serve as a just cause for humanitarian intervention. 
One reason why we might see mass sexual slavery as the kind of harm that could serve 
as just cause for humanitarian intervention, or one that would permit killing to prevent the 
harm, is an injury to honor. We can think about honor as “virtuous behavior, good moral 
character, integrity, and altruism,”35 a view that is fairly consistent across cultures. In some 
communities, honor has a second meaning that has to do with “status, precedence, and 
reputation,”36 and is “based on a person’s (usually a man’s) strength and power to enforce his 
will on others or to command deferential treatment.”37 So an injury to honor could be to the 
individuals who have been directly harmed, or to the other (i.e. male) members of the 
community, or both. I argue that this is the wrong place to locate the harm, because I do not 
believe that honor is what is necessarily harmed in the act of sexual slavery. I want to find a 
way to locate the harm in the individuals who have been directly harmed, as individuals and 
collectively, and perhaps in their larger social group. But I want the harm to be based on 
injury to well-being, rather than honor, yet I do not want the harm to rely on the subjective 
experience of any of the victims. The wrongness of rape should exist apart from the 
experience of the victim. Instead, I need to be able to locate the wrongness of sexual slavery 
within an objective view of well-being. This means that I argue for a sharp distinction 
                                               
35  Joseph O. Vandello and Dov Cohen, “Male Honor and Female Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts That 
Perpetuate Domestic Violence,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84, no. 5 (2003): 997. 
36  Ibid., 998. 
37  Ibid.; see also Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the 
South (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
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between harm and wrong, as the subjective harm experienced by any individual will not 
generate what is wrong about the act. 
The difference between genocide and the acts that can occur as part of a genocide, 
such as mass killing or sexual slavery38 is another issue that arises in light of the attacks on 
the Yazidi people. I do not want to equate the experience of sexual slavery with death for the 
same reason that I do not want to locate the harm of rape in injury to honor. Sexual slavery 
should not necessarily result in the loss of any reason to keep living. But I want to capture the 
nature and seriousness of the harm, to individuals and their communities, without equating 
sexual slavery with killing. Thus, I argue for a conception of the wrongness of sexual slavery 
that is based on a view of well-being that identifies at least some objective aspects of well-
being, including a right to bodily integrity and freedom of movement. 
I return to the question of how to classify IS as an organization in Chapter Four. Not 
only does this classification ambiguity generate ontological questions, but it affects how we 
think about states and the international community. Most of the answers to the responsibility 
questions hinge on whether IS is classified as a state or a terrorist group. In June 2014, IS 
declared a caliphate, or Islamic State, covering large areas of Syria and Iraq. In this 
declaration, IS  
invokes a specific utopian imagination of the resurrection of the Muslim 
ummah (nation) and the Caliphate (Islamic empire). It rejects the modern nation 
state and the states created during the colonial period and instead calls for a return 
of the Caliphate of the Islamic ummah, which transcends nationalism and race. In 
this context, thousands of Muslim ‘‘Jihadists’’ from around the world have joined 
                                               
38  Various acts of mass sexual violence can constitute genocide, if they are intended to result in the 
destruction of the group, and they involve one or more of the following: “(b) Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group.”  U.N. General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 9 December 1948, art. II. 
 13 
together to take part in establishing a new ‘‘Islamic State’’ with a social, 
territorial, and political agenda.39 
 
IS conceives of this imagined community as “a transition from the prevalent imagination of the 
nation and the nation state to a religious imagination that runs counter to the nationalist 
movements from the colonial and postcolonial periods.”40 Yet despite the fact that the Islamic 
State would be governed by Sharia law, the functions of the caliphate would be the same as a 
modern state: all the “affairs of individuals and the society at large, government administration, 
the rights and duties of citizens, the judicial system, laws of war and peace, and international 
relations.”41 This claim of statehood presents various political problems, since IS has claimed 
territory in Iraq and Syria, as well as problems of attributing responsibility.  
First, there is a question about what the relationship is between IS and the Yazidi 
people. If IS is a terrorist group (or a non-State actor), then the relationship between IS 
fighters and the Yazidi people is likely one of civilians relating to civilians, or some other 
relationship between civilian and non-state institution. However, if IS is a state, as it argues it 
is, then the relationship between IS and the Yazidi people involves different obligations. It 
might be that the Yazidi people are citizens of the Islamic State, in which case the harm of 
sexual slavery is a harm done by IS to its own citizens. Or it might be that the Yazidi people 
are citizens of a different state, and that IS is perpetrating harms on citizens of another state. 
Each of these scenarios would invoke particular obligations on the part of the international 
community or particular states.  
                                               
39  Yosef Jabareen, “The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and the Agenda of Social 
Transformation,” Geoforum 58 (2015): 52. Italics added. 
40  Ibid., 53. 
41  Ibid.; Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 
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It also might be that the Yazidi people are some other category of people living in the 
Islamic State with a status different from that of full citizen. Islamic law suggests that the aim 
of the Muslim world is to bring the entire world to the Islamic faith, and thus the Muslim 
world consists of two parts: the Muslim and the non-Muslim. For IS, the Islamic State is the 
Muslim part of the world, which is known as dar al-islam, or the “domain of Islam,” while the 
rest of the world is dar al-harb, or the “domain of war.” The dar al-Islam refers to 
communities of Muslims, but also has historically included “non-Muslim communities, the 
dhimmis (protected people), whose separate communal laws and leaders were tolerated by the 
Islamic state as long as they did not challenge Muslim sovereignty.”42 The dhimmis (mostly 
Christians and Jews) were permitted to retain their own religions, but they were required to pay a 
poll tax to the Islamic authority.43 The dar-al harb, however, existed in a “state of nature” 
because the dar-al harb “lacked the standard of justice granted to believers under the Islamic 
public order.”44 So the Yazidis could be dhimmis, protected people living under the sovereign 
rule of ISIS. Or they could be part of the dar-al harb, which means IS sees them as outside the 
rule of law governing states, and already in a potential state of war. I argue that IS’s obligations 
to the Yazidi people are at least negative obligations of non-interference with civilians, if IS is a 
terrorist group, which I think is the most plausible classification. But if IS is a state, as IS claims 
itself to be, then IS has positive obligations to protect the Yazidi people, either as citizens or as 
dhimmis.  
                                               
42  Sohail H. Hashmi and James Johnson, “Introduction,” in Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, 
Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 10. 
43  ʻAbd Allāh Aḥmad Naʻīm, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shariʻa (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 31; Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, 163. 
44  Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, 163. 
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The next question about statehood targets the relationship between IS and the rest of 
the world, as individual states, regional institutions, and the global community as a whole. 
This bears on the responsibilities of these other actors in preventing and responding to mass 
atrocities. It does not seem that the rest of the world would classify IS as a state, but rather as 
a terrorist group or a non-state actor. So if IS sees itself as a state, there is likely a conflict 
between the group and the rest of the world as to how IS should be recognized. Recognition of 
IS as a state would invoke the application of international legal norms, including norms 
related to war and human rights, so it may be that there is a benefit to recognizing IS as a 
state. But it is also the case that recognition of IS as a state would violate the sovereignty of 
states in the region, particularly Syria and Iraq. Again, it seems most plausible to view IS as a 
non-state actor, because their claims of territory or legitimacy as a state are invalid.  
The final chapter builds on my conceptions of groups, harm, and political relationships to 
answer moral questions about how to assess responsibility in the case of the Yazidi women and 
girls. In Chapter Five, I consider how we should hold IS morally responsible for the mass sexual 
enslavement of Yazidi women and girls, as a group and with respect to the individual members. I 
argue for a version of collective responsibility that locates a significant amount of agency 
within the group of IS as an entity, not any individual member of the group. But I also locate 
some amount of agency and corresponding moral responsibility within each member of the 
group. The case presented by IS and the Yazidi women and girls is not like most instances of 
sexual violence as spoils or weapons of war.  This is because the sale of the women and girls 
to individual IS fighters separates the actions of the individuals from those of the group in an 
important way. The group norms clearly require the practice of sexual slavery, but the 
ongoing use of the practice is enacted by individuals, not the group. Finally, I locate shared 
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responsibility for the failure to prevent harm (and further harm) to the Yazidi women and girls 
in the Sunni Arabs and the international community.   
The recent (and on-going) case of the Yazidi women and girls presents a serious, real-
world issue that has not been solved, either in theory or in practice. Not only is this particular 
experience an on-going particular problem, it is indicative of the kinds of problems we have 
seen elsewhere, and will likely continue to see around the globe. For this reason, the project 
of breaking down the conceptual frameworks underpinning mass sexual slavery at the hands 
of terrorist groups is an important one. We cannot hope to address the international problems 
of religious fundamentalist terrorism and mass sexual slavery in practice until we can analyze 
and explain the underlying concepts. 
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CHAPTER II – VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
In Chapter One, I identified a practical problem, that of how we should respond to the 
sexual enslavement of Yazidi women and girls by members of IS. In this second chapter, I 
begin to unpack the various philosophical questions related to this problem, beginning with 
how we should understand groups, particularly perpetrator groups and victim groups. My 
analysis of the ontological status of groups is instrumental for answering questions about 
group harm and group responsibility, as well as individual harm and responsibility, 
particularly individuals “on the margins” of groups with respect to their culpability or 
experience. I will address these questions in later chapters. 
In this chapter, I begin with an overview of the literature on the status of groups, 
focusing solely on ontological questions at this stage, rather than questions of rights, harms, 
or responsibility. I explore individualistic, collectivist, and hybrid accounts of the ontological 
status of groups. I go on to defend a hybrid account of groups, which is the best way to think 
about both victims and perpetrators in my case study. I want to be able to identify a group as a 
distinct unit without erasing individuals, and maintain the ability to capture the particular 
experiences and actions of individuals. In the final section of this chapter, I look at how this 
account works with respect to perpetrator groups and victim groups, including individuals we 
might think are on the margins of the groups. I have presumed a particular account of the 
perpetrators and victims involved in the sexual slavery of the Yazidi women and girls, and 
here I try to find the best conceptual scheme for explaining the account. 
2.1 Kinds of Social Groups 
The term “social group” can be used to describe many different entities, from “the 
1993 UNC-Chapel Hill men’s basketball team” to “Buddhists” to “my first cousins.” These 
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three examples involve different kinds of temporal permanence, choice, shared intent, and 
internal group relationships, to name just a few of the divergent aspects of social groups. One 
broad way to distinguish between types of social groups is David Copp’s distinction between 
organizations and aggregates.1 An organization is “formally organized,” while aggregates are 
mere groups of individuals.2 Aggregates can be further subdivided into accidental aggregates, 
involving individuals who happen to be in close proximity to one another, and purposeful 
aggregates, which involve individuals with quite similar or identical purposes.3 
Brian Epstein has recently argued that these kinds of groups are so varied that we 
cannot analyze them all in the same way, so we should not try to classify groups as we have in 
the past.4 I argue that we need to be able to establish certain minimum conditions for all social 
groups. There will, of course, be differences, but I will try to establish that these are due 
largely to the kinds of questions we want to ask about groups, not due to serious and 
irreconcilable ontological differences. This will become clear when my account is applied to 
victim and perpetrator groups in this chapter, and to states and non-state actors in Chapter 4. 
I give an account of the ontological status of groups that is generally applicable, but it 
will not be comprehensive. Rather, I aim to give a plausible, sparse account that can help 
answer questions about IS, the Yazidi women and girls, and members of the global 
community. This case is a representative example of the general problem of intergroup 
violence, so this account can be applied to similar problems that exist elsewhere. I consider 
                                               
1  See David Copp, “What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory,” Dialogue: Canadian 
Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 23, no. 2 (1984). Here, I use Copp’s terminology, 
although others have made the cut differently. See, e.g., Katherine Ritchie, Tracy Isaacs, etc. I use his 
terminology because it is quite broad, and does not anticipate a collective intentionality requirement, or 
other distinctions that might be made between kinds of social groups.   
2  Ibid., 250. 
3  Ibid., 253. 
4  See Brian Epstein, “What Are Social Groups? Their Metaphysics and How to Classify Them,” Synthese  
(2017). 
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more specific questions about perpetrator social groups and victim social groups later in the 
chapter, and about states and non-state actors as groups of individuals, engaged in asymmetric 
conflict, in Chapter 4. 
In the sections that follow, I consider the three main kinds of views about the ontology 
of social groups. Within each of the sets of views I consider, I assess how the views handle 
particular features of groups. I also introduce the most compelling objections to the views. 
Because I go on to defend a hybrid account of group ontology, I focus more space on 
comparing the hybrid views. 
2.2 Collectivism 
The first way we might think about groups, holism or collectivism, is as irreducible to 
the individuals who make up the group. On this account, the status of individual agency more 
or less fades in light of the group entity, because the actions of a group cannot be understood 
as the mere sum of the actions of its individual members. For the collectivist, there are 
emergent properties that appear only at the level of the group and do not apply to any of the 
component parts (individuals). These views of groups attempt to capture the idea that there 
are some collective actions that could not be taken without the participation of multiple 
individuals, working together to achieve an objective. Collectivist views recognize the 
existence of both individuals and groups as material particulars, but they see social groups as 
significantly more important than individuals in terms of explaining our social world.  
Emile Durkheim was an early defender of this type of view. In arguing for the 
existence of social facts, Durkheim claimed that social facts are constituted by “the beliefs, 
tendencies and practices of the group taken collectively,”5 which are distinct from the 
                                               
5  Emile Durkheim and Steven Lukes, The Rules of Sociological Method, trans. W. D. Halls, 2nd ed. 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 23. 
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“thoughts to be found in the consciousness of each individual.”6 Social facts, according to 
Durkheim, “assume a shape, a tangible form peculiar to them and constitute a reality sui 
generis vastly distinct from the individual facts which manifest that reality.”7 Durkheim 
argues that individuals accept the influence of these distinct social forces because they are 
regarded as the “work of the collectivity,” our society and its previous generations.8 For 
Durkheim, a group is also a distinct entity, because it is “a product of shared existence, of 
actions and reactions called into play between the consciousnesses of individuals.”9 The social 
facts that influence groups of individuals who act in concert constitute a “force,” one that “is 
propelling [the individuals] in the same direction.”10 
 Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject theory is a more recent collectivist account of social 
groups.11 Gilbert offers a non-reductionist view of groups, claiming that groups are objects 
that help us provide the best explanations of how the social world functions. For Gilbert, 
social groups are characterized by two features in particular: shared intentions, and a 
commitment of the individual members of a group to the entity of the group as a whole. A 
social group, according to Gilbert, is a plural subject, which she understands to describe the 
phenomenon that occurs “when certain individual people are in specific psychological states, 
that is only when they are jointly committed with certain others in some way.”12 The joint 
                                               
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid., 23-24. 
8  Ibid., 25. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid. 
11  See Margaret Gilbert, “Modelling Collective Belief,” Synthese 73, no. 1 (1987); On Social Facts, 
International Library of Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1989); Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, 
and Obligation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in 
Plural Subject Theory (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); A Theory of Political Obligation: 
Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Joint 
Commitment: How We Make the Social World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
12  Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation, 9. 
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commitments of group members can involve joint actions, intentions, and/or beliefs.13 Doing 
something as a plural subject is “not a matter of ‘all doing it’ but rather a matter of ‘all acting 
in such a way to constitute a body that does it.’”14 It will be important for our purposes later to 
note that on Gilbert’s view, one can be coerced into a joint commitment, but it would not be 
possible to be part of a plural subject without intention.15        
 A final version of collectivism I will touch on is the view promoted by Paul Sheehy. 
He adopts a realist view he calls “interrelational holism” in which he claims that “groups are 
material particulars which, alongside individual persons and artefacts, count as objects in the 
social world, figuring in our explanations and descriptions.”16 Sheehy’s view is more modest 
than Gilbert’s view with respect to what sorts of collective intentions are required to 
constitute a group,17 and his ontological claims are more explicitly focused on defending the 
idea that two material objects of different kinds (i.e. individuals and groups) can occupy the 
same space at the same time.18   
I now consider some important aspects of what it means for a group to have the status 
of a material object, in terms of intention, which includes shared beliefs and actions, group 
identification, and the relationship among group members. I note that there are a wide range 
of collectivist views, and I only analyze each category in broad strokes. 
 
 
                                               
13  See Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World. 
14  Margaret Gilbert, “Obligation and Joint Commitment,” Utilitas 11, no. 2 (1999): 147. 
15  Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory, 6. 
16  Paul Sheehy, The Reality of Social Groups (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 2. The idea 
of a material particular, according to Sheehy, is “of something in space and time, which can be individuated, 
counted and described. Such an entity can remain the very same thing while its properties change through 
time.” Ibid., 4.  
17  See Paul Sheehy, “On Plural Subject Theory,” Journal of Social Philosophy 33, no. 3 (2002). 
18  See Sheehy, The Reality of Social Groups, chapter 4. 
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2.2.A  Intention 
One of the main distinctions we might be inclined to make between a group as a 
material object, and a group as a mere aggregation of individuals, relates to the psychological 
states of the individuals in a group. Gilbert and some other collectivists adopt intentionalist 
views that “individuals must conceive of themselves in some particular way (for example as 
being or forming a group, as sharing certain ends or values), or possess certain shared intentional 
or psychological states” for the individuals to constitute a group.19 According to Gilbert’s plural 
subject theory, “intentions (broadly construed) are logically prior to collectivities.”20  Two 
persons have a “shared intention to [perform an action] if and only if they are jointly committed 
to intending as a body to do A.”21 For Gilbert, an individual might have personal intentions, but 
could only have shared intentions as part of a joint commitment with other individuals.  
If we accept the intentionality requirement, then we can think about two realms of 
joint commitment: the shared beliefs that make up the group’s common knowledge, and the 
joint action or intended action that comes out of the shared beliefs. The idea of joint 
commitment is based on an understanding of the parties to the commitment as parts of a 
unitary whole, rather than as individuals who happen to have the same beliefs and intentions. 
The acting as a unitary whole means “together to constitute, as far as is possible, a single 
body,”22 where the single body is our plural subject. Gilbert understands the members of a 
group to “collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p 
as a body.”23 Joint actions can only occur when the common knowledge of individuals 
                                               
19  Ibid., 4-5. 
20  Gilbert, On Social Facts, 12. 
21  Margaret Gilbert, “What Is It for Us to Intend?,” in Contemporary Action Theory Volume II: Social Action, 
eds. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka and Raimo Tuomela (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 22. 
22  Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, 64. 
23  Margaret Gilbert, “Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups,” Protosociology 16 (2002): 42. 
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includes expressions by each party of “personal readiness to enter a joint commitment to 
endorse a certain goal as a body.”24 So while joint action does not require an explicit 
agreement between joint actors, it does require shared beliefs and shared goals to act as a 
whole, rather than as discrete individuals.  
On Gilbert’s view, individuals who enter a joint commitment gain a special standing in 
relation to the others, such that “[i]f one violates the commitment, the other is in a special 
position to object.” 25  She claims that “a joint commitment grounds mutual claims for 
conformity. In other words, it grounds rights of the parties against each other, rights to 
conformity to the commitment.”26 The language of rights sounds strong, but Gilbert notes that a 
they only exist by virtue of the joint commitment, and are not grounded in morality.27 Thus 
plural subject theory presumes the existence of relationships among group members, and of 
mutual obligations that come about in light of a joint commitment. But it does not presume any 
particular organization of these relationships. 
Collectivists who reject the intentionalist view, such as Sheehy, do not require the 
shared beliefs, intentions, or actions among individuals for the individuals to make up a 
group.  Sheehy argues that “[a]ll that is conceptually necessary and sufficient for the 
formation and maintenance of a group (or to be a member) is that individuals interact in a way 
that unites them as a unit, as a body with its own impact on the world – typically on them as 
members.”28 The value of groups lies in action that can only be explained qua entity, and not 
the individual parts of the entity. He claims that plural subject theory, in particular, “identifies 
a common feature of group membership with a necessary condition for the existence of a 
                                               
24  Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, 33. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid., 34. See also Gilbert, “Obligation and Joint Commitment.” 
27  Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, 35. 
28  Sheehy, The Reality of Social Groups, 5.  
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group,” while he thinks the intentionality question should be separate from questions about 
the existence of a group.29 
Thus the question of the relationship between and among group members is much 
more important for a collectivist who rejects intentionalism. Sheehy’s interrelational holism 
understands the whole of a group not in terms of mutual obligations, but in terms of a more 
specific organization of the “relationship between the constitutive parts” and the relationship 
between those parts and the whole.30 On this view,  
A group is just a more or less complex organisation of individuals through time. 
The existence of a group is contingent on the patterns of interrelations being such 
that the individuals are united into a whole or body, which comes to exert an 
impact on the world – typical amongst which is an impact on the members 
themselves. Ultimately, then, the notion that groups are material objects rests on 
the view that individuals are related or organised in ways that give rise to a body 
with causal powers and properties.31 
 
Sheehy’s view of groups can be distinguished from aggregates based on the structural nature of 
these relationships. Aggregates, according to Sheehy, cannot be identified with groups because 
they do not permit the individual members of a group to change over time,32 but if the 
relationships are part of a pattern or organization, they do not disappear as the individuals 
change. For the non-intentionalist, the existence of the group is determined by the ability of the 
individuals to relate to one another in such as way as to function as a single entity, regardless of 
the intentions, beliefs, or obligations of one member of the group to another. 
A final result of the collectivist view with respect to intention is that it can inform both 
internal and external group identification. We can think about groups in terms of how they are 
identified, both by the individuals who are arguably part of the group (internal identification) 
                                               
29  Sheehy, “On Plural Subject Theory,” 382-83. 
30  Sheehy, The Reality of Social Groups, 99. 
31  Ibid., 100. 
32  Ibid., 22. 
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and those who are outside the group (external identification). Collectivist views about groups 
presume that there is an external, objective status that can be attributed based on particular 
features of groups (although they sometimes disagree about what those features are). So on 
this view, it seems that the external identification of the group could overshadow any lack of 
internal identification.  However, the intentionalist views would make the internal group 
identification a necessary condition for external recognition of the group, since the individual 
members could not accidentally find themselves as participants in a group. As Gilbert notes, 
“individual human beings must see themselves in a particular way to constitute a 
collectivity.”33 Thus, the internal and external identification of a group should correspond, 
under intentionalist views. However, a view that does not require intention on the part of 
individual group members could result in an externally identifiable group which meets the 
requirement of joint action, but where the group’s members do not self-identify with the 
group. 
2.2.B  Objections 
Briefly, since I will consider an opposing set of views in the following section on 
individualism, I note the most compelling objections to collectivism. The first is the purely 
metaphysical problem created by the idea that two material particulars, i.e. groups and 
individual persons, can inhabit the same space at the same time. In other words, identifying 
groups as material particulars means we are double-counting when we are also identifying the 
individual persons who make up the group as material particulars. We might think that this 
just reflects the idea that groups are composed of individuals, but this leads us to ask what 
materially makes the group any different from the aggregate sum of its parts. Practically, if 
                                               
33  Gilbert, On Social Facts, 12. 
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one reason we think about groups is to attribute responsibility, it is not hard to see why this 
metaphysical problem might result in absurd practices of blaming, in which we blame an 
individual twice, in both her individual capacity and her capacity as a member of a group, or 
only as one entity (when she is clearly part of both). 
Another objection to collectivism also becomes apparent when we think about 
practices of attributing responsibility, and that is the idea of holding groups responsible at all. 
Even if we can identify groups as material particulars, we might still think it absurd to 
attribute psychological states or legal liability to a group, rather than to the human individuals 
that constitute that group. Not only is this a challenge, logistically, but we also might think it 
ignores how we conceive of choices made by individuals when they appear to be pursuing a 
joint action with other individuals. It matters whether the choices of individuals are seen as 
the separate choices of individuals or the aggregated choices of the group. An account of 
groups, by my lights, should not force us to ignore the choices and intentions of the 
individuals who make up a group by conceiving of them as a single, unified choice.  
2.3 Individualism 
The second way we might think about groups is in terms of its individual parts. If there 
is nothing (or little) more to a group than the individuals that make up the group, then we can 
reduce the concept of the group to those individuals with no remainder. In other words, there 
is nothing left of the group to refer to as a material particular, outside of the individuals 
themselves. We could also adopt a more moderate view, that whether or not there is a 
remainder (materially or practically), the individual persons are what is important about the 
group. I will refer to this set of views as individualist accounts of groups. For an individualist, 
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it is individuals who determine social facts, rather than groups. As with the collectivist views, 
there are a wide range of individualist views, and I will only examine a few proponents. 
John Stuart Mill provides an early explanation of an individualist view of society. He 
describes society as “nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of human being united 
together in the social state.”34 Thus, he denies that the social world is anything over and above 
the individuals who constitute the parts of the social world. Mill claims that individuals “are 
not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance,” but that they remain 
individuals.35 For Mill, all of the properties of a group of individuals can be explained in 
terms of the individuals that make up the group. 
J.W.N. Watkins expands on Mill to defend what he calls “methodological 
individualism,”36 a view that entails the idea that people determine social facts. He argues that 
“large-scale social phenomena must be accounted for by the situations, dispositions, and 
beliefs of individuals.”37  Social facts “should be explained by being deduced from (a) 
principles governing the behavior of participating individuals and (b) descriptions of their 
situations.”38 Watkins rejects the idea that we should be concerned with social groups because 
“social ‘things’ like laws, prices, prime ministers and ration-books, are created by personal 
attitudes.”39 He compares the human social group to a half of a bifurcated bee hive, which he 
                                               
34  John Stuart Mill, “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences (Book VI),” in A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and 
Inductive, Part II (Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 879. 
35  Ibid. 
36  On at least one understanding, “methodological individualism” is not a metaphysical view. Watkins, 
among others, adopted this view from the perspective of the philosophy of science rather than metaphysics. 
While Watkins claims that he is taking a metaphysical position, it also seems that he is taking a 
methodological position, that this is the best way of accounting for the world as it exists, which does not 
necessarily entail a grand metaphysical position.  
37  J. W. N. Watkins, “Methodological Individualism: A Reply,” Philosophy of Science 22, no. 1 (1955): 58. 
Italics in original. 
38  J. W. N. Watkins, “Ideal Types and Historical Explanation,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, eds. 
Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), 729. 
39  Ibid. 
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claims is an “organism in the sense that its components’ behavior is determined by 
teleological principles which apply to the whole half-hive and which cannot be derived from a 
knowledge of individual bees. 40  Social groups of humans, on the other hand, are not 
organisms, because they can be “reduced” to the individuals that comprise them, and social 
phenomena to the individual attitudes that comprise them. Methodological individualism, for 
Watkins, supports the idea that social groups are not organisms, but consist of “people who 
behave fairly intelligibly and who influence each other, directly and mediately, in fairly 
comprehensible ways.”41  
Keith Sawyer offers a non-reductive view of individualism that focuses on 
supervenience, embracing “ontological individualism” instead of methodological 
individualism.  For Sawyer, individuals exist, while groups do not. He claims that 
“sociological objects and properties are nothing but combinations of the individual 
participants and their properties.”42  Sawyer’s ontological claims rely on the concept of 
supervenience, the idea that there is an “ontological relationship of dependence between 
properties”43 where higher-level properties supervene on lower-level properties. With respect 
to individuals and groups, supervenience involves the claim that any properties of groups, 
such as beliefs or actions, depend on the corresponding properties of the individuals that 
constitute the groups. Sawyer notes that “if a collection of individual properties with a given set 
of relations causes a certain social property to obtain on one occasion, then that same collection 
of individual properties in that same set of relations on another occasion will cause the same 
                                               
40  Ibid., 731. 
41  Ibid., 732. 
42  R. Keith Sawyer, “Nonreductive Individualism: Part I—Supervenience and Wild Disjunction,” Philosophy 
of the Social Sciences 32, no. 4 (2002): 537. 
43  Mark W. Risjord, Philosophy of Social Science: A Contemporary Introduction, (New York: Routledge, 
2014), 127. 
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social property to obtain.”44 The beliefs and actions of groups cannot change without changing 
at the level of individual beliefs and actions. Sawyer argues that while the individual-level 
properties that manifest in a group can be reducible to the properties of individuals, there may 
also be social properties present in the actions of groups of people that cannot reduce to 
individual-level properties. 45  Sawyer’s view can be distinguished from methodological 
individualism because he accepts that social properties may not be reducible to individual 
properties.46 He gives the example of “competitive team sport” as a natural kind term that 
cannot easily be reducible to natural kind terms of individuals,47 but if methodological 
individualism is true, then there must be a “coextensive set of individual natural kind 
predicates”48 for this sociological natural kind term. 
I turn to some important aspects of individualism in terms of group identification, 
which involves accounting for the relationships among group members and collective action. 
Again, I note that there is a wide range of individualist views, and I cannot account for each 
view here. 
2.3.A  Group Identification 
I noted in the previous section that one important distinction we could make between 
viewing a group as an aggregation of individuals and as a material object involves the mental 
states of the individuals. I suggested that shared mental states may involve shared goals or 
simply a shared and organized activity. In this section, we have seen that an individualist 
account of groups may or may not recognize the group as a distinct object at all. If the group 
members share beliefs, intentions, and actions, then on an individualist account, these will 
                                               
44  Sawyer, 543. 
45  See ibid. 
46  Ibid., 547. 
47  Ibid., 549. 
48  Ibid., 551. 
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replicate at the level of the group. But this does not guarantee that the individuals will (a) 
participate in collective action, (b) have particular kinds of relationships with one another, or 
(c) self-identify with a group. I focus in this sub-section on whether and how we can identify 
a group under an individualist model. 
For the individualist, there is no necessary relationship among individuals who are in 
one and the same group.49 A collective of individuals do not need to have responsibilities 
toward one another or any interest in one another whatsoever, nor would the presence of these 
features be helpful in explaining group activities, as a whole. If the idea of a group can be 
explained in terms of the individuals that constitute the group, then there is no need to explain 
the social group as a unified entity. Thus if each member of a family maintained the same 
associative obligations toward one another, then those obligations could be helpful in 
explaining the family as a single entity, but only insofar as the associative obligation was a 
motivating factor for each individual member of the family in acting as part of the collective. 
It would not be useful in explaining a larger social dynamic between and among family 
members. 
Similarly, the combination of the actions of individuals can be seen as nothing more 
than the additive effect of each individual’s contribution to a cause, rather than as a collective 
action. Even if we identified the aggregation of a group of individual actions with the unified 
moniker of a group, the individualist could say that the moniker merely serves as a convenient 
way of talking about the individual actions all at once. The individualist would still be able to 
either reduce the group action to the actions of each individual, or at least explain the group 
action in terms of the action and beliefs of each individual. 
                                               
49  Paul Sheehy identifies a group of views he calls “interrelational individualism,” but I would instead 
classify these views as hybrid views, and thus I address them in the next section. See Sheehy, The Reality 
of Social Groups. 
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Identification of a group can then be most easily accomplished through the internal, 
self-identification of the individuals in the collective unit with the group. The efficacy of this 
tactic relies, however, on the interest of the individual members in self-identifying with a 
group, rather than identifying as individuals who share in their beliefs and actions with other 
individuals. Should this not be the case, such that the individuals prefer not to self-identify 
with the group, a group can still be identified externally based on the same criteria of shared 
beliefs, attitudes, and actions. Again, if the individuals do not self-identify with the group, any 
group moniker will only be useful insofar as it is convenient.   
2.3.B  Objections 
Individualist views appear to suffer from their inability to acknowledge the potential 
significance of social structures and influences, in addition to the concept of collective action 
altogether. It seems that there are certain phenomena that cannot not be explained solely in 
terms of the beliefs and actions of individuals, or at least certain actions that cannot be 
accomplished solely by the discrete actions of individuals. An individual is necessarily 
limited, at least to some extent, by her physical location and her location in time. She may be 
able to direct others to act or use technology to perform certain tasks without her physical 
presence, but she will still be limited in her ability to perform large, complicated feats. There 
are social events and phenomena that appear impossible to explain without accounting for the 
joint efforts of many individuals, whether intentional or unintentional, whether coordinated or 
uncoordinated. A football match, the performance of a symphony, and the civil rights 
movement all seem impossible to explain as the mere aggregation of the efforts of individuals, 
because they involve coordination and results that go beyond the additive effect of the 
individual efforts. This objection makes Sawyer’s non-reductive version of individualism look 
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more compelling than the others, yet it still leaves us without all the resources we might want 
in order to describe such joint or collective phenomena. In the next section, I will explore 
some views that are less limiting in terms of explanatory resources. 
2.4 Hybridism 
I now turn to what we might think of as hybrid views that recognize the subjecthood of 
both social groups and the individuals that constitute the members of the groups. Many, 
including Sheehy, do not recognize the existence of hybrid views on group ontology, and they 
classify these views somewhere on the spectrum of either individualism or holism.50 The third 
category of hybridism is important, I argue, because it will allow for shared responsibility 
between individuals and groups of which the individuals are a part, instead of demanding the 
ontological priority of one entity over another.   
David Copp’s hybrid view is one that some categorize as individualistic,51 but is better 
seen as one that takes advantage of both individualist and collectivist features, because he 
sees both collectives and individuals as entities which can be agents. For Copp, a group is in 
some sense just the aggregate of the individuals that make up the group. Yet this is not 
sufficient, on his view, because it doesn’t capture the fact that collectives change membership 
while they persist over time.52 Thus, in order to capture the different time-slices of a group, he 
proposes that a group should be regarded as “a complex of its stages,” where a stage is the 
aggregate of the individuals who are members of a group at a given time. 53 An aggregate is a 
group when it “exhibits an appropriate kind and degree of historical continuity in purpose 
                                               
50  See Sheehy, The Reality of Social Groups. 
51  Sheehy, for instance, refers to Copp’s view as a “weak ontological individualist” view. Ibid., 21. 
52  Copp, “What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory,” 252. 
53  Ibid., 253. 
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and/or membership.”54 Thus Copp’s hybrid view focuses on groups as the sum of individuals 
persons, but it has two benefits that are not present in most individualist accounts. First, he 
can account for changes in group membership over time or by choice, which is a challenge for 
a traditional individualist view that does not recognize the ontological status of a group. 
Second, Copp’s account requires a level of shared purpose for an aggregate of persons to 
constitute a group, a feature that is also lacking in most individualist views. 
Like Copp, Christian List and Philip Pettit view both individuals and certain groups as 
capable of exerting agency, although their account is more in line with the collectivist 
tradition and its concept of emergent properties. For List and Pettit, groups are distinguished 
from “mere collections” of individuals in terms of their agency.55 A group agent must satisfy 
three criteria. First, the group agent must have “representational states that depict how things 
are in the environment.”56 Second, the group agent must have “motivational states that specify 
how it requires things to be in the environment.”57 Finally, the group agent must have “the 
capacity to process its representational and motivational states,” so that it can intervene in the 
environment.58 According to List and Pettit, a group’s attitudes are generated directly out of 
the individual attitudes of those who make up the group. However, they argue that the 
aggregation of individual preferences cannot produce appropriate group decisions, thus there 
has to be an identifiable group agent that “makes” decisions for the group, which they refer to 
as “holistic supervenience.”59 While this group agent is a “real agent,” List and Pettit still 
                                               
54  Ibid., 254. 
55  Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 32. 
56  Ibid., 20. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid., 59. 
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claim to adopt a version of methodological individualism that denies the existence of any 
psychological forces exerted on or on behalf of the group agent.60 
Larry May’s view of groups has been categorized by some as individualist, despite his 
explicit adoption of a “middle position.”61 He describes his view of groups as “individuals-in-
relationships,” where individuals are the focus in terms of intention and action, but we must 
look to the group structure in order to explain the relationship between the individuals.62 He 
argues that the group structure is “often best seen as a relational property, not a property 
inhering in the individuals themselves,”63 thus his view requires an analysis of both individual 
and collective features of a social group. May seeks to explain groups in terms of the 
manifestation of relationships between group members, and is focused on the actual collective 
action that manifests rather than the formal, institutional structure of the group.64  He argues 
that “when a collection of persons displays either the capacity for joint action or common 
interest, then that collection of persons should be regarded as a group.”65 Thus he sees 
putative groups like mobs or bystanders to an event as constituting groups when they have the 
capacity for joint action or common interest. This capacity, or set of relationships, is located 
in the structure of the group rather than in the individuals, but this does not make the group 
exist independently of the individuals.66  
                                               
60  Ibid., 4. 
61  Larry May, The Morality of Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 24-30. 
62  Larry May, “Group Ontology and Legal Strategy: A Reply to Tam,” Business and Professional Ethics 
Journal 8, no. 1 (1989): 83. 
63  Ibid. 
64  May, The Morality of Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights, 25-
26. 
65  Ibid., 29-30. 
66  Ibid., 23. 
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Raimo Tuomela initially identified as an individualist, but in recent years he has 
argued that 
neither individualism nor collectivism is capable of expressing the whole truth, 
so to speak: both individualist (I-mode) and collectivistic (especially, we-
mode) concepts and mental states are needed to explain, for example, social 
action and social institutions. Hence individualism needs to be supplemented 
by irreducible we-mode states and attitudes in order to fulfill the social 
scientific task of describing and explaining the social world as accurately and 
defensibly as possible.67 
 
Tuomela’s view distinguishes between the “I-mode” and the “we-mode” in terms of ways we 
can think about how individuals act within groups. The we-mode approach is based on the 
idea that “the primary acting agent in central group contexts is the group viewed as an 
intentional agent, while the individual members of the group are the primary ontological 
agents acting as representatives for the group.”68 As in the collectivist views, the individuals 
in the group are socially constructed by the group.69 The we-mode is distinguished from the I-
mode based on the reasons an individual has for acting. Tuomela says that “[a]ll intentions are 
necessarily related to one’s own actions,”70 but those actions can be more or less part of a 
joint action on behalf of a group. In the we-mode, the group is promoting the interests of the 
group, and the joint actions of the group are performed with the intention of acting in 
furtherance of the group’s interest. The I-mode, on the other hand, involves individuals acting 
for their own private reasons. An individual can still be part of a group, and still be acting in 
accordance with the group’s interest, but the individual’s intention is to further her own 
                                               
67  Raimo Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 4-5. 
68  Ibid., 2. Frank Hindriks challenges this view on the basis that groups cannot have intrinsic intentionality. 
See Frank Hindriks, review of Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, by Raimo 
Tuomela, Economics and Philosophy 31, no. 2 (2015). 
69  Tuomela, Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, 2. 
70  Raimo Tuomela, “Joint Intention, We‐Mode and I‐Mode,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2006): 
36. 
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interest rather than the group as a collective. As Tuomela admits, “in real life one often acts 
both for group reasons and private reasons when performing an action. In such cases the 
central problem is whether the group reason is effective enough to make the agent satisfy the 
conditions for acting as a group member.”71 
 Due to the variety of hybrid views, there are a wide range of objections we might 
consider. And as I noted earlier, many disagree with the concept of a category of hybrid views 
at all, and would instead categorize these views as either individualist or collectivist, but 
perhaps with the objection that the views are inconsistent. As for the specific features of each 
hybrid view, they are subject to some of the same criticisms that befall their counterparts. 
I adopt a hybrid view of the ontological status of groups, which I further explore in the 
next section, for two main reasons. First, I defend a hybrid account because many social 
groups do not function in ways that we could plausibly interpret as purely “individualistic” or 
purely “collectivist.” I agree with Tuomela, that neither individualism nor collectivism is 
capable of giving us all of the resources that we need to talk about individuals and groups, and 
that the hybrid views are better suited to this task. Not only is it useful to have both 
individualist and collectivist resources, it is in fact necessary in order to accurately capture the 
features of collective action. This is especially true given that I want to be able to apply the 
framework to cases in the real world, and the hybrid views mesh best with the particular 
account I am trying to explain. Thus, the upshot of these sorts of views is necessary for what I 
want to argue later in this dissertation, which is that responsibility for collective wrongs 
should be shared between groups and individuals.  
                                               
71  Ibid., 52. 
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 I also find Tuomela’s view to provide the richest resources of the hybrid views I have 
examined. Where most of the hybrid views seek to find a balance between collectivism and 
individualism, Tuomela attempts to employ both. The I-mode and we-mode distinction allows 
us to capture a lot of what we think is intuitive about groups, as well as address some of the 
harder issues that will come up when we apply the theory to actual groups and individuals. It 
is to these questions that I turn in the next two sections. 
2.5 Hybridism and Nonvoluntary Group Membership 
Two features of Tuomela’s view are most compelling. First, the we-mode view is more 
robust than many of the other hybrid views permit, acknowledging the significant impact of 
the social influence and explanatory power of group dynamics. Most of the hybrid views lean 
toward individualism, focusing on the intentions of the individuals but acknowledging the 
impact of relationships and social dynamics between individuals. Tuomela, along with List 
and Pettit, considers collectives to be capable of having their own distinct sets of intentions. 
The intention of the individuals involved in we-mode is more like the intention of the 
collectivist views, where a collective intention is usually required for collective action. 
Tuomela departs from List and Pettit where individuals remain the primary ontological 
agents, and this leaves open the possibility of holding individuals responsible for their actions, 
regardless of the collective nature of their joint actions. It seems fairly straightforward that a 
hybrid view like this one can account for both the individuals and a collective when the 
individual members of the group have clearly and intentionally chosen to be part of the group 
and part of the group’s collective action.  
The more challenging problem is how even hybrid views can account for less 
enthusiastic participants, yet I see Tuomela’s view as containing a second crucial feature that 
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addresses this problem. The I-mode provides resources to understand an individual who is, in 
some sense, part of a group or collective, and perhaps even a participant in what would be 
described as a joint action of the other members of the group, but we wouldn’t quite want to 
call the individual a joint actor herself. This would apply to cases where a group “member” is 
a nonvoluntary or involuntary participant in the group. Tuomela’s we-mode, then, provides 
sharp (or fuzzy, as the case may be) relief to distinguish the group’s intentions from the 
individual’s intentions. I-mode is also crucial for understanding that even individuals who are 
fully group members sometimes make decisions for both personal and group-based reasons. 
While the other hybrid views may be able to explain these sorts of participants, they cannot 
make the same clear distinctions between the participants and the group itself.   
2.6 IS Perpetrators and Victims 
In this final section, I apply a hybrid view like Tuomela’s to the case of IS and the 
Yazidi women, considering what it means to be a group that is perpetrating violence on 
another group, as well as what it means to be a victim group. Recall that in Chapter One I 
presented the case of the Yazidi women and girls who have been sold and held as sex slaves 
by IS fighters in Iraq and Syria, and I introduced some of the specific challenges that we face 
in trying to understand both the victims and the perpetrators as members of groups. If we 
assume the descriptive account I gave in Chapter One, the next step is to determine the best 
way to understand groups and individuals in light of the experience of the Yazidis and IS 
fighters. Description, I contend, informs our philosophical concepts here, and my adoption of 
Tuomela’s hybrid view of groups will now function to help us understand the description. The 
hybrid model makes the most sense out of the description I have already drawn on, and since 
have assumed this to be an indicative experience, I now use Tuomela’s hybrid view to help 
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explain the social meaning of the group status attributed to the IS fighters and the Yazidi 
women and girls. 
2.6.A  Perpetrators 
A perpetrator group like IS begins with a shared ideology and shared interests, and likely 
personal relationships between members of the initial group members.72 IS is a group that 
purports to act in accordance with one ideology and as part of what the organization claims to 
be its religious duty of jihad.  Members gradually join the group for a variety of reasons. Those 
who join for ideological or goal-based reasons will quickly become full-fledged agents of the 
group as they build individual relationships with the other group members. Individuals who 
become members of IS through coercion or force will likely build relationships first in order to 
survive, since they may be threatened with death or torture if they fail to support the cause of the 
group, but may become committed to the group beliefs due to time, proximity, and personal 
relationships. Each member of the group retains some level of autonomy, but this will vary with 
respect to the position within the group hierarchy.  
The we-mode can straightforwardly account for the status of IS as a group that is 
consistently engaged in joint action. For some if not most of the members of IS, there is a shared 
goal of spreading Islam through acts of violence that further the aim of the establishment of an 
Islamic caliphate. For those who share this ultimate goal, the concept of collective action can 
explain how the individuals carry out different tasks that contribute to instances of joint action. 
Whatever other reasons the individuals might have, their shared intention of furthering the aims 
of the group are what make their action joint, and what make an external assessment of IS as 
                                               
72  There are certainly other ways that a perpetrator group could form, such as when the individual participants 
have the shared goal of obtaining something of value. However, because my own aim is to answer 
questions about IS and other terrorist groups, I limit my analysis to groups with a shared ideology, or at 
least a shared purported ideology. 
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both a group and a group agent possible. The we-mode can also account for what might happen 
if a former group member defected, or if a captured individual did not indicate a willingness to 
be a part of the group at any time, and the “remaining” group members engaged in violence 
against the individual. The we-mode would likely consider the group to be engaged in joint 
action against someone who was not part of the group, and thus the we-mode would not be 
complicated by the violence. 
The I-mode can help us understand at least two more complicated situations. The first is 
the IS member who is committed to the goal of the Islamic caliphate, but may not agree with all 
of the terroristic tactics that the group pursues as joint action. For instance, consider an IS 
member who intends to participate as a joint actor in all group acts of violence that are 
perpetrated against Westerners or against persons who must be conquered in order to obtain 
control over territory.  However, this IS member does not share in the group’s interpretation of 
the Quran with respect to the treatment of women, and he does not share an intention with the 
other members of the group to perpetrate acts of sexual violence on women and girls. Thus, 
whether or not he participates in these acts, the fact that he does not share an intention with 
respect to acts of sexual violence may place him outside of the we-mode analysis for purposes of 
these situations. When an individual’s intention does not closely approximate the group’s 
intention or ideology, it should be considered within the I-mode. This doesn’t mean he should 
avoid responsibility for any direct or indirect support of these actions (an issue I will address in 
later chapters), but it does mean we might consider him to be an individual actor instead of part 
of the group agent, perhaps with respect to actions like preparing food for IS fighters, or 
providing transportation assistance.  
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Similarly, the I-mode can help us think about the agency of a nonvoluntary or involuntary 
member of IS, such as someone who has been coerced into joining IS, or who has been captured, 
forced to convert, and forced to join the group. At some point, the relationships between the 
individuals who constitute the group may change, and the nonvoluntary or involuntary group 
member may turn into a voluntary group member through the development of group-based 
intentions. Prior to this happening, a nonvoluntary or involuntary IS member could already be 
participating in the collective action of the group, yet it would be in the capacity of an individual 
rather than as a joint actor. A group member who does not share the group intention could be 
participating in the same actions as other group members, yet for personal reasons like self-
preservation or preservation of one’s family. In practice, it will be hard to distinguish between 
group and individual intentions, but assuming we know an individual’s mental states, we can 
distinguish between a full group devotee and one with either reservations or personal interests. 
We need to be able to capture these individuals as part of the collective, and participants in the 
joint scheme (rather than clear defectors/non-group members), but we must also be able to 
distinguish their intentions and actions from those of the group agent. I-mode allows us to 
consider these marginal IS group members. 
2.6.B  Victims 
Most of the foregoing discussion is related to joint action and joint intention, neither of 
which are likely to be relevant when we are thinking about a victim group. Instead, an 
analysis of a victim group is more focused on wrongs perpetrated against the individual 
victims, and the corresponding victim group, and requires us to find something about the 
victims that plays a causal role in the actions of the perpetrators. The group identity of victim 
groups (race, gender, religion, etc., or some combination) usually exists prior to the group 
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becoming a victim group, thus victims are not making a choice to be part of a targeted group. 
The Yazidi women and girls have been targeted by IS based on their ethnic/religious identity 
and their sex. The main issue, then, is how to understand what it means to be a member of a 
group being harmed as part of a campaign of mass violence. 
Tuomela’s view is about looking at individuals who are part of a group with group 
intentionality, while a victim group does not constitute itself through the intentions of its 
members. Yet the distinction between I-mode and we-mode also provides significant 
resources when we try to think about what it means to be an individual who is part of a victim 
group. With victims, the general framework can be used in a broader set of circumstances, to 
provide reasons for the actions of individuals in one group, and then using that evaluation to 
define a second group. Thus we use the I-mode and we-mode to analyze the actions of 
individual and group perpetrators to explain the group-level phenomenon of perpetrating 
harms on a second group. In the case of IS and the Yazidis, there are various opportunities for 
perpetrating harm, and individuals may act as individuals, or as group members, or both, 
depending on the specific action taken. It is the participation of individuals in the group 
scheme that defines the victim group, and this is less concerned with the intention behind any 
one action taken by an individual group member. The I-mode also allows us to focus on the 
individuals who are harmed by a perpetrator group, as they have been wronged in their 
capacity as individuals. There may also be harms that are done to the victim group, especially 
if the victim group already shares some other group identity, such as the Yazidi women and 
girls who shared an ethnic and religious identity prior to their victimization.  
We might even say that the harms experienced by the victim group, as a group, cannot 
be reduced to the individual harms experienced by the individuals without a remainder. But 
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the direction of our focus should not begin at the group level. Some part of the individuals’ 
experiences as part of the victim group will be shared or similar, such as the specific harms 
perpetrated. Yet other parts of Yazidi victim experiences will be unique, given their individual 
circumstances of enslavement and their phenomenological experiences of the sexual violence. 
The individuals who are harmed are harmed by the wrong actions of individuals, despite the 
fact that their status as victims is largely determined by the perpetrator group’s intention. The 
point of talking about group harms cannot be to make the individual group members invisible, 
and thus we cannot think about group harm solely in terms of its aggregative effect. Thus the 
I-mode and we-mode provides the resources to consider both sites of the harms to the Yazidi 
women and girls. The I-mode also allows us to account for individuals who do not see 
themselves as part of a victim group, or individuals who don’t see themselves as individual 
victims, although they acknowledge their status as a member of a victim group, or as a 
member of a group that existed prior to victimization.   
 
This chapter aimed at establishing a framework for how we should think about 
individuals and groups. I explored the main collectivist, individualist, and hybrid views of the 
status of groups and their members, considering how the views differ with respect to 
relationality, identification, and intention. I argued that we should adopt a hybrid view because it 
provides more resources than the other two sets of views. I found Tuomela’s I-mode and we-
mode concepts to be particularly useful for understanding perpetrator groups and victim groups. 
In the next chapter, I will take up the issues of mass sexual violence introduced in the last 
section, and I will explore the concepts of wrong and harm more fully with respect to 
perpetrators, victims, and sexual slavery. 
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CHAPTER III – THE HARM OF SEXUAL SLAVERY 
 
Thus far I have presented the problem of sexual enslavement of Yazidi women and 
girls by members of IS, and defended a hybrid account of groups that allows us to recognize 
both the social and individual aspects of perpetrator and victim groups. In this chapter, I 
analyze sexual slavery as a harm and as a wrong, relying on the metaphysical analysis of the 
previous chapter to understand the phenomenon. This is a crucial step in understanding why 
we should care about preventing, interrupting, and punishing mass sexual enslavement, and 
how we should go about addressing the problem with respect to victims and perpetrators, as 
groups and as individuals.   
I begin with an introduction to sexual violence in war, using Hugo Grotius to explore 
our intuition that this practice is unacceptable and warrants intervention. While he provides a 
novel and compelling account of justified military intervention for his time, Grotius holds an 
antiquated view of women, so I go on to construct a more plausible account of what could 
underpin these intuitions. I distinguish between harm and wrongdoing before giving an 
account of harm that acknowledges both subjective and objective interests. I then apply this 
account to the sexual slavery of individuals and groups. Finally, I distinguish the particular 
adverse consequences of sexual slavery from the wrong of perpetrating sexual slavery, and I 
claim that the wrongfulness of the action should be seen objectively, regardless of the 
subjective experience of the victims. Throughout, I use the illustrative case of the Yazidi 
women and girls to motivate and develop my account, though it is of wider applicability, 
including by exploring the way that IS has attempted to use Islam to justify their actions as 
not-wrongful, and some of the ways religion and society can play a role in the harm of sexual 
slavery.    
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3.1 Preventing Sexual Violence in War 
Sexual violence is manifested as both a symptom of war and a tool of war.1 Although 
the customs of war officially prohibited rape, historically the prohibition was rarely enforced. 
Rape has been used by men on the conquering side of a battle as a “means of expressing the 
totality of victory.”2 It has been used as an expression of power and ownership over the 
defeated side. When the defeated side gains power, rape is then used to retaliate against the 
former victors.3  
The ignorance or tolerance of rape by military commanders has been explained by the 
belief that sexual violence before a battle increased their soldiers' aggression and desire to 
win, while rape after a battle was a well-deserved reward, a chance to release tensions and 
relax.4 Particularly during World War II, women were forced into military brothels of sorts, 
such as the sex camps created by the Japanese of Koreans held as “comfort women.”5 These 
comfort women and other military brothels were used to keep troop morale high, a goal of 
individual men and also of commanders seeking military victory. Rape has also been used as a 
tool of genocide to systematically destroy a population.  As noted in the Introduction, acts of 
rape can constitute genocide when they are intended to result in the destruction of a group and 
involve one or more of the following: “(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
                                               
1  Laurel Fletcher, Allyn Taylor, and Joan Fitzpatrick, “Human Rights Violations against Women,” Whittier Law 
Review 15 (1994): 320. 
2  Tamara L. Tompkins, “Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeakable,” Notre Dame Law 
Review 70 (1994): 859. 
3  Ibid., 862. 
4  Kelly D. Askin, “Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: 
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 21 (2003): 296. 
5  Tompkins,  “Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime,” 864. 
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its physical destruction in whole or in part;(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group.”6 
While widespread sexual violence in conflict zones is not a new phenomenon, the 
attitude toward such atrocities is changing to recognize the gravity of the situations. It may 
seem impractical to look back to the seventeenth century for guidance as to whether mass 
sexual violence could constitute a just cause for war. But Grotius is a good place to start when 
we try to examine the theoretical underpinnings of mass sexual violence and war. His general 
position is appealing and still undergirds many debates about self-defense and just war today.  
3.1.A Grotius and Identifying Harm7 
 
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo Grotius maintains that death and injury-to-chastity8 
are the two threatened harms to individuals that give one a right to kill. He says that “no 
private person is permitted to kill another, except in defence of that which, if once lost, is 
irreparable, as Life and Chastity.”9  Grotius does not give us an account of what he means, 
specifically, by the term chastity. As the Latin origin means morally pure, it should best be 
understood as the state of refraining from morally impure acts of sex, or extramarital acts of 
sex. I read him to include protection of all women, both virgins and married women, from 
rape, as he uses the terms “Virgin-Chastity” and “conjugal Fidelity” to refer to the two aspects 
of chastity worthy of protecting. Therefore, I interpret “injury to chastity” to imply sexual acts 
that are not voluntary on the part of a woman, her marital status notwithstanding. 
                                               
6  U.N. General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 
1948, art. II. 
7  Grotius does not make a distinction between harm and wrong. I will, in Section 3.2.  
8  I see this “injury-to-chastity” to correspond with sexual violence, as I assume that Grotius was not referring to 
instances in which a woman chose to “damage” her chastity of her own accord as instances in which she would 
be entitled to kill in self-defense. But I will use his terminology instead of utilizing the terms “sexual violence” 
or “rape.” 
9  Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis [The Rights of War and Peace] (1625), trans. Richard Tuck, 
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2005), 413. 
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Grotius does not give an explanation of why death constitutes a harm that is serious 
enough to justify killing the person threatening the harm, although he appears to be focused 
on proportionality, only risking the same harm in the defense as in the threat. I will pursue a 
more robust justification. Natural law, for Grotius, permits killing to prevent a threatened 
injury, even when killing would be disproportionate, because he sees certain injuries as akin 
to death. He says there are “some Things which we prize equally with our Lives; as 
Reputation, Virgin-Chastity, conjugal Fidelity.” 10  Grotius does not permit defense of 
reputation11 via killing,12  but he does permit killing in defense of chastity. It seems that 
Grotius presents life and chastity as uniquely worthy of protecting because, as he quotes 
Maimonides, they are of a species of harms “which, if once lost, is irreparable.”13 It will be 
important, then, to determine who suffers the irreparable harm in the event of rape. 
There are at least two options for considering what Grotius sees as the harm of injury-
to-chastity that could justify killing. First, he might see the injury-to-chastity as injury to the 
honor or property of men. Grotius claims that husbands have a right over their wives, arising 
from consent, by virtue of their marriage.14  He says that “because of the Difference of Sex, 
the Authority is not equal; the Husband is the Head of the Wife in all conjugal and family 
                                               
10  Ibid., 885. 
11  Recall from the Introduction that there are two ways to think about honor or reputation: either as something 
inherent in an individual that is tied to character, virtue, and integrity, or as something that is tied to status and 
reputation. The latter definition, with its focus on reputation, is tied to an individual’s ability to command a 
certain kind of treatment from others. See Joseph O. Vandello and Dov Cohen, “Male Honor and Female 
Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts That Perpetuate Domestic Violence,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 84, no. 5 (2003): 998; see also Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The 
Psychology of Violence in the South (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
12  See De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 193: “There are those who assert, that a Man may lawfully kill such Persons 
too; but this is not only extreme false, but highly repugnant to the Laws of Nature; for such an Action is no 
proper Means of preserving one’s Character.” 
13  Ibid., 407. 
14  Ibid., 413. 
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Affairs.”15 So we might think that injury-to-chastity causes harm to the property of a man – 
except it is unclear if the marriage makes the woman the property of her husband. Grotius also 
says that the religious laws “not only give[] the Husband Power over the Wife’s Body, which 
in the State of Nature also was allowed him . . . but also grants the Wife reciprocally a Power 
over the Husband’s Body.” Perhaps the harm could also be located in the reputation of the 
husband, especially if it damaged his ability to command the deferential treatment of others.  
But as already noted, harm to reputation does not justify killing. 
However, a more plausible interpretation is this:  Grotius sees the injury-to-chastity as 
a direct bodily injury to the female victim of such an act, and as an injury to the property of 
the men.  Grotius refers to Heliodorus’s record of a woman who vindicated her own chastity, 
which is called a “just Defence of her injured Honour.”16  This appears to be an indication that 
Grotius sees the injury as located in a woman rather than the man, even if the injury is to her 
honor rather than her body. However, we know that injury to honor or reputation, for Grotius, 
is not sufficient to justify killing. Therefore, he could see the physical injury to a woman as 
sufficient to justify killing a would-be aggressor, or he could see the two sites of injury as 
jointly sufficient to justify killing a would-be aggressor, or it may be overdetermined.   
Given the above quote about reciprocal power over marital bodies, the harm of injury-
to-chastity could constitute property damage to the husband, but only if a loss to the husband 
constitutes a loss of some kind to the wife.  It seems that Grotius seems much more willing to 
draw parallels between death and bodily harm than death and loss of property. Yet it remains 
unclear whether Grotius locates the harm of injury-to-chastity in a woman’s body, as her 
body, or in the injury to a woman’s body as the property of a husband, or both. 
                                               
15  Ibid., 513. 
16  Ibid., 514. 
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A final note about Grotius and his account of defending chastity on a large scale: he 
does not clearly condemn the practice of rape during war. He says: 
The Ravishing of Women is sometimes permitted in War, and sometimes not. 
They that permit it, respect only the Injury done to the Body of an Enemy, 
which by the Law of Arms they think should be subject to all Acts of Hostility. 
But others, with more Reason, look not to that Injury alone, but also to the Act 
of Brutality, which being neither necessary for the Security of those who 
commit it, nor proper for the Punishment of those against whom it is 
committed, should be as much punished in War as in Peace...17 
 
This account is strange. It appears to locate the legal harm of mass injury-to-chastity in the 
“Body of an Enemy,” which sounds like the bodies of the male combatants, or in both the 
bodies of the male combatants and in the bodies of the injured female noncombatants.  
However, it seems clear that he finds the practices morally condemnatory and in need of legal 
revision.  He follows his initial statement with the claim that “this should be observed … not 
only as a Part of military Discipline, but as a Part of the Law of Nations, viz. that whosoever 
ravishes a Woman, tho’ in Time of War, deserves to be punished in every Country.”18 
3.1.B Grotius and Preventing Harm 
 
Recall that Grotius sees defense of life and defense of chastity as two clear 
justifications for defensive killing. We have a right to protect our lives and our bodies. 
Accordingly, if one aims to contravene these rights, we are permitted to stop them. Grotius 
says this right of self-defense “arises directly and immediately from the Care of our own 
Preservation, which Nature recommends to every one,”19 not from the wrong of the attacker. 
We are justified in killing an attacker, for Grotius, purely as a consequence of the attacked 
individual’s actions to ensure self-preservation. We can refer to this as a rights-based 
                                               
17  Ibid., 1151. 
18  Ibid., 1300. 
19  Ibid., 397. 
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account20 of self-defense. The intentions of the attacker, whether good or mistaken, and 
whether personal or as a soldier following orders, do not affect the attacked individual’s right 
to self-defense.  Grotius says that “it is sufficient that I am not obliged to suffer the Wrong he 
threatens to do me,”21 locating the right to kill one’s attacker solely within the right of self-
preservation. 
The rights-based account is not subject to justifications on the part of the attacker that 
may reduce or dissolve his liability to be killed. Grotius notes that it is a matter of dispute as 
to whether “an innocent Person, who happens to be in our Way, and hinders that Defence or 
Escape that is absolutely necessary for the Preservation of our Lives, may be run through, or 
crushed in Pieces.”22 The only reason one should avoid killing an innocent threat would be 
due to charity, not moral obligation.23 Rather, he finds that “we are commanded in the Gospel 
to love our Neighbours as ourselves, not before ourselves; nay, when an equal Danger 
threatens us, we are not forbid to take Care of ourselves before others.”24 Grotius sees killing 
in self-defense not as intentional killing, but rather as a lawful action taken as “the only 
Means left to preserve our selves, and not as the principal End proposed.”25 The danger must 
                                               
20  I use McMahan’s distinctions of the three main accounts of the basis of moral liability to defensive killing. See 
Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 (2005). 
21  De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 397. 
22 Ibid., 398. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid., 243-44. Thomson and Uniacke take up the rights-based account of liability to be killed in self-defense.  
For them, “the violation of a right is a matter of what one person causes to happen to another.” McMahan,  
389.  The culpability, responsibility, or agency of the person who poses a lethal threat does not matter for 
establishing the right to kill in self-defense; rather, both the innocent and the non-responsible can violate rights 
under this account. Ibid. See also Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self-Defense,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 20, no. 
4 (1991); Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
25  De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 398. 
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be both imminent and immediate, and cannot be based solely on fear. 26  Acting in self-
defense must be necessary and proportionate, based on reasonable anticipation of danger.27 
Grotius does not specifically discuss the right to kill one who threatens injury-to-
chastity.  But given his discussion of what gives one the right to kill in defense of life, it can 
be assumed that he holds a similar rights-based account of the right to kill in defense of 
chastity.  If the harm is located in the physical damage to a woman, then she (or a third-party 
defending her, as an innocent person) has a right to do whatever she needs to do to avoid the 
damage, regardless of the intentions of the assailant.28  
The “irreplaceability” aspect of chastity appears to be Grotius’ only claim about 
necessity in defending chastity. What Grotius thinks is irreplaceable seems like a combination 
of the honor and the physical purity of a woman – again, he references the “just Defence of [a 
woman’s] injured Honour,”29 but since defense of honor30 cannot justify killing, it can only 
overdetermine the harm of injury-to-chastity, as injury to a woman’s body. But Grotius does 
not specifically address the necessity of protecting a woman from injury-to-chastity.  So we 
must assume that he sees killing in defense of chastity as a last resort, which could require 
attempted use of non-lethal means of preventing an assault prior to killing. 
While I share Grotius’ intuition that sexual violence is a serious harm, I disagree with 
both his account of what makes sexual violence (or the loss of chastity) harmful or wrong, and 
his account of justified self- (or other-) defense. The rest of this chapter aims at constructing a 
                                               
26  Ibid., 389-99. 
27  Ibid., 398, 401. 
28  Assuming that the proportionality analysis in the previous section holds for defense of chastity.  If it does not, 
then she is barred from killing in self-defense because the response would be disproportionate to the threatened 
harm. 
29  De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 414. 
30  If it could, then my earlier qualification limiting the discussion to cases of coerced sex might be less plausible. 
But instead, as I argue, (i) only loss of chastity through rape could possibly be analogous to loss of life and (ii) 
defense of honor, alone, cannot justify killing.  
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more plausible account of the harm and wrong of a particular kind of sexual violence: mass 
sexual slavery. 
3.2 An Account of Harm 
In this section, I offer an account of harm, first distinguishing between harm and 
wrongdoing, which is the subject of the next section, before surveying the most compelling 
theories of harm. I endorse a well-being theory of harm and a preference theory of well-being 
for individuals. I close this section by considering the difference between individual and 
group-based harms, and endorse an objective list theory of well-being for groups. 
3.2.A Harm and Wrongdoing 
Before we can analyze the concept of ‘harm’, we must be able to distinguish it from the 
concept of ‘wrong’ or ‘wrongdoing’. We could actually distinguish between wrongs, harms, and 
wrongful harms, since there are harms that do not result from wrongful conduct, and there are 
wrongs that do not result in harm.31 Joel Feinberg offers one compelling account of harm and 
wrongdoing, in which he identifies two relevant senses of “harm.” The first involves a setback to 
interests, and the second involves one person wronging another person.32 A setback to interests 
need not have been caused by intentional human action, and could instead be the result of 
weather or an accident. We would say that a painful, broken leg caused by weather or an 
accident was a harm, but we wouldn’t attribute it to another person’s wrongdoing. 
The second sense of “harm” involves wrongdoing. A painful, broken leg that results from 
intentional tripping would be a setback to interests that involves wrongdoing. Notice that harm 
does not have to result from wrongdoing, such as where I intentionally trip someone, and instead 
of breaking her leg she bumps into a stranger and they fall in love. But since our aim is to answer 
                                               
31  See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), chapter 15. Parfit argues that it is 
possible for one to act wrongfully without negatively impacting the interests of an identifiable person. 
32  Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 31-36. 
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questions about harms where we can identify an entity that is at least partially culpable with 
respect to the harm, or acts that society could legitimately criminalize,33 and where some kind of 
setback to interest occurs, I will use Feinberg’s definition of harm because it captures both the 
result and the wrongful action.   
In accordance with the harm principle, Feinberg sets up the following as the conditions 
under which Person A (A) harms Person B (B):  
(1) A acts (perhaps in a sense of “act” broad enough to include acts of omission 
[…])  
(2) in a manner which is defective or faulty with respect to the risks it creates to 
B, that is, with the intention of producing the consequences for B that follow, 
or similarly adverse ones, or with negligence or recklessness in respect to 
those consequences, 
(3) A’s acting in that manner is morally indefensible, that is, neither excusable 
nor justifiable; and 
(4) A’s action is the cause of a setback to B’s interests, which is also 
(5) a violation of B’s right.34 
 
The harm aspect of this definition is found in condition 4.35 Thus, a harm is (1) a wrongful act 
that (2) sets back or invades the interest of another person.36  These interests can be either (1) 
well-being interests or (2) rights-based interests,37 as I consider in the next sub-section, in which 
I depart from Feinberg by taking up well-being interests rather than right-based interests as the 
best way to understand harm.  
Wrongdoing, or the wrongfulness aspect of harm, is captured by conditions 1, 2, 3, and 5 
of Feinberg’s definition. It is based on one’s moral or legal culpability for an action. A person 
                                               
33  J.S. Mill notably argues for the Harm Principle, which claims that “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), eds. David Bromwich and George Kateb (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003), 80. See also Feinberg, Harm to Others, 3. 
34  Feinberg, Harm to Others, 105-06. 
35  Ibid., 106. 
36  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapter 15. 
37  Feinberg, Harm to Others, 34-35. 
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can be said to wrong another person “when he treats him unjustly,”38 where the injustice consists 
of the morally indefensible actions taken under conditions 2 and 5 above. I return to the concept 
of wrongfulness in Section 3.4. 
3.2.B Harm and Interests 
 
 According to Feinberg’s definition, harm is understood in terms of setbacks to 
interests, so the first step in analyzing harm will be to explore the different kinds of interests 
that could be harmed. I consider rights-based interests and well-being interests in turn. 
3.2.B.i Rights-Based Interests 
 
 A rights-based account of harm explains harm by identifying the rights one possesses, 
either naturally or via convention, and establishing that a harm has occurred when one of 
those rights has been violated. For instance, a proponent of the rights-based account would 
claim that “[i]f B has a right not to be fondled without her consent, then A’s nonconsensual 
fondling sets back B’s rights-based interest in her bodily integrity, even though he does not 
harm B in any other way,” i.e. her well-being is not affected.39 Grotius offers a rights-based 
account of harm, and a corresponding rights-based account of self-defense.  
 However, it seems that rights-based interests cannot be identified without appealing 
to well-being. The reason why we might be justified in acting in self-defense is not simply 
based on the narrow view that we have inviolable rights, but rather that what we see as 
impermissible actions are grounded in our preferences related to our well-being. So whether 
or not there is a plausible rights-based account that identifies rights in terms of their likely 
impact on well-being, we must look at well-being interests to develop a robust account of 
harm. 
                                               
38  Ibid., 107. 
39  Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 93; see also 
Feinberg, Harm to Others, 107. 
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3.2.B.ii Well-Being Interests 
 
 An alternative account of harm looks at harm to well-being interests. Welfare 
interests include interests in “the continuance for a foreseeable interval of one’s life,”40 as 
well as “health, adequate intellectual capacity, the absence of absorbing pain, and emotional 
stability.”41 These interests are “those general all-purpose interests” that must be satisfied for 
an individual to pursue her “particular goals and aims.”42 Thus the concept of well-being 
interests can be seen as universal, whether or not we subscribe to an objective understanding 
of which interests count as well-being interests. It is clear, however, that harm to welfare 
interests will have an impact on “the whole network of [an individual’s] interests,” since they 
are prior to the fulfillment of “more ultimate aspirations.” 43 
 If we look at the above case of nonconsensual fondling from the perspective of well-
being interests, the list of interests we care about could either be subjective or objective. On a 
subjective list account of well-being interests, if B does not identify or experience a harm that 
has occurred as a result of the fondling, we would say that B’s subjective interests have not 
been harmed.  However, on an objective list account of well-being, B’s interest in autonomy 
and bodily integrity have been negatively affected, and therefore her well-being has been 
negatively affected as well. I look more closely at these theories of well-being in the 
following sub-section. 
 
 
 
                                               
40  Feinberg, Harm to Others, 37. 
41  Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, 94. 
42 Ibid. See also Feinberg, Harm to Others, 37. 
43  Ibid., 37. 
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3.2.C Harm and Well-Being 
 There are three main theories about assessing the quality of a person’s life: mental 
state views, preference-based views, and objective list views.44 Mental state theories “hold 
that the quality of a life for the person who lives it is determined completely by […] its 
experiential quality,”45 and since experience is largely subjective, these theories broadly focus on 
self-evaluation of how a life is going. Only something that has an effect on the “quality of one’s 
experience” counts as a contributor to well-being.46 This branch of theories often focuses on the 
mental states of pleasure or happiness,47 where harm to well-being consists in the introduction of 
pain or unhappiness, but mental states other than happiness can be captured by these sorts of 
theories, such as life satisfaction or a more general emotional well-being.48  Yet happiness-based 
theories, or hedonism, boasts several attractive features. It is a straightforward way of looking at 
what it means for a life to go well, since pleasure and the absence of suffering is a simple way of 
answering this question. As Daniel Haybron illustrates, when we think of what makes intense 
nausea bad, we are focused on what it feels like, as the “badness appears to be brutely 
phenomenological, residing in the quality of the experience itself.”49 Self-evaluation of one’s 
emotional state or life satisfaction will be similarly focused on how one feels.  
                                               
44  Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 205; 
Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, 94-95; Thomas Scanlon, “The Status of Well-Being,” in Tanner 
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45  Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 113. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 493. 
48  Daniel M. Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being,” in The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and 
Public Policy, eds. Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 347. 
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 But what makes these views straightforward is arguably what makes them weak: they 
are too simplistic. As demonstrated by Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment,50 most 
people think about their own welfare as having “more than just positive states of mind.”51 
Applying this to the view we have already seen from Grotius, it fails to capture everything we 
might think it wrong with the loss of life and chastity. It can account for any suffering that might 
occur prior to death or the loss of chastity, the fact that one no longer experiences any mental 
states after death (as far as I know), and the fact that one can no longer have the experience of 
knowing one is chaste after it has been taken away. But mental state theories cannot account for 
other aspects of harm. One does not “experience” death, as one only experiences (at most) 
whatever leads up to death. And would we want to say that someone who has been raped has not 
been harmed if she was unconscious at the time and never learned of the event? Some might, but 
I would disagree with a view that cannot account for a way in which an individual who does not 
“experience” the feeling of being sexually violated could still have been harmed. 
 Preference-based theories hold that the quality of a person’s life is a matter of the extent 
to which that person’s preferences or desires are satisfied.”52 These views claim that the 
“quality of a person’s life depends (in part) on whether one’s actual subjective desires are 
fulfilled, but it does not require that one actually experience the fulfillment of the desire.”53 
Preference-based theories differ from experiential theories in that they appeal to more than 
just the “present features of our lives that are introspectively discernible.”54 Rather, they 
appeal to all preferences one might have about her life, and are tied to the correspondence 
                                               
50  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 42. 
51  Haybron, “Mental State Approaches to Well-Being,” 355. 
52  Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 113. 
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between these preferences and actual states of affairs.55 There are several different versions of 
preference-based theories, with different requirements for what constitute suitable desires. 
Some views look straightforwardly at the satisfaction of current desires, while others look at 
the overall satisfaction of desires over a lifetime. Still others require that desires be informed 
in some way, so as to avoid the criticism that some people lack the information necessary to 
“properly” formulate desires. On any of these views, “[y]our well-being has to do with what is 
in your self-interest,”56 and this is hard to argue with on its face. These views appear to be 
necessarily tied to reality in a way that mental state views are not, yet they still account for the 
subjective preferences of an individual in analyzing her well-being. The harm of death or rape 
to someone who prefers to stay alive and prefers to stay celibate is easily captured by these 
views. 
 Yet the difference between the distinctive preference-based views reveals a challenge 
for these views. Either we want to give full deference to someone’s expressed desires, or we 
want to couch these desires in some way. If we opt for the first view, we may accept certain 
preferences that have been somehow limited due to the particular circumstances of one’s 
upbringing, especially involving limited access to information. Yet if we take the other route, 
and require that desires must be “informed,” we seem to be veering into objective territory in 
which someone’s true preferences might not meet the standard for counting as preferences, 
based on what the preferences are, or what went into their formation. An individual’s desire to 
remain chaste, for instance, should not necessarily be discounted simply because she believes 
that she will be immediately struck down by lightning if her chastity is lost. 
                                               
55  Ibid. 
56  Krister Bykvist, “Preference-Based Views of Well-Being,” in The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public 
Policy, eds. Matthew D. Adler and Marc Fleurbaey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 330. 
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 Objective theories assert that “certain things are good or bad for people, whether or not 
these people would want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.”57 On these 
accounts, there are “standards for assessing the quality of a life that are not entirely dependent on 
the desires of the person whose life it is.”58  Rather, for example, “knowledge, achievement, and 
moral virtue can be good in your life and their absence bad even it you're not in fact attracted to 
them,”59 and thus they count toward your well-being. Harm consists of denial of these objective 
goods, whether or not an individual experiences the denial as harm or has a preference for these 
particular goods. This has the benefit of permitting external assessment of well-being, and can 
allow for the institutional provision of resources in order to achieve well-being. 
 It might be the case that most would agree on at least some objective features of well-
being, such as those listed above. But that claim seems to be tied to our preferences – if we tried 
to come up with a list of objective goods, we would only want to include those things for which 
we have a preference. Otherwise we would have a hard time accepting that the good is 
objectively “good.” And this arguably causes objective list theories to collapse into preference-
based theories. Denial of life or chastity would likely be captured as an objective harm under 
nearly any objective list we could imagine, although it is not in Hurka’s list (inspired by 
Aristotle) as noted above. 
 At the level of the individual, the harm of sexual slavery will not look good no matter 
which conception of well-being we adopt. But the most compelling of these three accounts, when 
assessing harm to the individual, is the preference-based set of views. The experiential view is 
too limiting, in that someone’s life can go well as long as they are oblivious to certain pains or 
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wrongdoings. The objective list views are also too limiting, in that they determine what will 
contribute to the well-being of individuals without taking into account their own view of what 
will make their lives go best, and what will not detract from it. Individuals should be able to 
identify their own preferences, and be understood to be doing well, or to be harmed, based on the 
satisfaction of these preferences.  
 The preference-based views might look like a problem for application of the harm 
principle. If goods are whatever individuals (or even groups!) desire, and harms are what they 
desire to avoid, then it may be hard to identify a wrongful action as a harm. If condition 4 is 
purely subjective, and “B’s interests” can be based on anything B desires (or does not desire), 
then it may be a challenge to assess the other conditions based on what B sees as her interests. 
This would make it challenging to justify the criminalization of behavior, if everyone had 
idiosyncratic desires. Yet this assumes that there is no way to generalize about individuals’ 
preferences. While we would not want to claim that an particular individual has necessarily 
experienced a particular harm, or preferred to avoid that harm, we can make generalizations 
about the sorts of harms that individuals prefer to avoid when we identify what sorts of harms 
should be criminalized by a society, and in the next sub-section I argue that we should.   
3.2.D Group-Based Harms 
 
 The preceding account is persuasive if we think about harms to individual persons. 
But reliance on the subjective preferences in order to determine well-being is less plausible if 
we try to think about harming a group. As I argued in Chapter Two, we need to be able to 
capture both the collective and individual aspects of a group, and acknowledge the shared and 
differing experiences. The preference-based views align with the I-mode, acknowledging the 
individual preferences one might have with respect to oneself as an individual and as a group 
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member. But the we-mode demands something beyond the aggregation of individual 
preferences, and the identification of a set of collective preferences seems much more 
challenging than the identification of a collective intention. Thus the objective list views will 
be more appropriate for assessing whether or not a group has been harmed through a setback 
to their collective interests. Since individuals will have a variety of preferences as to how they 
see their lives going best, adopting and utilizing an objective list of goods that capture 
fundamental aspects of humanity is a better way to assess collective harm. While I do not 
want to suggest that there is an extensive list of goods that are objectively better (such as 
listening to classical music or drinking expensive wine), I would adopt an objective list that 
coheres with the fundamental aspects of humanity as what constitute well-being interests. 
That is, an objective list of well-being interests should contain those things without which it 
will be impossible for the group, and its individual members, to fulfill “more ultimate 
aspirations.” 60 These include such interests as bodily integrity, insofar as it is possible, which 
would capture health, safety, and sustenance. At a bare minimum, widespread and arbitrary 
deprivation of these interests would constitute harm to a group.61 
Now that we have an account of what (minimally) counts as a setback to the interests 
of a group, I turn to the particular harm of sexual slavery of individuals and groups, and 
analyze how we should understand this as a harm. 
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3.3 Harm of Sexual Slavery  
Sexual slavery in war describes the practice of enslaving women and girls for 
“recreational sexual service to soldiers and officers.” 62  This practice is somewhat 
distinguishable from the mass rape of female noncombatants as a “weapon of war,” where the 
purpose of the rape is to terrorize the women and the society as a whole.63 Instead, women and 
girls are “enslaved for sexual service in brothels for soldiers and in forced ‘marriages’ (usually 
to officers who may select a woman or girl from one of the brothels or from a group of women or 
girls targeted for mass rape),”64 and while the purpose may also include terror and humiliation, 
the practice is generally aimed at providing recreation and generating revenue.65 
The sexual enslavement of the Yazidi women and girls follows this familiar pattern. 
While the Yazidi men and boys were killed or forced to convert to Islam during the attack, many 
women and girls were kidnapped and deemed to be the property of IS. They were then 
transferred to sites in Iraq and Syria, where most were made available to IS fighters for 
individual purchase, and a small number were held as the “collective property of ISIS” and 
“distributed in groups to military bases throughout Iraq and Syria.”66  The women and girls 
who were held by individual IS fighters were subjected to brutal sexual violence and beatings. 
When women or girls tried to escape, they were punished with gang rape or the murder of 
their children.67 Many Yazidi women and girls report that they were forced to take birth 
                                               
62  Claudia Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 118. I focus 
on the practice of sexual slavery in conflict scenarios, rather than considering the more general and widespread 
practice of human sex trafficking.  
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid. 
65  See ibid.; see also Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival 57, no. 3 (2015): 67. 
66  “‘They Came to Destroy’: ISIS Crimes against the Yazidis,”  (U.N. Human Rights Council, 15 June 2016), 12, 
para. 55. 
67  Ibid., 14, paras. 67-68. 
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control by the IS fighters, while others became pregnant as a result of being raped on a regular 
basis.68 
While sexual slavery cannot be understood merely as a combination of two discrete 
aspects, sexual violence and slavery, it will nonetheless be helpful to utilize these two types of 
harm in order to construct an account of the harm of sexual slavery, especially in comparison 
with Grotius’s account of injury-to-chastity. I turn to this analysis now. 
3.3A  Sexual Slavery of Individuals 
For Grotius, the loss of chastity constitutes a harm of the same magnitude and kind as 
murder. As I explained in the first section, I see injury-to-chastity as plausibly corresponding 
with sexual violence, and here I focus on sexual enslavement as a particular kind of sexual 
violence, albeit one that involves other kinds of harm as well. There are plenty of accounts of 
sexual enslavement that could make Grotius’ view of the harm of injury-to-chastity appealing 
as a starting point. For some enslaved individuals, the isolation from community and the lack 
of social existence outside of the master renders the enslaved individual “socially dead.”69 As 
Claudia Card explains, “[s]ocial vitality exists through relationships, contemporary and inter-
generational, that create an identity that gives meaning to a life. Major loss of social vitality is a 
loss of identity and consequently a serious loss of meaning for one’s existence.”70 For some 
women and girls, repeated rapes and violations are experienced as torture. Robin West 
describes rape as a kind of “spiritual murder.”71 Some women and girls commit suicide 
following rape or sexual enslavement because the experience has robbed them of any interest 
                                               
68  Ibid., 15, paras. 69-70. 
69  Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 37. 
70  Claudia Card, “Genocide and Social Death,” Hypatia 18, no. 1 (2003): 63. 
71  Robin West, “Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on ‘Beyond Rape’,” Columbia Law Review 93 
(1991): 1448. 
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in life. Still others may understand the harm of sexual slavery to include loss of honor,72 or 
something irreplaceable, as it seems Grotius would see the harm. However, we should not 
have to require that one have a particular experience of sexual enslavement, such as one that 
involves the irreplaceable loss of honor, in order to identify what is harmful or wrong about 
sexual slavery. 
Returning to the preference satisfaction view of well-being, the quality of a person’s 
life could depend on her desire to not have her body (or her chastity, should that be her desire) 
violated. So here, the harm would be located in, say, the woman’s preference for bodily 
autonomy, regardless of whether or not there is a subjective, experiential harm she 
experiences. Her experience of distress does not seem to be what makes the act wrong – the 
act of rape is wrong irrespective of her experience because it violates her preferences. On this 
view, the preference for bodily integrity corresponds to a harm when that preference is not 
satisfied. But the harm is not the death of the body or the death of chastity, nor is it 
necessarily irreparable or irreplaceable.  Labeling sexual assault as death is not something we 
want to do for those who do not experience sexual assault as death, and thus we don’t want to 
inextricably tie the harm of sexual slavery with the experience. This is not to say that the 
experience of those who are held in sexual slavery does not matter. It is only to say that 
someone should not be required to experience or respond to sexual slavery in a particular way 
for it to be a harm. This seems like what Grotius might see as the importance of honor or 
reputation in considering the harm of rape. It can be experienced as akin to death by some 
individuals, but this is not where we should locate the threatened harm that results in liability 
to be killed. 
                                               
72  While I acknowledge the fact that some direct victims of sexual slavery may experience a loss of honor, I do 
not consider the individual loss of the honor of secondary victims, particularly male family members or other 
individuals in the community. I do acknowledge that this can account for part of the group harm. 
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3.3.B Mass Sexual Slavery 
 
As a group harm, it becomes even more clear why we don’t want to rely on the 
experience of sexual enslavement as death, regardless of the particular experience of some (or 
even nearly all) of the individual members of the group. The we-mode requires us to establish 
a collective interest, and this involves establishing certain objective goods, the denial of 
which results in harm to the group and its individual members. When a victim group has been 
determined by the actions of a perpetrator group, the perpetrators are concerned with harming 
through the denial of objective goods. They are not focused on denying any individual victim 
the satisfaction of her preferences, or the experience of happiness, except insofar as these 
denials contribute to the terrorizing of the victim group as a collective. The focus is on the 
group, and thus the analysis of the harm must be tied to collective, objective interests. 
Returning to the case of the Yazidi women and girls, we identified them as a victim group in 
Chapter Two, targeted by IS based on their ethnic/religious identity (which existed prior to 
their capture) and their sex (which became the basis for the victim group following capture). 
We can think about the I-mode and the we-mode as two ways of thinking about the harms 
experienced by the victim group.  
The I-mode captures the individual experiences of individual circumstances of 
enslavement and their phenomenological experiences of the sexual violence, but should be 
explained in terms of preference satisfaction. The experience of sexual slavery is horrific and 
constitutes a serious impediment to well-being for nearly all individuals, which should not be 
ignored. Yet as I have already argued, this should not be necessary in order to identify a harm, 
so I will focus on the preference-based view of individual harm. Many or most Yazidi women 
and girls likely desire bodily autonomy, the opportunity to live in their own community, and 
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the ability to make choices about their own health and lives. Those who take their religion 
seriously may be strongly invested in maintaining their chastity. These women and girls are 
seriously harmed in the setback to these well-being interests, but perhaps to varying degrees, 
based on their individual preferences. It seems unlikely, but other women, depending on their 
individual preferences, might find themselves in relatively bearable circumstances. An 
individual woman might have her basic preferences for food and clothing satisfied, while her 
objective well-being interests are being denied, and she may find her situation bearable. The 
perpetrator in this scenario commits a wrong, regardless of the relative satisfaction of the 
victim’s preferences, but the I-mode can identify the harms as unique to each woman or girl. 
The we-mode captures the idea that the harm to the victim group of Yazidi women and 
girls who are sold as sex slaves is more than just the aggregation of the harm done to each 
individual victim, and that the collective harm done to the group as a group must be explained 
in terms of an objective list of well-being interests. They have been created as a victim group 
based on the actions of a perpetrator group, and this perpetrator group is focused on 
perpetrating objective harms, or denying objective goods, to the victim group. Thus the 
interests that are fundamental to the ability of the victim group to fulfill its ultimate 
aspirations, collectively and individually, are the best way to think about collective harm. I 
have already touched on the individual aspirations, but we might think of the collective 
aspirations of this small religious community as continuing to practice their religion in their 
community without fear, continuing to bear and raise children with two Yazidi parents, 
continuing to thrive as a healthy, peaceful community. All of these collective aspirations are 
threatened by mass sexual slavery. This should not discount the experiences and preferences 
of the individual group members. But the Yazidi women and girls who have been held as 
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sexual slaves have been denied respect for their bodily integrity and freedom to make their 
own choices about their lives, and while there may be some individuals who are not set on 
having these interests satisfied, I would again claim that these are minimal enough to be 
interests of every individual. And when we think about the harm that is done when these 
interests are denied to an entire group of individuals, we can compare the “social death” of 
individuals to the destruction of an entire group’s identity, “by decimating its cultural and 
social bonds.”73 The Yazidi women and girls who are still being held as sexual slaves are 
continuing to experience individual harms, and their enslavement is continuing to harm the 
community of Yazidis as a group. Those who have survived and escaped may also continue to 
experience individual harms. Group harms also continue, as the knowledge that the victims 
survived rape and sometimes pregnancy are likely to threaten the cultural unity and group 
identity of the Yazidi community,74 since chastity is an important part of their religious codes. 
The collective trauma in and of itself is likely to prevent the realization of their collective 
aspirations of living together in peaceful communities. 
I have argued that mass sexual slavery is a clear setback to interests, and thus an 
individual and group harm. In the next section, we can turn to the other aspect of harm under 
the harm principle: the wrongful nature of the act, and what follows from wrongfulness of 
sexual slavery.  
3.4 Wrong of Sexual Slavery 
I used Feinberg’s definition of harm in Section 3.2, in which he distinguishes between 
the wrongfulness of an act and the harmfulness of an act. I have analyzed the aspect of harm 
that corresponds with the setback to the victim’s interests, and I will now turn to the 
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conditions that correspond to wrongfulness. Because I have already established the 
harmfulness of sexual slavery, I go directly to the act of sexual enslavement of an individual 
as a way to draw out its wrongfulness.  
Wrongdoing, or the wrongfulness aspect of harm, consists of four conditions. First, it 
is an act, or possibly an omission. Second, it is performed “in a manner which is defective or 
faulty with respect to the risks it creates” to another person, i.e. with intent to produce certain 
adverse consequences, or “with negligence or recklessness in respect to those 
consequences.”75 Third, the action is morally indefensible, i.e. not saved by an excuse or 
justification. Fourth, it violates the rights of another person. I consider each condition in turn, 
with respect to sexual slavery.     
3.4.A Action 
 
Sexual enslavement involves an initial action, either capturing an individual to be held 
as a sex slave, purchasing an individual to be held as a sex slave, or accepting as a “gift” an 
individual to be held as a sex slave. The initial action is followed by repeated acts of rape or 
torture, combined with an ongoing denial of freedom to the individual. Particular instances of 
sexual enslavement may include other acts that cause setbacks to the enslaved individual, as 
well as omissions like a failure to provide medical care, adequate food and water, or the 
ability to communicate with friends or family members.  
3.4.B Manner 
 
The manner in which the acts or omissions of a perpetrator of sexual enslavement are 
“defective” or “reckless” is well-established. Whether we only acknowledge the minimal 
objective list interests, or take into account the most pressing desires of an individual on a 
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desire satisfaction view of interests, the denial of interests like freedom of movement and 
bodily autonomy clearly constitute adverse consequences. Moreover, a perpetrator would be 
hard-pressed to deny that these adverse consequences are reasonably foreseeable, if not 
guaranteed, by his actions. Thus a perpetrator who engages in sexual slavery likely has the 
intent to produce the adverse consequences. We could imagine a member of IS who does not 
possess the intent, yet still engages in sexual enslavement or contributes to its fulfillment. I 
will consider this “marginal” member of IS in the later chapter on moral responsibility. Yet 
even this person acts recklessly or negligently, with respect to the adverse consequences, 
given that the range of possible outcomes of sexual slavery is limited.     
3.4.C  Moral Indefensibility 
 
Feinberg uses the concept of moral indefensibility to refer to “actions and omissions 
that have no adequate justification or excuse.”76 A justification changes the status of an act 
itself, so that an act that was otherwise impermissible or wrong (like raping or enslaving) 
becomes a permissible act. An excuse, however, does not change the status of the act. The act is 
still wrong, but the person acting is considered “not blameworthy” for the act. I consider 
potential justifications here, but I will not consider the possibility of an excused perpetrator, as a 
“marginal” member of IS, until later chapters. I look at war and religion as two familiar 
justifications for sexual slavery. If either justification succeeds, the practice would not constitute 
a wrongdoing. 
3.4.C.i War 
 
As I noted in Section 3.1, rape was historically seen as a permissible feature of war, as 
a reward for a battle won, or as a consolation for a battle lost. The sex camps that existed in 
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Japan during WWII are a recent example of women being sexually enslaved for the purpose 
of buttressing troop morale. Yet this particular practice has been met with almost universal 
condemnation in recent years,77 and the norms against sexual slavery as a permissible practice 
in war have solidified. International criminal courts and tribunals have also criminalized 
sexual slavery.78 So IS fighters will be met with two challenges if they try to justify the 
practice of sexual slavery as a permissible practice during war. First, it is not clear that their 
invasion of the Sinjar province and destruction of the Yazidi people’s community constitutes 
a “war” as we might traditionally think of a war. But regardless, the second problem is 
insurmountable, and that is that there are both empirical and normative reasons to challenge 
any claim that the practice is acceptable. First, the practice of sexual slavery is no longer a 
widely accepted practice as a way to entertain fighters. The norms that were in place during 
previous conflicts no longer exist to support the idea of using women as the spoils or rewards 
of war. But second, and more importantly, sexual slavery is wrong no matter how many 
people support it. The involuntary use of women’s bodies to entertain soldiers or to terrorize 
the women’s communities is not acceptable at any time, whether during wartime or not, 
whether purportedly permitted by a religious text or not, whether it has historical precedent or 
not. Thus the argument I explore next, that IS is morally justified in engaging in sexual 
enslavement based on their religion, fails because sexual slavery is universally morally 
wrong.  
 
                                               
77  Etsuro Totsuka, “Commentary on a Victory for Comfort Women: Japan's Judicial Recognition of Military 
Sexual Slavery,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 8 (1999). 
78   See U.N. General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 
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3.4.C.ii Religion 
 
The other tactic for trying to justify the practice of sexual slavery is to establish that 
the correct source of morality does not condemn the practice. Religion, as a source of 
morality, has been used by IS to defend the practice. IS now has a complex bureaucracy 
supporting the institution of sex slavery, “including sales contracts notarized by the [IS]-run 
Islamic courts.”79 The group has used the Quran to create a religious doctrine that allows IS to 
recruit conservative Muslim men who come from communities where causal sex and dating 
are impermissible. The leaders of IS have “emphasized a narrow and selective reading of the 
Quran and other religious rulings to not only justify violence, but also to elevate and celebrate 
each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, even virtuous.”80 Yazidi girls who have escaped 
from sexual slavery recall that their captors explained the girls’ rapes as permissible and even 
encouraged by Islam, based on the fact that the girls practiced a religion other than Islam.81 
Again, we have at least two reasons to question this use of religion as a justification for 
the practice of sexual slavery. We might think that there are universal moral norms that condemn 
sexual violation, especially ongoing sexual violation, as a form of religious devotion. No religion 
could reasonably justify this behavior. But even if we turn to Islam itself, without relying on a 
universal or commonsense morality, most modern sects of Islam would not condone the practice 
of sexual slavery in the name of the Quran.82 While Islamic law and scripture permit and regulate 
slavery, many today would argue that these passages are no longer relevant.83 IS, on the other 
hand, argues “that these institutions need to be revived, because that is what the Prophet and his 
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companions did.”84 So while it may be the case that some IS fighters believe themselves to be 
justified in their actions, the practice of sexual slavery cannot be objectively justified because it 
is a universal moral wrong to enslave and use the bodies of women and girls, without their 
consent, for any ends whatsoever.  
3.4.D  Rights Violation 
 
The final criterion of a wrongful act of harm requires that the harm constitute a rights 
violation. Feinberg defines a right as a “valid claim which an individual can make in either or 
both of two directions.”85 The first involves claims that could be made against specific 
individuals to meet their obligations, or as demands for noninterference. 86  The second 
involves claims against the state to meet their obligations, or as demands for noninterference, 
or “claims to the legal enforcement of the valid claims he has against other private citizens.”87 
I address the possibility of IS existing as a political entity in the next chapter, so I focus on the 
first of these directions here.  
Some claims will be both moral claims against an individual, and legal claims against 
the state. Criminal acts, for instance, will usually involve both moral and legal claims. Sexual 
slavery, as well as rape and enslavement individually, are crimes in nearly every jurisdiction 
in the world, so there is almost certainly a legal right not to be subjected to these sorts of 
violations. However, even if sexual slavery does not constitute a legal rights violation, it is a 
moral rights violation. A moral right, according to Feinberg, is “a claim backed by valid 
reasons and addressed to the conscience of the claimee or to public opinion.”88 Based on the 
well-being interests account of the harm of sexual slavery, it seems that there are valid 
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reasons to think that individuals have a moral claim right to be free from sexual slavery, 
whether we consider natural rights or rights that we have from being part of a particular 
community. The right to move freely (within reason) and maintain control over one’s own 
body (again, within reason) are seriously violated by sexual slavery. Accordingly, based on 
the foregoing analysis, perpetrators of sexual enslavement, such as IS and its individual 
members who have sexually enslaved Yazidi women and girls, engage in wrongful acts of 
harm.    
 
In this chapter, I explored the intuition that mass sexual violence, particularly mass 
sexual slavery, is the kind of harm and wrong that I will eventually demonstrate should warrant 
intervention. I engaged with Grotius’s understanding of injury-to-chastity and argued that while I 
agree with his general intuition, I disagreed with his understanding of the location of the harm, 
and what justified the use of force to prevent the harm. I presented a more plausible account of 
harm and wrongdoing, arguing for an objective list account of well-being as the best way to 
understand what constitutes a group-based harm. I applied these accounts to the specific harm of 
mass sexual slavery, and responded to the claim that a religion could justify this harm by making 
the act “morally defensible.” In the next chapters, I will continue to analyze the harm principle as 
I answer questions about the political nature of perpetrator groups, and the moral responsibility 
of groups and their individual members.  
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CHAPTER IV – TERRORIST GROUP STATEHOOD 
In the previous chapter, I analyzed sexual slavery as a harm and as a wrong, relying on 
the hybrid account of groups I defended in Chapter Two. In this chapter, I return to the 
question of how to classify perpetrators of mass violence, pulling together concepts from 
various literatures in a unified approach and focusing on the political status of group 
perpetrators. The moral, political, and legal obligations that attach to a group may differ based 
on how we understand that group to function, both in legal terms and in practical terms. The 
specific question of statehood arises in the midst of the other questions at hand because IS has 
claimed to be a state, as noted in the first chapter, in both the religious and political senses of 
the term.  
I begin by analyzing authority and recognition as key aspects of statehood from the 
perspective of political philosophy, where authority refers to the moral right to exert political 
control, while recognition refers to the respect garnered from others as a legitimate political 
agent. I go on to consider the relationship between certain political communities and religious 
communities. I then turn to the requirements for statehood under international law, 
considering the contrast between the declaratory and constitutive models of statehood, which 
somewhat mirrors the philosophical distinction between legitimate authority and recognition. 
I acknowledge the difference between the formal requirements and what might garner 
informal political recognition by the rest of the international community. Next, I discuss the 
relationship between political communities and individuals, in terms of the obligations a 
political community has toward the individuals who are part of the community, and also in 
terms of the responsibilities of the individual leaders of the political community. Finally, I 
confront the problem of non-state actors, which today often exercise political control over 
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territories and/or populations, despite their formal non-state status. This includes a discussion 
of the relationship between such political communities and the international community of 
formally-recognized states. Again, I consider how the analysis helps us understand IS 
throughout, both during the height of their political control and the subsequent downfall 
beginning in 2017. I conclude that IS should be seen as a non-state actor, rather than a state, 
but that this does not absolve the organization or the individuals that make up the organization 
from moral, political, and legal obligations. Both the organization and the constitutive 
individuals remain members of the international community. 
4.1 Statehood and Sovereignty 
In this section, I consider several prominent ways of understanding statehood in terms 
of sovereignty. One way we often think about sovereignty is in terms of the ability of a 
political community to make its own choices about how it should be governed, or in terms 
similar to the autonomy model of individuals. However, for our purposes, we are focused on 
the relationship between a would-be state and the individuals it claims to have the authority to 
govern, and the relationship between the would-be state and other states. Both of these 
relationships are closely tied with territoriality. As Max Weber argued, “a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state.”1 In focusing on 
these two kinds of relationships, I identify the concepts of authority and recognition as the 
crucial features of statehood and sovereignty. Early theorists were more concerned with the 
former than the latter, but I will argue that both authority and recognition are necessary for 
statehood. 
                                               
1  Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. H.H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), Part I, Chapter 30, 1. Italics in original. 
 76 
I only analyze statehood from a political perspective in this section, while I consider 
the legal analysis in a later section. My view is that political and legal questions of statehood 
cannot be completely separated. In the domestic realm, the law is promulgated by political 
institutions. In the international realm, the sources of law include treaties between states, 
general principles of law, customary international law, and judicial decisions and the writings 
of “the most highly qualified publicists.”2 Each of these sources can or does involve political 
interests, and nearly every mechanism for enforcement of international law does as well. 
Accordingly, while I initially consider the political and legal concepts of statehood separately, 
I maintain that the legal and political conceptions of statehood inextricably rely upon one 
another. I will return to this discussion in Section 4.3. 
4.1.A Authority 
A government’s political authority is premised on the government having a moral 
right, not just the power, to coerce its citizens. H.L.A. Hart makes the distinction between 
power and authority by drawing on J.L. Austin. He says that an entity with power can compel 
an individual to act with the threat of “unpleasant consequences.”3 Hart compares this entity 
to a gunman who threatens to shoot an individual if he does not hand over his property.4 The 
gunman issues “an order backed by threats,” and if the individual complies with the demands, 
we might say that “he was obliged to do so.”5 It seems that this captures what a legal authority 
does when it threatens punishment for failing to obey orders. However, Hart and Austin 
distinguish the gunman situation, which involves an order backed by a threat, from the law.6 
A command issued by an entity with authority may or may not be backed by a threat of 
                                               
2  U.N., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1. 
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5  Ibid. 
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unpleasant consequences as well, but it need not be.7 Rather, an individual is obligated to 
comply with commands issued by an entity with authority whether or not the individual could 
ever be met with any threatened unpleasant consequences like punishment.8  
Authority refers to “the moral power of one agent (emphasizing especially the state) to 
morally require or forbid actions by others through commands.”9 But as already noted, brute 
power is not sufficient to generate an obligation. A state can only claim to have legitimate 
authority based on the “moral permissibility of the state’s issuing and enforcing its commands 
owing to the process by which they were produced.”10 For the remainder of this chapter, I use 
the term “authority” to mean “legitimate authority” unless otherwise noted.  
The next question to answer is where a state gets this authority to command. Even if it 
is clear why a gunman does not have the right to command simply by virtue of the fact that he 
can inflict violence, it is not clear why a state would have the right to command, or what sort 
of process would make a state’s commands morally permissible. A state could have a natural 
right to command, or a state could have acquired the right to command through some sort of 
authorization process, either implicit or explicit. We could argue, for instance, that each 
citizen of a state or community authorizes, either implicitly or explicitly, the state to 
command her to follow certain laws, and punish her if she breaks the law. I adopt such a view 
of authorization, which limits the scope of legitimate state authority to those affairs which the 
citizens see as reasonably within the purview of state control. Of course there will not be 
explicit authorization of each political actor and each political decision from each citizen, but 
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there must be general community acknowledgement that the state acts with moral authority 
when it acts within an appropriate scope of control.  
4.1.B Recognition 
An act of social or political philosophical recognition involves what Avishai Margalit 
calls “acknowledging and honoring the status of the other,”11 or what Heikki Ikäheimo calls 
“taking another subject as a subject.”12 Most contemporary work in recognition theory has been 
rooted in German idealism, despite its broad historical roots.13 Hegel, for instance, developed 
theories of interpersonal recognition in which persons can only become conscious of ourselves as 
autonomous agents by having interactions with other autonomous agents.14 In other words, 
recognition must be mutual.15 Robert Brandom argues that “[t]o recognize someone is to take or 
treat that individual in practice as a self: a knowing and acting subject, hence as subject to 
normative assessment as potentially committed, responsible, authoritative, and so on.”16  
More recently, theorists have considered whether this view of mutual recognition is too 
limiting, and asked if we should instead conceive of recognition as “adequate regard,” which 
would allow us to see recognition in the affirmation of a valuable feature of non-person 
entities. 17  Some of these views consider the relationship between recognition and social 
ontology, as discussed previously in Chapter Two, as well as the relationship between 
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recognition and collective responsibility, as we will discuss in Chapter Five. For our purposes, 
we are interested in the question of whether or not states can count as objects of recognition.18 
For those who argue that states are “among the recipients that can get recognition in the relevant 
sense (because they are recognizers themselves and can recognize the other as a recognizer), it 
need not be the case that [states] must thereby be regarded as persons of some sort.”19 What 
matters is still the capacity for mutual recognition.20  
4.1.C Statehood 
A state, I now argue, requires (to some extent) both sovereign authority and 
recognition. Jean Bodin, an early theorist of sovereignty, claimed that sovereignty is “the 
most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a 
Commonwealth.”21  Bodin understood sovereignty primarily in terms of the relationship 
between the ruler and those over whom it had this high, absolute, and perpetual power. He 
makes the distinction as such: “For the one was the prince, the other the subject; the one the 
lord, the other the servant; the one the proprietary and seised of the Sovereignty, the other neither 
proprietary nor possessed thereof, neither holding anything thereof, but as a feoffer or keeper in 
trust.”22 For Bodin, the source of this power came from God and the laws of nature. Sovereign 
powers were to “give account unto none, but to the immortal God alone.”23 This supreme power 
                                               
18  See Simon Thompson, “Models of Democracy and the Politics of Recognition,” in The Plural States of 
Recognition, ed. Michel Seymour (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 122. 
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was meant to be used for “giving laws unto the subjects in general, without their consent.”24 The 
sovereign, however, was not subject to its own laws.25 One result of Bodin’s understanding of 
supreme authority was that it could only be held by one individual, rather than by a group of 
individuals.26 
Thomas Hobbes shared Bodin’s view of sovereignty as supreme authority. Sovereign 
power is either obtained by acquisition or by institution, which is when “men agree amongst 
themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be 
protected by him against all others.”27 The main underlying motivation for any such covenant 
among individuals is fear.28 The state’s sovereign power thus comes from the individuals that 
make up the body politic, as well as the law of nature,29 but not from any other external source. 
For Hobbes, a state maintains sovereign authority only as long as it can effectively protect the 
individuals that have consented to obey the sovereign: “For the sovereign, is the public soul, 
giving life and motion to the commonwealth; which expiring, the members are governed by it no 
more, than the carcase of a man, by his departed (though immortal) soul.”30 
Jean Jacques Rousseau appealed to the general will of the people as the source of 
sovereign authority. He distinguished between “the will of all” and “the general will,” arguing 
that “the latter regards only the common interest, while the former has regard to private interests, 
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and is merely a sum of particular wills.”31 Thus the general will reflects the equality of citizens 
by recognizing each individual only as a member of the collective body, an assembly of people.32 
According to Rousseau, “the general will is always right, but the judgment which guides it is not 
always enlightened,” and so a government is necessary to ensure that the public “conform their 
wills to their reason.”33 Yet the government does not exist as something separate from the public. 
The members of the public are charged with ruling over themselves, because the sovereignty of 
each individual cannot not be transferred.34 Thus the members of the political community must 
directly identify the general will and ratify it so that it becomes law, 35 which in turn ensures that 
the public interest or common good is what predominates.36  However, if the general will is not 
sought, this direct form of government will lack legitimate authority over its citizens, since the 
citizens are only ever subject to their own, collective, general will.37 
More recently, Carl Schmitt advocated for a view of sovereignty that mirrored the 
centuries-old views of Hobbes and Bodin. He defined sovereignty in terms of supreme authority, 
claiming that “the sovereign is he who decides on the exceptions,”38 or when to deviate from 
existing legal norms. For Schmitt, the clearest expression of sovereignty occurs when the law 
does not identify how to handle an emergency situation, and the sovereign is the entity which 
both identifies the situation as an emergency and identifies what should be done to alleviate the 
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emergency.39 The authority of a sovereign is prior to the law, since in an emergency situation “it 
is clear that the state remains, whereas law recedes.”40 Accordingly, even if the law does not give 
sovereign authority to any particular agent or institution, the identity of the sovereign will 
become clear when there is an emergency situation.41  
Other theorists focus on statehood in terms of recognition, or the acknowledgement of 
others that the state is legitimate. This acknowledges that statehood does not exist in a vacuum, 
and a political community must garner some level of recognition by other states in order to fully 
participate as a state in the global order. Recognition of political entities “for purposes of 
structured interaction in a divided international space” has been possible for centuries,42 but it is 
only recently that it has been seen as a coherent alternative to thinking about states as members 
of the global political community. 
Henry Wheaton, influenced by Hegel, distinguished between internal and external 
sovereignty, and argued that external sovereignty “may require recognition by other States in 
order to render it perfect and complete.”43 For a political community that wishes to participate in 
the global political community,  
all the members of which recognize rights to which they are mutually entitled, and 
duties which they may be called upon reciprocally to fulfill, such recognition 
becomes essentially necessary to the complete participation of the new State in all 
the advantages of this society. Every other State is at liberty to grant, or refuse, 
this recognition, subject to the consequences of its own conduct in this respect; 
and until such recognition becomes universal on the part of the other States, the 
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new State becomes entitled to the exercise of its external sovereignty as to those 
States only by whom that sovereignty has been recognized.44  
 
Wheaton thus saw statehood as somewhat distinct from mere sovereign authority. 
Hans Kelsen suggested that we should go even further and reject the traditional doctrine 
of sovereign authority as a sufficient criterion for statehood. He first argues for a distinction 
between political recognition (considered in this section) and legal recognition (considered more 
fully in Section 4.3), as he sees only the latter as something that entails a legal obligation. 
Political recognition, on the other hand, just means that “the recognizing state is willing to enter 
into political and other relations with the recognized state or government, relations of the kind 
which normally exist between members of the family of nations.”45 This is a discretionary act for 
the recognizing state,46 and for Kelsen, it carries significant weight since a so-called state must 
be able to engage in relations with other states for its status to hold any meaning. However, 
political recognition “presupposes the legal existence of a state or government to be 
recognized,”47 so for Kelsen any discussion of statehood relies on an understanding of legal 
recognition.  Kelsen sees statehood as something that can only exist as a relative feature of an 
entity, arguing that a “state exists legally only in its relations to other states,” and accordingly, 
there is no such thing as the “absolute existence” of a state.48 A political community must first 
self-identify as a state, and then it must be recognized as a state by other states “in order to 
                                               
44  Ibid., 39. 
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46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid. 
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become a subject of international law.”49 As with Hegel’s understanding of recognition, “mutual 
recognition is necessary” for a political community’s existence as a state.50 
Allen Buchanan constructs a theory of recognitional legitimacy in which “[t]he judgment 
that a political entity is legitimate in the recognitional sense confers the status of being a member 
in good standing of the state system on that entity, with all the powers, liberties, claim-rights, and 
immunities that go with that status.”51 He acknowledges the objective criteria of sovereignty that 
are often seen as necessary for statehood, but he also considers recognitional legitimacy to be 
“both necessary and sufficient for being a primary participant in the processes by which 
international law is formulated, adjudicated, and by which measures designed to increase 
compliance with international legal norms are devised and implemented.”52 Thus, for Buchanan, 
both sovereign authority and recognition play a role in a political community’s ability to exist 
and function as a state, and thus both are necessary for statehood. Buchanan’s view seems right, 
as a state needs to be able to function as a state in terms of exerting sovereign authority over its 
citizens, to some extent, but it must also be recognized as a state by other members of the global 
political community. Functionally, a state cannot exist if the political community fails to meet 
either of these conditions.  
These more recent accounts seem to be tracking something important, and that is the 
relationship between authority and recognition. The accounts of statehood promoted by Bodin, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau are all internally focused on the relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled, and while Schmitt’s more contemporary view is more reflective of the global political 
order, he remains concerned with the objective power of the ruler. But each of these accounts 
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could be used to explain the internal structures of any sort of political community. If we think 
there is something unique about statehood, as a particular kind of political community, then it 
has to be about the community’s desire and ability to have a certain kind of relationship with 
other political communities. The benefit of this particular designation seems to be that it provides 
level footing for establishing and maintaining these sorts of relationships, and this requires that 
we take the concept of recognition seriously. Even if a political community does not wish to 
acquire positive obligations toward other political communities, it is the global order of states 
that provides the framework for establishing negative obligations. Wheaton fails to go far enough 
in seeing this recognition as necessary, and Kelsen goes a bit too far in claiming that statehood 
can only be a relative feature of a political community. Again, Buchanan’s view strikes the right 
balance, by requiring a certain kind of relationship between the ruler and the ruled, in addition to 
a certain kind of relationship between the state and other states.  
4.2 Statehood and Islam 
Before the modern notion of a state, which grew out of the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 and the American and French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789, people identified with 
religious, familial, or tribal identities, rather than identities based on territory.53 Early Muslim 
communities lived in a variety of political arrangements, including under the rule of non-
Muslims.54 The founding texts of Islam “do not specify any particular types of governmental 
institutions nor is most of Islamic political history normative.”55 While the Quran contains 
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“principles upon which a state should be run if Muslims are ruling,” it does not require 
Muslims to establish their own state.56   
The individual is generally the subject of Islamic law. The aim of the individual Muslim 
is to achieve salvation, and the divine law shows the path to salvation through the imposition of 
certain obligations.57 The basic articles of faith that constitute the obligations of individuals are 
the Five Pillars, which include faith, prayer, charity, fasting, and pilgrimage. These are duties 
that must be performed by individuals, such that an individual is liable to punishment for failing 
to perform a duty.58 However, early Muslim societies placed much more emphasis on the group 
than the individual. The rights and obligations of an individual were “always defined in terms of 
(though subordinate to) the community’s interests.”59 Communities were seen as necessary for 
protecting individuals and ensuring their cooperation, because an individual by himself 
possessed “weakness and inability either to provide a livelihood or to protect himself against 
outsiders.”60 But society was not enough. A community needed legal authority to properly 
function. The Quran notes, “if it were not for Allah checking [some] people by means of others, 
the earth would have been corrupted, but Allah is full of bounty to the worlds.”61 Early Islamic 
philosopher Al-Farabi “stressed the necessity of a society in which the individual could attain 
physical and moral satisfaction” when discussing the model state.62 
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Islam actually predated Hobbes in arguing for the existence of a sovereign authority, to 
which individuals gave up some of their rights for the sake of their protection.63 The role of the 
Islamic state was thus instrumental. The Islamic state, which was “derived from and exercised on 
behalf of God, was potentially capable of governing the whole of mankind,”64 and we can see 
this universalist aspiration as the Islamic state’s obligation. The duty to establish Islam all over 
the world was the collective duty of all Muslims, rather than that of any one individual Muslim. 
The universalist aspiration could only be realized, however, if the Islamic state were able to 
engage in effective dialogue and negotiations with other communities and other states.  
As noted in the first chapter, the Quran states that the duty of Muslims is to “strive for 
Allah with the striving due to Him,”65 and “believe in Allah and His Messenger and strive in the 
cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives.”66 The term used to refer to this activity, jihad, 
refers to the “exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and 
in making His word supreme over this world,”67 by either peaceful or violent means.68 The 
struggle to expand the influence of Islam was meant “to establish peace with justice within a 
secure political order,”69 but the peaceful and secure political order might only be established 
through war. The Quran distinguishes between personal jihad and political jihad, where the latter  
refers to an armed struggle of the state. 70 Thus political jihad, as a collective duty, falls on the 
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state. One benefit of the state’s obligation, according to Khadduri, is that the “head of the state 
can in a more effective way serve the common interest of the community than if the matter is left 
entirely to the discretion of the individual believer.”71 So an Islamic government is arguably the 
most effective way to fulfil a primary aspect of the Quranic duty to spread Islam. In 
Muhammad’s time, he was the head of government, while Allah was the “titular head of the state 
and its source of governing authority.”72 The leaders of the Islamic state following Muhammad’s 
death were called imams, and thus jihad as a state doctrine should only be declared by the imam 
who serves as the head or deputy head of state.73 Quranic “legal principles, such as a penal code 
or references to international law, can only be enacted by a state government.”74  
Muslims today, despite their religious group membership, live in territory-based nation-
states. Modern “Islamic nation-states,” a term I use to refer to those states with “constitutions 
that entrenched Islam or Islamic law (sharia) as a source, a primary source or the primary source 
for legislation,”75 are the closest parallel to the Islamic state referenced in sharia law. The 
Islamic state was a religious entity first and foremost, and was only thought of as a political 
entity in terms of its responsibility to protect individuals and communities. The head of state was 
a religious leader, not just a political leader. This is contrary to the religious and political 
underpinnings of many modern Western states, which distinguish between religious and political 
leaders regardless of widespread cultural or social commitments to a particular religion. 
Therefore, to function within the modern global order, “Islam’s previous role in governance had 
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to be realigned and reconfigured to fit the emergence of the ‘modern’ nation-state.”76 As a 
practical matter, nation-states are subject to the rules and norms of international law. So 
regardless of the influence of Islamic law on their constitutions or international relations policies, 
if Muslim majority states want to participate in the modern global order, they will be expected to 
abide by international law. International law eventually developed in order to manage relations 
of war and peace between nation-states, and a nation-state that refuses to acknowledge and abide 
by these laws and norms will be unable to maintain relationships with other members of the 
global order. 
IS is the most recent iteration of a new geopolitical phenomenon, which involves other 
Islamic political organizations, in addition to Islamic nation-states, declaring themselves to be 
Islamic States in both the political and religious sense of the term.77 Other examples of this 
phenomenon include “the Taliban’s proclamation of a state subject to Sharia law in Afghanistan 
in the 1990s, Hamas’s rule in the Gaza Strip since 2006, and Boko Haram’s declaration of an 
Islamic caliphate in Nigeria in 2014.”78 The 2014 declaration by IS, however, has been the most 
prominent of these declarations, due to the organization’s “territorial successes and sheer 
brutality,”79 which have forced the international community to take this claim more seriously 
than those of other Islamic political organizations. If IS is a nation-state, and provided that 
recognition is part of how we understand nation-states, it is subject to the rules and norms of 
international law, regardless of the influence of Islamic law on its governing documents or 
international relations policies. Even if Islamic political organizations like IS do not qualify as 
nation-states, the organizations, and the individuals that make up the organizations, cannot 
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operate outside of the system of international norms and laws. Any political organization that 
operates on a global scale will be subject to international laws, including economic law, criminal 
law, and the laws of armed conflict, even if cannot be held accountable in the same way that a 
nation-state can be held accountable. I will turn to these specific questions of responsibility in the 
final chapter. For now, I turn in the next section to an analysis of statehood under international 
law. 
4.3 Statehood and International Law 
In Section 4.1, I argued that a political conception of statehood requires both 
legitimate authority and recognition by other members of the global political community. 
Here, I will explore the legal conception of statehood, which informs both the legitimacy 
claims and recognitional possibilities under a political conception of statehood, and also relies 
on the political relationships identified under a political conception of statehood. The legal 
and the political do not inhabit two completely separate spheres. Law is “not an answer to 
politics, neither is it isolated from political purposes and struggles.”80 The international legal 
system, in particular, relies on many non-legal norms and political associations. Thus the 
following discussion of legal statehood will both rely on and inform the political conception 
of statehood  
4.3.A  Legal Theories of Statehood 
In international law, the two theories of state recognition mirror the concepts of 
authority and recognition discussed in Section 4.1. The constitutive theory argues that 
recognition is constitutive of statehood, and that rights and duties related to statehood derive 
from recognition by other [recognized] states.81 The declaratory theory, on the other hand, 
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understands statehood as an objective legal status that exists whether or not the state acquires 
recognition.82  
Most commentators today adopt the declaratory theory. 83  The 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which reflects the declaratory theory, has 
traditionally been used as a guide for determining whether or not a political entity qualifies as 
a state. Article 1 sets forth four criteria for statehood: a permanent population, a defined 
territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with the other states.84 A permanent 
population is, according to Oppenheim, an “aggregate of individuals of both sexes who live 
together as a community in spite of the fact that they may belong to different races or creeds, or 
be of different colour.85 The population “must have the intention to inhabit the territory on a 
permanent basis,” 86 and thus the territory must be habitable, 87 but this does not exclude nomadic 
populations from the possibility of statehood.88 The second condition requires that a state possess 
some territory, but there are no specific requirements as to the size or shape of the territory.89 
Statehood “requires a defined territory, but not necessarily defined or agreed external 
boundaries,” meaning disputes with neighboring states as to the precise status of these 
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boundaries does not preclude an entity from statehood.90 However, international law on the use 
of force does not permit states to take the territory of other states in order to create a new state.91 
The crucial feature of territory is that it must be effectively governed,92 which leads into the 
criterion of government. Recent interpretations of statehood require that a government be 
effective, rather than merely legitimate. 93  The traditional law of statehood requires “an 
institutionalized political, administrative and executive organizational machinery for the purpose 
of regulating the relations in the community and charged with the task of upholding the rules,” 
and this organizational machinery “must actually exercise state authority over the claimed 
territory and the people residing in that territory.”94 Finally, a state must have the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states. Commentators note that this does not require states to 
actually enter into these relations, just that a state has the capacity to do so.95 This criterion has 
been challenged on the basis that it is a “consequence of statehood” rather than a criterion, and 
also based on the fact that this capacity depends, at any given time, on the particular situation of 
states.96 
 Article 3 of the Convention states that “the political existence of the state is independent 
of recognition by the other states,” expressly adopting the declaratory view. The four criteria are 
supposed to be based on the principle of ex factis jus oritur, meaning they are to be viewed 
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without regard to legality or legitimacy.97 But having the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states seems to depend, at least somewhat, on the willingness of other states to enter into 
relations with a would-be state. This leads us to recognition and constitutive theory. Constitutive 
theory relies on the idea that a state cannot exist if it is not externally recognized as legitimate 
by other states. No “formal procedure exists to determine membership status,” but “the other 
members [of the community of sovereign states] must voice acceptance in substantial numbers 
before membership is legitimately obtained.”98  
The constitutive theory of statehood gained prominence following the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815, when “a small influential state circle granted diplomatic recognition only to 39 
political entities in Europe in order that they be treated as sovereign states.” 99 This rendered state 
sovereignty a phenomenon that could only come about through the legal act of recognition by its 
peers, rather than by satisfying a list of objective requirements for statehood.100 The constitutive 
model has fallen out of favor over the last century, but there is still much to be said for the idea 
that recognition could serve as proof of statehood and a commitment from the global community 
to continue to recognize a state as such.101 Hersch Lauterpacht, for instance, argues that while 
recognition is “declaratory of an existing fact, such declaration, made in the impartial fulfillment 
of a legal duty, is constitutive, as between the recognizing State and the new community, of 
international rights and duties associated with full statehood.”102  
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As with the political analysis of statehood in Section 4.1, it seems that a political 
community needs to meet the requirements of both the declaratory and constitutive theories to 
function as a state under international law. This does not mean that a community will fail to be a 
state if any one member of the global political and legal community does not recognize that 
community as a state. It does mean, however, that a community which merely meets the 
requirements for legal statehood under a declaratory theory of statehood, and does not have 
mutual recognition with a substantial portion of the rest of the global community, will fail to 
function as a state. Depending on the context, and assuming other nation-states are acting in 
good faith, I would argue that a political community that is recognized as a state by less than half 
of the other nation-states may fail to meet the requirements for statehood. It may be that the lack 
of recognition is indicative of some moral failure on the part of the would-be state, which would 
negate the legitimate authority of the political community. But even if the government possesses 
legitimate authority and exercises sovereign authority over the individual members of the 
political community, if the community is unable to engage in reciprocal relations with other 
members of the global order, it cannot function as a state.  
4.3.B  IS Statehood under International Law 
It follows that IS should meet the requirements of both the declaratory and constitutive 
theories of statehood in order to claim to be a state under international law. I now attempt to give 
the most generous analysis of IS’s claims of statehood possible. This is what matters for official 
political recognition and thus participation in the international community, and also for 
identifying the group’s responsibilities and liabilities with respect to the individuals over 
which it claims to exercise sovereign authority, which I consider in the next section. 
Under the declaratory theory, it is possible that IS could meet the requirements for 
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statehood, but unlikely. First, IS should have a population that intends to occupy territory on a 
permanent basis. As of June 2015, IS had control over territories containing a population of eight 
million inhabitants.103 While the population intends to stay in the territory, it is unlikely that most 
of the population would decide to be part of a state controlled by IS. But despite this fact, and the 
fact that IS members and other individuals may be non-permanent, there is no requirement that 
there be a particular relationship between the leaders of the political group and the population.104 
Accordingly, IS probably satisfies the first condition for a permanent population. 
Second, IS should have a defined territory. IS maintained control over a significant 
amount of territory from 2014 through early 2017 At the time, it controlled “cities, towns, 
refineries, and uses major conventional weapons including tanks to confront conventional armies 
of states with some degree of success.”105 Precisely-defined borders are not necessary in order 
for the existence of a broadly-defined territory to be recognized, because all that is required is 
that the political entity be able to “deny others from using coercion on its territory.”106 So land 
can be permanently contested and still be considered legitimately defined territory. However, the 
overall stability of IS control and the means by which IS acquired the territory in Iraq and Syria 
are straightforwardly challenged. While IS consistently maintained control over territory, it 
gained and lost control over particular areas on a regular basis. It also appears that IS acquired 
the territory in Syria and Iraq in violation of Article 11 of the Montevideo Convention, which 
declines “to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by 
force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, 
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or in any other effective coercive measure.”107 IS asserts that it has a moral right to the territory, 
which could negate the claim that their methods of acquisition were impermissible. This seems 
wrong, but the law would not recognize this claim regardless of its validity. Thus the grounds for 
establishing a defined territory are shaky at best. 
Third, IS should have a government. There is clearly a well-organized hierarchy in place 
to facilitate the administrative functioning of the military and political communities.108 The 
organization is complex and appears to function like a government, without relying too much on 
any one individual leader.109 Sharia law governs both households, business, and courts, and taxes 
are imposed on both Muslims and non-Muslims.110 There is no democracy nor is there much 
respect for rule of law,111 but these are not disqualifying under the Montevideo Convention. Thus 
IS should be able to meet this criterion. 
Fourth, IS should have the capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Recall 
that on the declaratory theory, this requirement is just about capacity for relations, not actual 
relations. IS has participated in economic transactions and engaged in “informal inter-state 
relations through social media platforms, where the group readily posts messages to states such 
as Italy, and the US.”112 This dialogue has not been reciprocated, but this is not required. 
Because no other state has recognized its statehood, and there are no international agreements 
between IS and any other international actor, the possibility of relations with other states seems 
implausible.113 The “admission of an entity to international organizations and its participation in 
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many bilateral or multilateral treaties play a role in the statehood discourse,” even if the 
declaratory theory rejects recognition as a criterion.”114 It remains possible for IS to meet this 
criterion, if this criterion can be met purely in the abstract or we adopt a broad view of what 
counts as “relations,” and thus is remains possible for IS to qualify as a state under the 
declaratory theory of statehood. 
The implausibility of IS’s statehood claim is even more glaring when we turn to the 
constitutive theory, as there is no evidence that other states accept IS as a member of the 
international sovereign state system. Only other non-state actors (or terrorist groups) have 
claimed allegiance to and acceptance of IS as a sovereign power.115 Other States actually 
“consider it a perversion that [IS] calls itself a State while simultaneously violating the 
fundamental rights of local inhabitants”116 and engaging in acts of aggression against sovereign 
states. For IS to achieve recognition by other states, it would need to acquire territory by less 
violent and more legitimate means.117Accordingly, due to the somewhat weak argument for 
statehood under the declaratory theory, and the very weak argument for statehood under the 
constitutive theory, I argue that IS should be considered a non-state actor. 
4.4 Relational State/Non-Statehood 
The final inquiry for this chapter relates to the relationship between a state (or non-
state actor) and other entities, including both individuals and other political actors. I argued in 
the last section that IS should not be considered a state, since it fails to meet the requirements 
of the constitutive theory of international law, and likely does not meet the requirements of 
the declaratory theory of international law either. However, I will briefly consider how the 
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group’s relationship to individuals and other political actors differs based on whether it is 
considered a state or a non-state actor. This analysis will set up the questions explored in 
Chapter Five regarding responsibility. 
4.4.A Relationship to Individuals 
If IS is a non-state actor, then the relationship between the between members of IS and 
the Yazidi people is likely one of civilians relating to civilians, or if we think of IS as a unit, 
between a non-state institution and civilians. This would mean that there are no positive 
obligations between IS members and the Yazidi people. Rather, all of the individuals would 
possess negative obligations to not commit crimes of theft, murder, sexual violence, etc. 
against the other individuals. These obligations would fall under the domestic laws of Syria 
and Iraq, as applicable, and international criminal law.  
However, if we consider IS to be a state, then the relationship between IS and the 
Yazidi people involves different obligations. It might be that the Yazidi people are citizens of 
a different state, and IS is perpetrating harms on citizens of another state. In this case, IS and 
its members would again be subject to the applicable domestic and international criminal laws 
for crimes against individuals, as well as the international crime of aggression. It could also 
be that the Yazidi people are citizens of the Islamic State, in which case the harm of sexual 
slavery is a harm done by IS to its own citizens. In the former case, the state might be able to 
claim to be acting in accordance with domestic law, but could be subject to individual and 
joint criminal responsibility under international law. If the Yazidis are citizens, the collective 
entity would have particular positive obligations toward the individual Yazidis, in virtue of its 
political status as a state, obligations that would warrant intervention by other states 
(including territorial incursions) if breached.  
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Finally, the Yazidi people could be members of some other category of people living 
in the Islamic State with a status different from that of full citizen. Islamic law suggests that 
the aim of the Muslim world is to bring the entire world to the Islamic faith, and thus the 
Muslim world consists of two parts: the Muslim and the non-Muslim. For IS, the Islamic State 
is the Muslim part of the world, which is known as dar al-islam, or the “domain of Islam,” 
while the rest of the world is dar al-harb, or the “domain of war.” The dar al-Islam refers to 
communities of Muslims, but also has historically included “non-Muslim communities, the 
dhimmis (protected people), whose separate communal laws and leaders were tolerated by the 
Islamic state as long as they did not challenge Muslim sovereignty.”118 The dhimmis (mostly 
Christians and Jews) were permitted to retain their own religions, but they were required to pay a 
poll tax to the Islamic authority.119 The dar-al harb, however, existed in a “state of nature” 
because the dar-al harb “lacked the standard of justice granted to believers under the Islamic 
public order.”120 So the Yazidis could be dhimmis, protected people living under the sovereign 
rule of IS. Or they could be part of the dar-al harb, which means IS sees them as outside the rule 
of law governing states, and already in a potential state of war.  
It follows that if IS is a non-state actor, the entity and its individual members have at least 
negative obligations of non-interference toward the Yazidi people. But if IS is a state, as it has 
claimed to be, then IS has positive obligations to protect the Yazidi people, either as citizens or 
as dhimmis. I am not a scholar of Islamic law, so I cannot say which status reflects the correct 
interpretation of Islamic law, but IS must have a view if it claims to exert legitimate control over 
the Yazidi people. In either situation, they cannot be justified in the rape, murder, or enslavement 
                                               
118  Sohail H. Hashmi and James Johnson, “Introduction,” in Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, Jewish, 
and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10. 
119  ʻAbd Allāh Aḥmad Naʻīm, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shariʻa (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), 31; Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, 163. 
120  Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, 163. 
 100 
of the Yazidi people based on the relationship between the political entity and the individual 
Yazidis.  
4.4.B Relationship to Other Political Actors 
The next question about statehood targets the relationship between a state or non-state 
actor and the rest of the world, as individual states, regional institutions, and the global 
community as a whole. While international law governs state actors more directly than other 
actors, any political organization has certain legal and political obligations under international 
law. For our purposes, IS and its members are subject to international humanitarian law, and 
may be subject to international criminal law (which I do not address here). This is again 
important to set us up for the next chapter, when we consider both the responsibility of 
perpetrators and the responsibilities of other actors in responding to mass atrocities.  
Most of the global community would not classify IS as a state, but instead would 
identify the group as a non-state actor at best, and as a terrorist group at worst. So even if IS 
sees itself as a state, there is likely a conflict between the group and the rest of the world as to 
how IS should be recognized, and a lack of mutual recognition. This means that nearly every 
member of the global community is not engaged in political or diplomatic relations with IS. 
Instead, much of the global community is participating either directly or indirectly in a 
campaign to limit the reach and violence generated by IS. This gives little support for the idea 
that IS is globally recognized as a legitimate political community on equal footing with states. 
On the legal front, there is clearly no legal recognition of IS as a state. Recognition of IS as a 
state would violate the sovereignty of states in the region, particularly Syria and Iraq. Again, 
it seems most plausible to view IS as a non-state actor, because their claims of territory or 
legitimacy as a state are invalid. If IS is a non-state actor, then the relationship it has with other 
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political communities is not reciprocal. Rather, IS continues to have negative obligations toward 
other states and their inhabitants, including duties to respect borders and obligations to obey laws 
on non-international armed conflicts. But it would not have any rights as a member of the state 
system either. 
If IS was recognized politically and/or legally as a state, on a reciprocal footing with 
the current states, it would have certain rights and obligations under the global political and 
legal order. IS would have the right to participate in the state system and in international 
organizations, and it would be entitled to a certain amount of respect of its choices as to 
political and economic operations, as well as territorial claims. But legal recognition of IS as a 
state would also invoke the application of international legal norms, including norms related 
to war and human rights. IS would be subject to international humanitarian law, with respect 
to its fighting. This would be a benefit in terms of ability of the international community to 
more clearly define its obligation to the Yazidi people and others, and in terms of its ability to 
hold IS accountable under international law, but it would also require respecting IS’s political 
and territorial claims. 
4.4.C IS and its Shifting Power 
I want to make a final point about the status of IS as a non-state actor in light of recent 
geo-political events. IS’s strongest claim related to statehood related to the territory it controlled 
at the height of its power. In mid-2015, for instance, IS may have controlled over 50 percent of 
Syria’s landmass.121 IS was able to regulate the territory through administrative control and 
operational military capabilities.122 Yet as of this writing, in early 2018, IS no longer maintains 
control over substantial territory.  The group has been effectively defeated in both Syria and Iraq, 
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having lost Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria toward the end of 2017.123 This raises questions 
about permanence – could IS really have been considered a state for such a short time, holding 
such tenuous control over territory? It seems that this is a good reason to have a multi-faceted 
definition of statehood. Conquering territory without recognition of the legitimacy of the claims 
will likely not result in long-term claims of statehood. The claims should be legitimate and 
garner some level of recognition from the international community. IS did not meet these 
criteria, and while their power has certainly changed, including their effective control over 
territory, their political status has not. Although it would be strange for the organization to have 
been a state three years ago, and not today, this is not dispositive. It does suggest, however, that 
we should think about the requirements for statehood in terms of maintaining a stable global 
order. If the line between statehood and non-statehood is too fine, there will be a significant 
impact on international relations, as states move in and out of a certain kind of participation in 
the international community. This is yet another reason why both authority and recognition are 
necessary to establish a community as a particular kind of political actor. 
 
In this chapter, I explored the political classifications and relationships that can be 
utilized in understanding a political entity like IS. I considered the relationship between Islamic 
law and states, and I analyzed the moral, political, and legal constructions of statehood, arguing 
that the classification should only be applied to groups that can satisfy both objective 
(declaratory) and relational (constitutive) requirements. aimed at establishing a framework for 
how we should think about individuals and groups. I looked at the relationship between political 
groups that may or may not be states, and their relationships with both individuals and other 
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political communities. I argued that IS should be considered a non-state actor rather than a state, 
because it cannot meet the relational requirements, and may not be able to meet the objective 
requirements either. But whether or not IS is a state, it has minimal obligations of non-
interference with the Yazidi people, and the ongoing acts of sexual slavery certainly represent a 
failure to meet these obligations. In the chapter that follows, I turn to questions of responsibility.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEXUAL SLAVERY 
In this final chapter, I build on my conceptions from previous chapters of groups, harm 
and political relationships to answer moral questions about how to assess responsibility in the 
case of the Yazidi women and girls. I consider the various types of individual and collective 
responsibility that arise from this and similar situations, in which both individuals and groups act 
to harm, and perhaps more interestingly, both individuals and groups fail to act to prevent harm. 
This chapter provides some resolution in terms of how we should understand the moral 
responsibility of these various entities, as well as an opening for how we might address the 
challenging questions of legal responsibility in the future.  
I begin with a general overview of the relevant features of moral responsibility, building 
on the discussion from Chapter Two about intentions and actions, and distinguishing the purpose 
of moral responsibility from purely causal or legal forms of responsibility. I construct a 
representative scenario of sexual enslavement of a Yazidi girl by an IS fighter to illustrate, for 
the rest of the chapter, the different models of responsibility that attach to this instance of harm. I 
then turn to three forms of moral responsibility and consider each in turn. First, I look at the 
traditional concept of individual responsibility for individual acts. Second, I look at collective 
responsibility for group acts. And finally, I look at shared responsibility of individuals and other 
entities for failures to act as a group to prevent harm. In this final section, I look not only at the 
responsibility of members of IS for harm done, but also at the responsibility of states and 
international organizations for failures to prevent harm. I ultimately conclude that many 
individuals and entities can be held responsible, in various ways, for the harms that have already 
been done to the Yazidi women and girls, and those that have been allowed to continue. 
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5.1 Moral Responsibility 
In this section, we can begin to understand moral responsibility as a general concept 
by first distinguishing it from other kinds of responsibility, and then go on to identify the 
necessary features for holding an individual or entity morally responsible. We will then return 
to the idea of what makes moral responsibility distinctive and identify the purpose of having 
practices of holding others (and perhaps ourselves1) morally responsible.  
One way to think about responsibility is in terms of causation. A hurricane, for 
instance, might be “responsible” for severe flooding in a coastal community. This sort of 
responsibility involves identifying causal connections, and thus it can be attributed to nature 
and other things that we wouldn’t be able to hold morally responsible. Another way to think 
about responsibility is in terms of legal obligations. An insurance company, for instance, 
might be legally responsible for paying to repair a home that flooded as a result of a 
hurricane, due to a contractual relationship between the homeowner and the insurance 
company. An individual who intentionally shot and killed a co-worker might be legally 
responsible for the death of the co-worker, in addition to being both causally and morally 
responsible. So while someone may incur more than one kind of responsibility due to their 
action or inaction, or due to their relationships, they are distinct. 
A person can be thought of as morally responsible when she is an apt target of moral 
praise or blame. In other words, moral responsibility involves the reactions that we should 
have to the choices individuals make. According to Aristotle, “praise and blame are dependent 
on whether the people in question are compelled or not to act as they do,”2 thus we can only 
identify an apt candidate for praise or blame based on her voluntary actions and voluntary 
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dispositions.3 Holding someone morally responsible through the practices of blaming or 
praising involves responding in a particular way to something of negative or positive 
normative significance, such as a character trait or behavior. Blame can either be seen as a 
judgment about an individual, or as an emotional response based on the features of 
interpersonal relationships. But most theorists agree that an emotional response rests on a 
judgment that an individual is, in fact, objectively responsible.4 I return to the questions of 
blaming practices shortly and again in later sections. 
  The most important questions about moral responsibility, for our purposes, are how 
we designate someone (or something) as a moral agent, and when that agent can be properly 
met with the reaction of praise or blame. In general, “the capacity to recognize the interests of 
others as making valid claims on one is necessary for moral agency.”5 Scanlon argues that moral 
blame is inappropriate when “a person lacks the general capacities presupposed by moral agency. 
If, as a result of mental illness or defect, a person is unable to understand and assess reasons or 
his judgments have no effect on his actions, then he cannot be a participant in a system of co-
deliberation, and must be seen, rather, as simply a force to be dealt with, like an animal.”6 Thus 
we cannot consider certain individuals to be full moral agents, such as children or other 
individuals who cannot process reasons to act as members of a moral community. R. Jay Wallace 
goes further and requires that moral agency involves the “ability to grasp and apply moral 
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reasons,” but also the ability “to govern one's behavior by the light of such reasons.”7 He would 
not attribute moral agency to one who could not “reflect on the ends they incline one to pursue in 
light of moral principles, and to adjust or revise one's ends as a result of such reflection.”8 This 
bar seems high, albeit desirable. Thus I will adopt Wallace’s view of moral agency, but with a 
minimal requirement for the ability to self-reflect. Minimal motivation should not disqualify one 
from the status of being a moral agent, although no motivation should, thus I will adopt a limited 
view that one must be able to understand, consider, and apply moral reasons. 
In thinking about when someone is not a moral agent, we can identify two different 
cases. In the first, moral agency is temporarily withheld, and a particular act is deemed 
“excused.” Excuses “challenge the claim (or suspicion) that s was morally responsible for x; 
they adduce conditions that make it unfair to hold s morally responsible for x.”9 An excuse does 
not change the fact that the act was morally wrong, but an excuse prevents a particular person 
from being deemed blameworthy for that action. Scanlon describes this as a situation in which 
“some agent, moral appraisal of whom is generally appropriate, cannot be judged on the basis of 
the action in question, since it does not reflect that person’s judgment-sensitive attitudes.”10 It 
might be inappropriate, for instance, to blame someone who does something accidentally, when 
it would be morally condemnable had it been done intentionally. It may also be inappropriate to 
blame someone who commits an immoral act, but does so in pursuit of an end that could justify 
the immoral act. However, an excuse does not prevent us from holding a moral agent as morally 
responsible in general. In the second case, moral agency is permanently (within or without a 
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particular timeframe) withheld, and a particular individual is deemed “exempt” from moral 
agency. While an excuse attaches to a particular act, exemptions attach to a would-be moral 
agent. P.F. Strawson argues that it would be unfair to hold someone morally responsible while 
they are under short-term conditions like hypnosis or extreme stress, and under long-term 
conditions like insanity or psychopathy.11  These exemption conditions acknowledge the 
criteria for moral agency discussed above by relieving a person of moral agency if she does 
not have what Wallace refers to as “the powers of reflective self-control.”12 He requires that a 
moral agent must have (1) the power to grasp and apply moral reasons, and (2) the power to 
control or regulate his behavior by the light of such reasons.”13 The cases described by Strawson 
as extreme situations in which we should not hold someone morally responsible involve an 
inability to exert control over one’s own behavior through the use of moral reasoning. 
The second of these questions, when an agent can be properly met with praise or 
blame, acknowledges the fact that we don’t want to hold someone responsible for something 
over which that person had no control. We want our practice of blaming to track the choices 
that someone has made, rather than bad luck (or mere bad luck). But how do we determine 
when someone has made a choice without undue influence? Arguably, no one acts without the 
influence of others, or the past influence of others. Aristotle argues that voluntary actions 
must originate in the decision-making of the agent, rather than as the result of compulsion or 
ignorance.14 When an agent is aware of the particular circumstances of an action, and makes 
the choice to take the action (even where there is a confined set of choices), an agent acts 
                                               
11  Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 8-9. 
12  Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, 157. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1110a1. 
 109 
voluntarily, and we may properly blame him.15 This relies on the agent’s ability to exert some 
amount of self-control and self-awareness. Thus returning to Wallace once again, it is only 
appropriate to blame an agent if she can exert reflective self-control. 
It should now be clear that when we talk about moral responsibility, we generally act 
under the assumption that a particular action has been taken (or not taken) by an agent. Most 
of the questions that remain relate to the mental state of the moral agent, in terms of their 
intent, external influences, and the presence of alternative possibilities. When we get to group 
responsibility in the third and fourth sections, the action questions will become more 
challenging. 
There is one final aspect of moral responsibility to discuss before we set up a case 
study and consider the relevant ways moral responsibility can be properly attributed to 
different individuals and groups: the purpose of moral responsibility. I have already discussed 
the practice of praising and blaming, but we have not delved into the reasons why we might 
want to have this practice, instead of just thinking about responsibility as causal or legal in 
nature. There are two main views about when someone is “appropriately” blamed. The first is 
Kant’s merit-based conception, that someone is appropriately praise or blamed when this 
reaction is merited, or deserved, due to her choices. 16  The judgment that an agent is 
blameworthy involves an assessment of her metaphysical control and the possibility of 
alternative actions.17  The other view is that praise or blame is warranted when the reaction is 
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likely to lead to a desirable outcome, such as the actor changing her behavior in the future.18  
A judgment on the consequentialist view involves an assessment of the agent’s control in 
terms of whether the behavior could be influenced by praise or blame.19 A third view comes 
from Strawson, who argues that we can’t actually justify our blaming practices from an 
external perspective, be it Kantian or consequentialist. Rather, according to Strawson, we 
praise or blame because it is an essential feature of our interpersonal way of life.20 
I adopt a moderate consequentialist view of moral responsibility, which includes 
features of the Kantian and Strawsonian views of blameworthiness. I don’t agree with the 
Kantian sentiment that we must hold everyone to account for their actions in order to show the 
appropriate respect for them as moral agents. We shouldn’t seek to blame an individual if the 
practice seems likely to generate only negative outcomes. But neither should we blame 
individuals purely based on desired outcomes. Blame must be merited in some way, through 
the choices that one has made, for blame to be properly attributed, or else the practice will 
become meaningless. I agree with Strawson’s view of reactive attitudes as a constitutive part 
of our interpersonal relationships, and I think the consequentialist view of blame can 
incorporate the importance of acknowledging and maintaining these relationships through 
practices of praise and blame. If we want to live in communities, which I would argue is a 
desirable outcome, we need to be able to hold each other responsible for our choices. I now 
turn to what this practice of blaming should look like in the context of the sexual enslavement 
of Yazidi women and girls.  
                                               
18  See, e.g., J. J. C. Smart, “Free-Will, Praise and Blame,” Mind 70, no. 279 (1961); Daniel C. Dennett, 
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); Manuel 
Vargas, Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013).  
19  Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” 258. 
20  Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 24. 
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5.2 Case Study: Nadia Murad 
In order to draw out the different models of moral responsibility for the harm of sexual 
enslavement of Yazidi women and girls, and to make some distinctions between these models 
for different actors, I will present some salient features of a real case study. This case study 
comes from the story of Nadia Murad, a young Yazidi woman who was captured and held as a 
sex slave in 2014, as she tells it in her memoir.21 Nadia herself notes throughout her story the 
individuals and groups of individuals that she holds responsible for actions taken and actions 
not taken, which resulted in serious harm to herself, her family, and her community. There are 
many atrocities described in her story, but I will focus on responsibility for harms that occur 
to Nadia leading up to and during her ordeal as a sex slave. 
Nadia22 was living with her family in a town called Kocho in 2014 when IS fighters 
arrived to the Sinjar region. The Kurdistan Regional Government had sent additional 
peshmerga (military forces) to guard the Yazidi towns after IS captured Mosul, but when IS 
drew close, the peshmerga withdrew, and many of the Sunni Arab neighbors welcomed the IS 
militants. IS began launching attacks on surrounding communities, facing little resistance, and 
many Yazidis fled to Mount Sinjar, where they were trapped without food or water. Some of 
these Yazidis eventually escaped to Syria with the help of U.S. air strikes. Nadia stayed with 
her family in Kocho for nearly two weeks after the siege of Kocho began on August 3, unable 
to flee due to the presence of IS militants. They heard rumors that Yazidi women and girls had 
been abducted and were being used by IS as sex slaves. 
On August 15, Nadia’s family was told by IS to gather at the primary school, where 
they would be given the choice to convert to Islam or be taken to Mount Sinjar to stay with 
                                               
21  Nadia Murad and Jenna Krajeski, The Last Girl: My Story of Captivity, and My Fight against the Islamic 
State (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017). 
22  In the case study I will refer to Murad by her first name, Nadia. 
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the rest of the Yazidis who had refused to convert. However, when they reached the school, 
none of the Yazidis were taken to Mount Sinjar. Nadia’s family and community was split up 
by age and sex. The men were put on a truck and shot, with only a few survivors. The boys 
were forced to convert to Islam. The older and married women were eventually killed, and the 
younger women were transported several times, with Nadia eventually ending up in Mosul. 
On the bus ride, one of the men, Abu Batat, began groping the breasts of the girls while he 
walked up and down the aisle of the bus. He also forced some of the girls to stand and have 
their pictures taken, ostensibly for use later as part of their being sold as slaves. When Nadia 
complained about the abuse to a commander, Nafah, he responded: “‘I don’t know what you 
thought we had taken you for,’ he said. ‘But you have no choice. You are here to be sabaya, 
and you will do exactly what we say. And if any of you scream again, trust me, things will be 
even worse for you.’”23 Nadia explains this term to her reader as follows: 
 When ISIS took over Sinjar and began kidnapping Yazidis, they called their 
human spoils sabaya (sabiyya is singular), referring to the young women they 
would buy and sell as sex slaves. This was part of their plan for us, sourced 
from an interpretation of the Koran that had long been banned by the world’s 
Muslim communities, and written into the fatwas and pamphlets ISIS made 
official before they attacked Sinjar. Yazidi girls were considered infidels, and 
according to the militants’ interpretation of the Koran, raping a slave is not a 
sin. We would entice new recruits to join the ranks of the militants and be 
passed around as a reward for loyalty and good behavior. Everyone on the bus 
was destined for that fate. We were no longer human beings—we were 
sabaya.24 
 
When the bus reached Mosul and the girls were moved into a heavily-guarded house, 
Abu Batat and Nafah burned Nadia with a cigarette on her stomach and shoulder to punish her 
for speaking out against the molestation by Abu Batat and for screaming when he touched her. 
She made a pact later that night with her niece Kathrine, that they would commit suicide 
                                               
23  Murad and Krajeski, The Last Girl, 186. 
24  Ibid. Italics in original. 
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before being taken by the IS militants, but they quickly changed their minds and promised to 
help each other escape if they could. The next day Nadia was sold to a high-ranking IS 
official, a judge, called Hajji Salman, and the day after that she was forced to covert to Islam 
and “marry” Hajji Salman, meaning she was officially declared to be his property. After the 
marriage they stopped at the house of Morteja, Hajji Salman’s guard. Nadia recalls meeting 
Morteja’s mother and being shocked that this woman had done nothing to stop the IS militants 
from taking over Mosul and making people suffer, and instead was openly celebrating the 
enslavement of girls like Nadia.  
Hajji Salman raped Nadia daily for four or five days before he sold her. Despite the 
presence of many guards, on Nadia’s last night in Hajji Salman’s house, she attempted to 
escape through a window. After she was caught, Hajji Salman beat her with a whip, and then 
she was gang raped by Morteja and two other IS militants who were guards in the house. The 
following day she was sold to a man named Abu Muawaya who lived in nearby Hamdaniya. 
Nadia was raped by Abu Muawaya and his friends for several days before she was again 
moved. Abu Muawaya left her at a checkpoint between Hamdaniya and Mosul, where she was 
raped by two IS militants. A man named Hajji Amer picked her up from the checkpoint the 
next day and drove her back to Mosul, where he assaulted her and told her she would be in his 
house for a week, and would be moved to Syria. Hajji Amer left Nadia alone with the door 
unlocked, and she was able to escape, eventually making her way back to Kurdistan to be 
reunited with what remained of her family with the help of a Sunni family in Mosul.  
5.3 Individual Responsibility 
Identifying individual responsibility for individual acts is the most straightforward 
analysis of responsibility, assuming at least some acts can be individuated. As noted in 
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Section 5.1, we need to identify that an agent has reflective self-control, which means they are 
not exempt from moral responsibility, and that their specific actions are not excused by the 
circumstances surrounding the action. As I am skeptical of the possibility of psychopaths, and 
particularly with respect to the participants in mass atrocity, I will assume that this exemption 
condition does not apply to any of the individuals considered in what follows. Because of the 
limited information we have about each individual, and their respective religious views and 
educational background, I also do not consider whether the excuse of ignorance applies. It 
could be argued that each member of IS, and particularly those who fulfill lower-level roles 
within the organization, could claim ignorance that what they are doing is wrong given their 
firmly held religious views. I accept at least certain objective moral claims, and the wrongness 
of sexual slavery is one of them (see Chapter Three). Accordingly, although I suppose it is 
theoretically possible, this claim sounds absurd, and thus I do not consider whether individual 
perpetrators could be excused for their actions on these grounds. Because this needs little 
setup beyond what was already explicated in Section 5.1, I will turn immediately to an 
analysis of the individuals involved in perpetrating harm on Nadia. 
In the case of sexual enslavement, such as that experienced by Nadia, it is perhaps 
easier than in some other cases of mass atrocity to identify individual perpetrators with clear 
individual responsibility. In cases of mass killing with the aim of extinction, for instance, the 
ultimate goal cannot be achieved without the participation of many perpetrators. Yet once the 
aim has been achieved, in most cases the perpetrators will move on to achieve another goal, 
either jointly or separately. But with sexual enslavement, despite the participation of many to 
create the conditions necessary for the individual atrocities to occur, it is individuals who 
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make the choice to confine and assault the women and girls. Thus it is relatively simple to 
analyze the moral responsibility of at least some of the perpetrators. 
We can begin with Abu Batat, who is participating in the larger project by supervising 
the transportation of the Yazidi women and girls to Mosul, but also has his own project. He 
choses to exercise his power over all of the girls on the bus, and Nadia in particular, by 
groping and taunting them. There is no indication that he is acting under someone else’s 
orders, although he could be, yet his attitude does not appear to be one of someone acting 
under duress. As Nadia notes, Abu Batat “seemed to enjoy his job, stopping at certain rows to 
peer at the girls, singling out the ones who cowered or pretended to be asleep.”25 While his 
actions were likely part of the plan to dehumanize the Yazidi women and girls prior to their 
sale as sex slaves, he clearly seemed to have the intent to harm them, and Nadia in particular. 
She notes that he groped her “hard as if he wanted to hurt me.”26 Later, when Nafah burns 
Nadia with a cigarette, Abu Batat is the one who hands him the lit cigarette. Nadia recalls his 
response to her suffering: “‘She screams now, will she scream tomorrow?’ Abu Batat said to 
the others. He wanted them to be even harsher with me. ‘She needs to understand what she is 
and what she’s here for.’” 27  Thus Abu Batat seems to meet all the conditions for 
blameworthiness, since he has indicated the ability to reflect on his interactions with Nadia 
and inflict further harm upon her in light of them. While we are in a limited epistemic 
position, we have no reason to think he is exempt or excused from blame for his behavior. 
The final question is the purpose of blame, and this raises the question of who counts as a 
member of our community. I doubt Nadia would want to consider Abu Batat a member of her 
community, but it seems that he was, at least for a time, part of her moral community due to 
                                               
25  Ibid., 181. 
26  Ibid., 183. 
27  Ibid., 193. 
 116 
their interactions. His actions were reprehensible, resulting in the harm of many Yazidis just 
based on Nadia’s account, and thus he should be blamed for his acts of groping and terror. 
  Nafah should be blamed similarly, although he does not actively grope anyone during 
Nadia’s story. Yet he makes it clear that he is individually participating in a larger plan to 
enslave the Yazidi women and girls, and indicates that Abu Batat’s actions are a necessary 
part of it. Nadia notes that he was “particularly cruel and harsh, shouting at us without an 
ounce of humanity,”28 and he repeats that the Yazidis have no choice but to submit to the 
ownership of IS. Nafah also takes his own action to actively harm Nadia, burning her shoulder 
and stomach with a lit cigarette. As with Abu Batat, we have no indication that he is acting 
under duress, and his decision to burn Nadia reveals that he too has taken the time to reflect 
on her complaints about Abu Batat, and take action to ensure that she performs her 
subservient role without complaint in the future. Nafah is blameworthy for his individual acts 
that contribute to the dehumanization of Nadia. 
 Hajji Salman, the man to whom Nadia is initially sold, is blameworthy for his 
individual acts against Nadia, including his direction that she should be gang-raped following 
her failed escape attempt. He rapes her multiple times, forces her to be “married” to him, and 
restricts her movements. Again, the mass sexual slavery has been planned by IS, but the 
individual actions of Hajji Salman reflect his own belief that Nadia is not a human being, and 
he makes choices to treat her as he does. Nadia describes Hajji Salman as “the worst, in part 
because he was the first to rape me and in part because he acted the most like he hated me. He 
hit me if I tried to close my eyes. For him, it was not enough just to rape me—he humiliated 
me as often as he could, spreading honey on his toes and making me lick it off or forcing me 
                                               
28  Ibid., 185. 
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to dress up for him.”29 According to Nadia, he seems to obtain and discard young Yazidi 
women regularly. While he does not exercise control over her for more than a few days, he 
treats Nadia as a slave by raping her and giving her specific instructions for how to dress and 
act, and then punishing her for insubordination by telling his guards to rape her as well. He is 
personally blameworthy for each of these actions. 
 Hajji Salman’s guards are also individually blameworthy for their actions in raping 
Nadia, although their moral responsibility could be slightly mitigated by their lower position 
within the structure of IS.  Yet their actions when they are alone (or somewhat alone) with 
Nadia do not indicate that they act under duress. Nadia describes an earlier interaction with 
Morteja, for instance, by claiming that “[w]ithout Hajji Salman nearby, [Morteja] approached 
me with more authority, but it seemed put on, like a boy wearing his father’s shoes.”30 When 
he rapes her as instructed by Hajji Salman, Nadia says he “acted like a child who had been 
allowed a treat he had been whining for.”31 Morteja had certainly been influenced and 
instructed by IS, and he wants to emulate those with more power in the organization, but this 
doesn’t take away from the choices he makes. We have less information about the other two 
guards, but Nadia does not experience any sympathy or remorse from either of these guards 
either. She recalls that one of the guards took off his glasses before raping her, and she says 
she “will never forget the other guard’s glasses, the way he was so gentle with them and so 
vicious with me, a person.”32 All three of the guards are blameworthy for their individual 
actions, since there is no evidence that they warrant excuse or exemption, and it is incumbent 
on the global moral community to condemn their actions. 
                                               
29  Ibid., 268. 
30  Ibid., 229. 
31  Ibid., 268. 
32  Ibid. 
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 The IS militants at the checkpoint and Hajji Amer are similarly individually 
blameworthy for their assaults on Nadia and accompanying cruelty in the face of her sickness. 
But there is not much more to say about these men than has already been said about her other 
perpetrators, since these men also acted in private when they harmed Nadia. Thus I will close 
this section by briefly distinguishing these blameworthy individuals from one of the sons in 
the Sunni family that helped Nadia escape to Kurdistan. Nasser risked his own safety and that 
of his entire family by accompanying Nadia, with fake documents in hand, on her journey 
back to her own family. He was kind to Nadia while she stayed with his family, and then 
continually reflected on the dangerous situations they faced together on their journey, making 
the decision to proceed with their journey at every opportunity to turn back. Nasser had no 
special obligation to help Nadia, and his choices to help her, despite the risk, warrant robust 
praise from the global moral community.  
5.4 Collective Responsibility for Group Acts 
Collective responsibility as a general term associates moral agency with group agents 
rather than individual agents. It refers to the causal responsibility and blameworthiness of 
groups, where moral responsibility is located in the group, as a collective, rather than in the 
individual members of the group. Some argue that the concept of collective responsibility is 
meaningless, claiming that responsibility can only be attributed to individuals who have their 
own intentions and engage in their own discrete acts. Those who defend the possibility of 
collective responsibility claim that some intentions and acts, and corresponding 
blameworthiness, can fairly be attributed to groups. I have already adopted a view of collectives 
that groups can constitute agents, and here I argue that they can constitute moral agents. In 
Chapter Two, I endorse a hybrid view of groups, which permits me to attribute individual 
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responsibility to individual members of IS, while still attributing collective responsibility to 
group agents in this section. Not only does my view permit such dual attribution, but I claim that 
it is necessary in order to accurately capture all of the features of collective action. 
Moral agency can exist for groups because they can act with a collective version of 
reflective self-control. They can share beliefs and intentions, which means they can share moral 
reasons for their joint actions. The internal self-reflection that is performed by individuals must 
occur externally in groups, and we can see it through internal records as well as public 
statements and publications put out by a group. While some would argue that group intention and 
action is nothing more than an aggregation of the intentions and actions of the individuals that 
make up the group, this ignores the social influence and interpersonal relationships within a 
group, which cannot be captured by mere aggregation. Thus we cannot fully capture the moral 
responsibility for groups by attributing it to its individual members.    
I begin, of course, with IS. I argued in Chapter Two that IS is an organization that claims 
to act in accordance with one ideology, in service of its religious duty of spreading Islam and 
establishing an Islamic caliphate. We have significant evidence that most of the actions attributed 
to IS are part of a larger plan, but the evidence of plans for mass sexual slavery is particularly 
damning. Amal Clooney, in the forward to Nadia’s book, explains as follows: 
ISIS even released a pamphlet entitled Questions and Answers on Taking 
Captives and Slaves to provide more guidelines. “Question: Is it permissible to 
have intercourse with a female slave who has not reached puberty? Answer: It 
is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn’t reached 
puberty if she is fit for intercourse. Question: Is it permissible to sell a female 
captive? Answer: It is permissible to buy, sell, or gift female captives and 
slaves, for they are merely property.33 
 
As a group, IS has a shared goal of exerting complete control over the Yazidi people, through 
                                               
33  Amal Clooney, forward to The Last Girl, 18. 
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extermination, conversion, and enslavement. The belief that they are infidels, and not worthy 
of the same respect as other human beings, justifies this shared goal for the members of IS. In 
this way, the “moral reasons” that IS has to reflect on are warped, but this misplaced 
motivation is not an excuse. The intent is to harm, and the belief that Yazidi women and girls 
are property instead of human beings cannot be justified. Individual militants perform distinct 
tasks in order to achieve this aim of complete control. The siege of Kocho, for instance, 
required the concerted and persistent actions of many IS militants, none of whom appeared to 
Nadia to show any resistance to the task they had been ordered to perform. There are more 
individual actors involved in the perpetration of mass sexual enslavement, as evidenced by the 
previous section, but the overall endeavor requires significant joint action. The drivers and the 
guards, the men purchasing the Yazidi women and girls, and the judges recording their 
property claims all play a role in supporting the joint endeavor. No one or two IS members 
could have designed and implemented such a scheme, and it requires joint intention and 
action in order to be successful. I noted quite a few named individuals in the last section, but 
most of the actors in Nadia’s story are nameless faces who played some small role in creating 
the conditions and logistics for her sexual enslavement. Thus the group IS is blameworthy in 
its capacity as a group moral agent.34 
 As I noted in Chapter Two, there is a concern about how to address the individuals 
who are “members” of IS but do not share the aim of exerting control over all Yazidis, or who 
were only forced to convert to Islam and join IS under duress. I noted that this may place him 
outside of the we-mode analysis for purposes of the situations in which an individual IS 
                                               
34  Because I adopt a view of groups and individuals that utilizes both the I-mode and the we-mode, I see the 
attribution of individual and collective responsibility as something that occurs concurrently. Both are 
necessary because they capture different features of intention and action, and one does not reduce the need 
for the other. 
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member does not agree with the premise of the rest of the group. Had there been an IS 
militant in Kocho who wanted to force all Yazidis to convert to Islam, but who did not agree 
with mass sexual slavery, he may not be part of the collective that would be blameworthy. Yet 
at some point, if he knew that an outcome of his control over the Yazidis was the sexual 
enslavement of many women and girls, it would be hard to say that he had not participated in 
the joint action with at least a recklessness toward the joint intention of mass sexual 
enslavement. This is blameworthy, as it involves reflection on the outcome of one’s choices, 
and a decision to proceed with conscious disregard for the consequences. With respect to the 
overall subjugation of the Yazidi people, a more challenging question is presented by the 
young Yazidi boys who were forced to convert to Islam and serve as human shields, suicide 
bombers, or militants. While the initial conditions of their group membership were coercive, it 
is their long-term integration into the group that will matter most in terms of responsibility. If 
they do not integrate and adopt the shared beliefs and intentions of the group, it is unlikely 
that an attribution of collective moral responsibility will be properly made to them.  And with 
respect to the sexual slavery experienced by their mothers, sisters, and cousins, none of the 
Yazidi boys appear in Nadia’s story as perpetrators.   
 The next collective to consider is the Kurdish government, which made the decision to 
withdraw the peshmerga at some point during the siege of Sinjar. When Mosul fell, the 
Kurdish government sent these Iraqi fighters to guard Kocho. Nadia explains that some 
Yazidis, including a few of her brothers, sought to receive training from the peshmerga so that 
the Yazidis could protect themselves. Instead, “[n]o one offered to train the Yazidi men or 
encourage them to join the fight against the terrorists. The peshmerga assured us that as long 
as they were there, we had nothing to worry about, and that they were as determined to protect 
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Yazidis as they were the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan.”35 But instead they prevented the Yazidis 
who tried to leave from leaving, and eventually fled Sinjar as soon as IS militants arrived. 
 The collective intent of the Kurdish peshmerga is less clear than that of IS with respect 
to mass sexual enslavement of the Yazidis. It may have been that each individual fighter 
realized his life was in danger, and they all left out of the own self-interest. And if any 
individual fighters intended to stay, he would have been forced to leave if he acknowledged 
the great danger he faced alone, and his complete inability to protect the Yazidis without the 
rest of the group. But it seems more likely that the peshmerga acted in response to a group 
directive, based on a group belief about the impending danger and the group’s inability to stop 
it from happening. As the peshmerga are part of a military organization, the most likely 
scenario is that the Kurdish government ordered them to escape Sinjar before it became 
impossible due to the presence of IS militants. If this is the case, this means the Kurdish 
government acknowledged its obligation to protect the Yazidis after the fall of Mosul and then 
abandoned its duty as soon as it became clear that they might not be able to fulfill its duty to 
the Yazidis. It does seem that the peshmerga faced a serious challenge in the form of IS, and 
this may have exerted a significant amount of stress on the organization in deciding whether 
or not they should stay and fight. But it also seems that they were aware of what IS was likely 
to do to the Yazidi people, and they decided to cut and run anyway. Thus the peshmerga, as a 
group, maintain some level of collective moral responsibility for the sexual enslavement of 
Nadia and thousands of others. The group’s decision, at some level, to abandon Kocho and 
other parts of Sinjar was a necessary factor in the eventual harms that befell Nadia and many 
others.   
                                               
35 Murad and Krajeski, The Last Girl, 31.  
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 Before turning to shared responsibility, I briefly consider the moral responsibility of 
Iraq and Syria. In the next section I will look at the moral responsibility of the international 
community, but Iraq and Syria had special obligations to prevent and stop the sexual 
enslavement of the Yazidis in their own territory. However, it seems that we should refrain 
from blaming these two states, as they might qualify for a collective excuse or exemption. The 
success of IS in 2014 meant that neither of these states had control over large parts of their 
territory, including Sinjar and Mosul. Iraqi and Syrian forces were already fighting IS in many 
places. Thus it seems that they might not be blameworthy for several reasons. First, it may 
have been that these states did not have an available option to protect or save the Yazidis. If 
their troops were otherwise engaged in fighting IS and were too depleted to come to Sinjar, 
then they could not have made a collective decision to do so. The Syrian and Iraqi 
governments may also qualify for a short-term exemption based on the extreme stress they 
were facing from IS (and other forces) at the time. Either way, there is a good argument to be 
made that there are good reasons to refrain from blaming these governments. As both of these 
countries try to rebuild from years of war, and the case for blaming is weak, we might think 
that we should be encouraging community-building instead of engaging in practices of 
blaming. Thus despite their unique responsibility to protect the Yazidi women and girls that 
were trafficked in their respective territories, we should refrain from blaming Iraq and Syria. 
5.5 Shared Responsibility for Group Acts  
Shared responsibility is an alternative form of group responsibility, and it requires a bit 
more explication than either individual or collective responsibility. The term refers to the concept 
of individual group members each being held partially responsible for harm that is caused by the 
group’s actions. So we can think of the difference between collective and shared responsibility in 
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terms of distribution: collective responsibility applies blame to the group as a whole, while 
shared responsibility applies blame to individual members of the group. Even if we accept the 
possibility of group responsibility as collective responsibility, we might wonder if (and how) it is 
possible to fairly distribute blame among the individual members of a group. For our purposes, I 
will focus on shared responsibility for the failure to protect the Yazidi women and girls, 
especially for collectives that are not well-organized groups.    
5.5.A An Account of Shared Responsibility 
An attribution of collective responsibility relies on the identification of something over 
and above the individual contributions of each member of a group, but since shared 
responsibility is about the aggregation of individual responsibility, it can be used to understand 
responsibility within groups that are less cohesive. Thus it is particularly useful for situations in 
which a person made a “choice that contributed to a harm for which that person was then at least 
partially responsible.”36 This tracks our earlier discussion of voluntariness, in that we can hold 
people at least partially responsible for choices made while maintaining the capacity for 
reflective self-control. But on my view, shared responsibility allows for us to hold individuals 
responsible for voluntary actions and attitudes that were not intended to cause the harm, or may 
not have directly caused the harm.   
What is important for identifying a possible locus of shared responsibility is to look at 
whether “a collection of persons displays either the capacity for joint action or common 
interest.”37 This capacity is located in the structure of the group rather than in the individuals, but 
this does not make the group exist independently of the individuals. Arguably, a “group” can 
exist based on the capacity of the individuals for joint action, not the actual shared commitments 
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shared responsibility, I draw significant resources from May’s view. 
37  Ibid., 29-30. 
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and intentions. I am concerned here with putative groups created out of circumstance rather than 
shared interests. Take the example of a drowning child in view of a collection of bystanders on 
the shore, for instance, which I will refer to as Beach.38 None of individuals who hear the 
drowning child are capable of saving her on their own, but should they be obligated to coordinate 
amongst themselves to facilitate a rescue attempt? We might think not, since in this sort of 
emergency they do not necessarily have the time to coordinate amongst themselves. We can 
contrast this example of a drowning emergency with a famine (which I will call Famine), a 
situation in which there is more time for a putative group of individuals (or institutions) to 
develop the mechanisms necessary to coordinate group action.39 A putative group in this case 
could be held collectively responsible for failing to coordinate and failing to prevent harm, and 
as we turn to now, individually responsible for failing to prevent harm. Shared responsibility, 
however, does not rely on the existence of a group, since it is based on the aggregation of 
individual responsibility. 
When responsibility is shared, individual responsibility should be divided fairly among 
the various actors, but not necessarily equally. Both individual and collective responsibility for 
inaction should acknowledge capacity, since “some persons in [a] collective may be able, 
because of their various leadership skills, to be more effective in bringing these people to form a 
group able to act intentionally.”40 Thus an individual who could have used leadership skills to 
prevent harm should have a greater share of responsibility than those who were only capable of 
following orders. In Beach, a CEO is likely more responsible than a teenager for failing to 
coordinate the pair of former Olympic swimmers to work together to save the drowning child. 
And Famine, it may be that relief organizations with experience responding to large-scale crises 
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receive more blame for the continued harm than a new nation-state with few resources. 
Individuals should be required to do as much as they are capable of doing, which is based on an 
assessment of an individual’s capacity, and which does not change in relation to the capacities of 
the other individuals in the putative group.  
The concept of shared responsibility is important because it provides a mechanism for 
holding individuals responsible for inaction in situations where they could have prevented harm 
by coordinating with other, similarly situated individuals. So an account of shared responsibility 
for collective inaction should be focused on inspiring and motivating individuals to be better. Yet 
most accounts of collective responsibility and for shared responsibility for collective inaction are 
retrospective, in that they take a particular harm and attempt to identify who (or what) can be 
held responsible for the harm.41 It is easy to see why this is appealing: it allows us to create the 
kinds of counterfactuals that are necessary in order to generate responsibility for inaction. While 
we are not in an epistemic position to know exactly what was possible, we can know certain 
features of the individuals who failed to act, and we know the extent of the harm that occurred, 
and this can allow us to work backwards to create various counterfactuals. But this retrospective 
look at collective inaction does not provide the same motivation as a forward-looking view of 
shared responsibility. Forward-looking responsibility establishes what individuals or other 
entities should be doing, not what they should have done in the past. Particularly when we think 
about ongoing crises like the one in Famine, there is good reason to think that future harm can be 
prevented, and focusing on past collective inaction does not necessarily motivate anyone to 
mitigate the ongoing harm. Forward-looking responsibility can get us to the same sort of analysis 
                                               
41  See, e.g., Virginia Held, “Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?,” Journal of 
Philosophy 68, no. 14 (1970); David Copp, “Responsibility for Collective Inaction,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 22, no. 2 (1991); Torbjörn Tännsjö, “The Myth of Innocence: On Collective Responsibility and 
Collective Punishment,” Philosophical Papers 36, no. 2 (2007); Björn Petersson, “Collective Omissions and 
Responsibility,” Philosophical Papers 37, no. 2 (2008); May, Shared Responsibility.  
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we do when we try to create a counterfactual to establish if a collective of individuals should 
have been expected to organize themselves into a group to prevent harm. However, it can use the 
tools that are immediately available and give normative force to the moral responsibilities that 
are determined by the analysis. This means we are focused on achieving particular states of 
affairs, i.e. a world/nation/community with less suffering, rather than merely designating which 
entities will be blamed if these states of affairs do not materialize. 
Tracy Isaacs offers such a forward-looking view of collective inaction, which she refers 
to as “collective obligation” to distinguish from backward-looking “collective responsibility.”42 
She gives her own example of a case in which several individual bystanders should work 
together to prevent harm to some children rafting nearby, and she goes on to argue that we 
should be focusing on our current and future “obligations” to perform particular acts. She frames 
responsibility as a prescriptive rather than an evaluative concept. Yet Isaacs is limited in her own 
ability to be prescriptive as well because she is focused on collective obligations, rather than 
individual obligations as parts of a shared collective obligation. She claims that individual 
responsibility in collective contexts can only be understood in terms of collective responsibility, 
and she sees “no necessary connection between collective blameworthiness and individual 
blameworthiness.”43 Isaacs does see collective obligation as providing a useful framework for 
understanding individual failures to act, especially in terms of what role an individual might take 
in a potential response to harm. We agree that with respect to collective action, “certain 
individuals are in a better position than others to direct the actions of the collective and to see 
that the collective’s intention actions are consistent with its obligations as a collective.”44 It is 
                                               
42  Tracy Lynn Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (Oxford University Press, 2011); Tracy 
Isaacs, “Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (2014). 
43  Isaacs, “Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation,” 43. 
44  Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 134. 
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true that we can’t understand collective inaction from a purely individualistic perspective, and 
individuals should be expected to engage in collective action based on their own abilities. But 
her focus on the collective is too attenuated to be properly motivating. It looks like any given 
individual might be able to eschew her obligations, and the collective would have the same 
obligation to prevent future harm, only the roles would have to be redistributed among the group 
members. The individual could ostensibly avoid her individual obligation by removing herself 
from the putative group prior to an assessment of the collective obligation. The obligation should 
be shared between the individuals, where each is blameworthy for failing to fulfill her 
obligation. 
We might think that given the relative moral weight of a failure to intervene to prevent 
harm, shame might be a more appropriate reactive attitude than blame, to reflect a less 
accusatory assessment. If we take a forward-looking view of shared responsibility, then neither 
blame nor shame will be directly applicable, simply because they are reactive. But we can still 
look at the difference between these two attitudes to track what is motivating about avoiding one 
or both of them as a reaction to one’s inaction. We can distinguish between guilt, which is a 
feeling associated with an act or failure to act, from shame, which focuses on feelings about 
one’s character. Bernard Williams distinguishes between guilt and shame as follows: 
What arouses guilt in an agent is an act or omission of a sort that typically elicits 
from other people anger, resentment, or indignation. What the agent may offer in 
order to turn this away is reparation; he may also fear punishment or may inflict it 
on himself. What arouses shame, on the other hand, is something that typically 
elicits from others contempt or derision or avoidance. This may equally be an act 
or omission, but it need not be: it may be some failing or defect. It will lower the 
agent’s self-respect and diminish him in his own eyes.45 
 
                                               
45  Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 90. 
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So while guilt is tied to something done (or not done), shame attaches to an assessment of one’s 
identity. As Williams notes, guilt can be tied to reparation, or some other accounting for one’s 
behavior. Shame, it seems, looks inwardly and is not tied to making changes outside of oneself. 
If we think about holding individuals partially responsible for, say, maintaining racist or 
sexist attitudes that increase the risk of harmful behavior on the part of others, shame may be an 
appropriate reactive attitude. When considering individual responsibility for this sort of 
collective inaction, which is tied to one’s identity, it makes sense to look inwardly and see racist 
attitudes as character defects. This is accurate, regardless of whether or not such self-awareness 
is motivating enough to encourage change. But it is not sufficient, and to rely on this internal 
self-assessment is to deny the power of accountability, and deny the moral weight of making a 
choice not to intervene to prevent harm. Guilt is a powerful (albeit backward-looking) tool for 
acknowledging that one should have acted differently, and provides the opportunity and 
obligation to improve the state of affairs. It motivates one to make a different choice the next 
time in order to prevent harm. And when we try to translate this to a forward-looking view of 
shared responsibility, it encourages us to look at how the choices we make affect other people, 
and how we might be obligated to prevent harm at some point. Returning to Isaacs’ term 
“collective obligation,” it seems that we should look at our responsibilities to prevent harm as 
obligations in the first place, rather than failed responsibilities after-the-fact, and the concept of 
guilt is better suited to encourage that way of looking at collective inaction. Whether or not 
shame generates an obligation to become a less defective person, it does not require us to create 
better states of affairs, and this should a necessary feature of accountability. 
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5.5B  Failure to Prevent Harm to Yazidi Women and Girls 
In this final sub-section, we return to Nadia’s case study and identify three different 
instances in which a putative group failed to act collectively to protect the Yazidi women and 
girls, or to prevent future harm to them. At the outset, we might (generously) concede that the 
timing around the initial siege of Sinjar made the case of the Yazidis more like Beach than 
Famine. It would have been quite challenging for anyone to assess the situation and put a stop 
to it. But this contains three instances of generosity, only one of which is plausibly warranted. 
First, it assumes that the initial two week time period between the beginning of the siege of 
Sinjar and the siege of Kocho was not enough time for anyone organize to intervene. This is 
plausible, but seems like a weak argument. Second, this assumes that the Yazidi people 
started “drowning” out of nowhere, which is certainly not the case. The peshmerga, for 
instance, had been in the region for two months. And third, this assumes that once the Yazidis 
“drowned,” there was nothing that could be done to prevent further drowning. This, too, 
seems implausible, given that the sexual enslavement of the Yazidi women and girls was 
ongoing, and may still be happening today. Thus our case study seems much more similar to 
Famine. There is an ongoing crisis, during which significant harm has already occurred. Because 
the harm is ongoing, there is time for the putative group members to organize themselves into a 
collective, make decisions, and prevent future harm. 
The first putative group we consider as a potential site of shared moral responsibility is 
the Sunni Arabs. Nadia notes from the very first page of her book that the Yazidis in Sinjar 
lived close to many Sunni Arabs, and that while historically they had coexisted peacefully, the 
fighting in Iraq in recent years had strained their relationships. Sunni Arabs had lost power in 
Iraq following the war that left a Shiite government in control, and they had lost influence in 
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Sinjar as the Kurds had grown in strength. When IS began growing in strength, their 
fundamentalist message found sympathizers in the Sunni Arab communities. Nadia and her 
family “learned that many of [their] Sunni Arab neighbors welcomed the militants and even 
joined them, blocking roads to stop Yazidis from reaching safety, allowing the terrorists to 
capture all non-Sunnis who failed to escape from the villages closest to Kocho, then looting 
the vacant Yazidi villages alongside the terrorists.”46 She notes the stark difference between 
the Sunni Arabs and the Iraqi Kurds, most of whom are Sunni, who drove to meet fleeing 
Yazidis, delivering supplies and opening their homes. Nadia describes her Sunni Arab 
neighbors as their “last hope for outside help,” as the genocide of the Yazidis unfolded and 
her family was trapped in their home in Kocho. They did not help, and Nadia saw this as a 
betrayal: 
Our Sunni neighbors could have come to us and tried to help. If they knew 
what was going to happen to the women, they could have dressed us all in 
black and taken us with them. They could have just come and told us, matter-
of-factly, “This is what will happen to you,” so we could stop fantasizing about 
being rescued. But they didn’t. They made the decision to do nothing, and their 
betrayals were like bullets before the real bullets came.47 
 
Thus Nadia and other Yazidi women and girls might have been saved from harm if their 
Sunni Arab neighbors had acted differently.  
 At first glance, we might think that the Sunni Arabs are a group already. Yet it is not 
clear that the delineation Nadia makes, which is her “neighbors,” refers to an organized group. 
It is more likely that her Sunni neighbors had some shared intentions and beliefs, but it is 
unlikely that they all had a plan in place to allow harm to come to the Yazidis. What is more 
likely is that they had an idea of what was about to happen to the Yazidi women and girls, and 
they were not motivated to act together to prevent harm from coming to the Yazidis. A single 
                                               
46  Murad and Krajeski, The Last Girl, 91. 
47  Ibid., 106. 
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family of Sunni Arabs could not have saved all of the Yazidi women and girls. It is unlikely 
that they even could have saved all the women and girls in Nadia’s family. But if the Sunni 
Arabs with relationships to the Yazidi community had worked together, they may have been 
able to construct a plan to save some of all of the women and girls. These individuals would 
be hard-pressed to say that they lacked the capacity to organize themselves. The bigger 
question is whether they should have been willing to take the risk that preventing harm to the 
Yazidis would have entailed, and based on the harms described in this chapter and in Chapter 
Three, and their (prior) special relationship with the Yazidis, it is clear that they should have 
done something.  
Each individual Sunni Arab, however, would share responsibility based on her own 
capacity. Sunni Arabs who ignored direct appeals from Yazidis for help, and who had the 
financial resources to help would be more responsible than, say, a Sunni Arab acquaintance 
living on a family member’s couch and with none of his own resources. A community leader 
is more responsible for failing to organize the community to save Yazidi women and girls 
than a recent transplant with few social skills. But this is the sort of failure to act that should 
result in a distribution of responsibility among the various individuals who could have done 
something to change the outcome for Yazidis, and some amount of blame for each. The Sunni 
Arabs provide a good example of why we should think of shared responsibility as forward-
looking: if this putative group had felt an obligation, they may have acted differently, which 
could have resulted in a better outcome for the Yazidis.  
The second putative group is women who are affiliated with IS in some way. This, too, 
refers to a delineation that we might think is already organized, but which is more likely to be 
individuals that have the capacity to easily organize. Nadia is struck by her interaction with 
 133 
Morteja’s mother and wonders how she could have so little sympathy toward Nadia and other 
Yazidis like her. Nadia expresses hatred for the woman because she had let Mosul be taken 
over by IS militants, men who erased women from public life. She understood that men joined 
IS for sex, money, and power, but she could not understand “why a woman would join the 
jihadists and openly celebrate the enslavement of girls the way Morteja’s mother did. Any 
woman in Iraq, no matter her religion, had to struggle for everything. Seats in parliament, 
reproductive rights, positions at universities—all these were the results of long battles. Men 
were content to stay in power, so power had to be taken from them by strong women.”48 So 
Nadia saw the women of IS as complicit in the violence enacted by their husbands and 
brothers, but she also thought they had an obligation to fight back. 
This putative group seems less likely to be blameworthy for failing to prevent harm. If 
we think about the global community, it might be that the women of IS are blameworthy for 
their complicity in helping their male colleagues carry out atrocities, and perhaps for sharing 
their attitudes about the inhumanity of the Yazidis. But there is no reason why they were 
obligated to save the Yazidi women and girls, especially because it does not appear that they 
would have been in a position to do so. As members of the perpetrator group, even if these 
women were questioning the acts of the IS militants, they could not have organized 
themselves to act to prevent harm to the Yazidis because it would have been too dangerous for 
them to even suggest the organization to the other women. IS is an organization that shows 
little respect even for its own women, so many of the women associated with IS “voluntarily” 
may be victims of violence. It does not seem plausible that these women would have the 
capacity to organize themselves to protect the Yazidis, and thus the blame for failing to do so 
                                               
48  Ibid., 226. 
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cannot be shared by the individual women. These women might be better candidates for the 
reactive attitude of shame, but that is outside our scope here. 
Finally, we can consider the shared moral responsibility of the international 
community. One might argue that the international community is not a putative group either, 
but is instead a well-organized group with clear structures in place to enable the immediate 
rescue of any “drowning children.” The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, endorsed by all 
member states of the U.N. in 2005, imposes an obligation to protect all populations from 
human rights violations and mass atrocity, and it provides a framework for the use of force 
through the U.N. Security Council. Thus one way of looking at the shared responsibility of 
the international community is to identify the members of the U.N. Security Council as a 
group, and then determine whether the group failed to prevent harm. On this view, it seems 
they have failed, since the U.N. Security Council did not intervene to protect the Yazidis 
despite the information that was publicly available about the atrocities being committed. They 
did pass a resolution in September 2017 providing support to the Iraqi government in the 
collection and preservation of evidence of crimes against the Yazidis. Yet assistance with 
accountability is not the same as intervening to prevent more harm. The existence of the 
Responsibility to Protect frames this as a forward-looking collective obligation, and the group 
members should be blamed for failing to meet this obligation. The U.N. Security Council 
could be held responsible as a collective, and the permanent members would share 
responsibility, all for failing to prevent harm to the Yazidi women and girls. 
We can also see the larger international community as a putative group, which can 
include the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (since working through the U.N. 
is not their only option for preventing harm). Because the harm was (arguably is) ongoing, 
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there has been time for members of the international community to organize themselves into a 
collective aimed at fulfilling the promise of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, make 
decisions, and prevent future harm. Again, the goal of shared responsibility should be to generate 
better outcomes, and assuming that IS could have been stopped from selling and enslaving 
Yazidi women and girls at some point, a better state of affairs will be achieved by collective 
action (even if, to recognize the real-life complexity of the situation, the group makes a decision 
to “act” but in a way other than through military intervention). Backward-looking responsibility 
for failures to intervene incentivizes waiting to see what happens, and provides an opportunity to 
actually rely on epistemic gaps to explain the reasons for inaction. Forward-looking 
responsibility encourages thoughtful weighing of information and options, but generates an 
obligation to avoid the worst outcomes, which in this case seem to be the continuation of the 
unwarranted violence. Entities like international organizations and nation states are even less 
likely than individual persons to have their behavior changed by something akin to shame, such 
as external (or even internal) criticism of the nature of national identity. The potential for guilt, 
which would demand that entities get involved after-the-fact to make up for their failure to 
intervene, should encourage collective action at the outset instead. And as I have already noted, 
the harms that could have been prevented are serious enough to risk the lives and well-being of 
individuals from the entities that would make up this group. So each state should be partially 
blamed, based on its ability to contribute to the collective effort at preventing harm to the Yazidi 
women and girls. The result of this collective inaction has been that more suffering occurred, and 
blaming these states might encourage them to establish different values or policies to ensure that 
this sort of inaction did not happen in the future.   
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In this chapter, I used the conceptual work from the previous chapters to construct 
models of responsibility for the mass sexual enslavement of Yazidi women and girls. I used the 
story of Nadia Murad, a young Yazidi woman, to identify the representative sorts of individuals 
and groups that could be blamed for their actions. I also constructed a view of shared 
responsibility that would allow us to share responsibility among the members of putative groups 
for their failure to act, or their failure to constitute a group that could have acted to prevent harm. 
My aim has been to identify responsibility looking backwards, with the hope that in the future, 
individuals and entities will see an obligation to protect vulnerable populations as a forward-
looking obligation. This will, I hope, result in a better state of affairs. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It has been three and a half years since IS attacked the Yazidi communities in the 
Sinjar region. It is estimated that several thousand Yazidi women and girls remain held by IS, 
despite the group’s significant territorial losses in recent months. For those who survived and 
escaped, many have not returned to their former communities in Sinjar, instead opting to 
apply for asylum in Europe and elsewhere around the world. In Iraq, as shown in Nadia’s 
story, “there has been a complete breakdown of trust between the Yazidi community and their 
neighbours.”1 It has been reported that survivors often recount the action (and inaction) of Arab 
families who assisted IS in (and failed to prevent IS from) committing atrocities against the 
Yazidis.2 The Yazidis have also expressed significant anger toward the Kurdish government, 
“flowing from the unannounced withdrawal of the Peshmerga from Sinjar as ISIS advanced.”3 
Finally, there is “a sense of profound disappointment with the international community. While 
there is support for organizations doing humanitarian work in IDP camps and, abroad, refugee 
camps, it is perceived that, at best, there is a paralysis, and, at worst, a reluctance regarding the 
taking of any action to rescue Yazidis still held by ISIS.”4 
While the ongoing plight of the Yazidis appears to be unique in its severity and scope, the 
strategy of the perpetrators is unfortunately representative of the new face of “rape as a weapon 
of war,” justified by religious doctrine. In the 1990s and early 2000, Algerian insurgents used the 
religious laws on sex and marriage to force women and girls to “temporarily marry [the] 
                                               
1  U.N. Human Rights Council, “They came to destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/32/CRP.2, 15 June 2016, 34, para. 184. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Ibid., para. 185. 
4  Ibid., para. 186. 
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insurgents before being discarded once the husbands’ conjugal rights had been satisfied.”5 Boko 
Haram, which is loyal to IS, captured over 276 schoolgirls in April of 2014, many of whom have 
reportedly been used as sex slaves for militants.6 Some have escaped or been freed in the months 
since their abduction, but as many as 112 may still be held by Boko Haram.7 The prospect of 
rape and sexual slavery, justified and even encouraged by religious ideology, has been used by 
IS and Boko Haram as a recruiting tactic.8 Given its success in attracting young men, there is no 
indication that the groups will stop using sexual slavery as a tactic of terrorism and recruitment. 
My aim here has been to take this problem and use philosophical tools to analyze how we should 
think about it, both now and when new situations arise. 
In Chapter Two, I explored what it means to be a group or a member of a group, 
considering the spectrum of views between individualist and collectivist accounts. I adopted a 
hybrid view that recognizes both the shared and individual identities of group members, so 
that the group is something more than the aggregate of the individuals. A perpetrator group 
like IS, for example, begins with a shared ideology and shared interests, but members join the 
group for a variety of reasons. Considering what it means to be an individual member of IS 
allows me to rule out a purely collectivist view of groups, since individual agency within a 
group varies widely. But the group ideology and organizational hierarchy limit my view from 
dissolving into a reductionist individualism. With respect to victim groups, like the Yazidi 
women and girls, the focus is more on wrongs perpetrated against the individual victims on 
                                               
5  Jonathan N.C. Hill, “Boko Haram, the Chibok Abductions and Nigeria's Counterterrorism Strategy,” 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point 7, no. 7 (2014); Marina Lazreg, “Consequences of Political 
Liberalisation and Sociocultural Mobilisation for Women in Algeria, Egypt and Jordan,” in Governing 
Women: Women’s Political Effectiveness in Contexts of Democratization and Governance Reform, ed. 
Anne Marie Goetz (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
6  Dionne Searcey, “Nigeria Rescues Another Student from 2014 Chibok Kidnapping,” The New York Times, 
January 4, 2018. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Mark Townsend, “Rape and Slavery Was Lure for U.K. ISIS Recruits with History of Sexual Violence,” 
The Guardian, October 7, 2017. 
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the basis of their group identity. Some aspects of the victim experience will be shared, while 
others are based on individual circumstances, so I again embraced a view that acknowledges 
both the individual and social aspects of an individual member who is part of a group. 
In Chapter Three, I used Grotius’ claim that defense of life and chastity are the main 
justified causes for the use of force as a jumping off point to consider the harm of mass sexual 
slavery. Historically, injury to an individual woman’s chastity constituted an injury to the 
honor of her male family members, in addition to her own honor. I argue that this is the wrong 
place to locate the objective harm of sexual slavery. Sexual slavery is an injury to well-being, 
and I adopted a view of well-being that identifies at least some objective aspects of well-
being, including a right to bodily integrity and freedom of movement. My view relied on the 
preference-based account of well-being for individuals and an objective list account for 
groups. But while the harm of sexual slavery may involve both subjective and objective 
injury, the wrongdoing is about the actions of the perpetrator, not the experience of the victim. 
Accordingly, I argued for a distinction between harm and wrongdoing, as the harm 
experienced by any individual Yazidi or the group as a whole does not generate what is 
objectively wrong about a perpetrator’s actions. 
In Chapter Four, I attempted to classify IS as a non-state actor by analyzing the 
concept of statehood from political, religious, and legal perspectives. I considered statehood 
in terms of authority and recognition, adopting a view that requires both features in terms of 
political and legal requirements. I conclude that while IS maintained political control over 
some territory and garnered recognition from some other political actors during the height of 
its power, it still likely failed to constitute a state. Regardless of its status, however, IS failed 
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to meet certain obligations toward individuals and communities by engaging in widespread 
campaigns of terror and violence. 
Finally, in Chapter Five, I used my previously-defended views of perpetrator and 
victim groups, the harm of sexual slavery, and IS as a non-state actor to answer moral 
questions about how to assess responsibility for the harms suffered by Yazidi women and 
girls. I used the case study of Nadia Murad, a Yazidi survivor of sexual slavery at the hands of 
IS, to build a case for individual, collective, and shared responsibility. I focused on the 
members of IS and their collaborators in arguing for widespread but varied levels of 
individual and collective responsibility. I then defended a view of shared responsibility for the 
Yazidi’s neighbors and members of the international community, all of whom failed to act 
collectively to prevent past and ongoing harms to Yazidi women and girls. By suggesting that 
we adopt a forward-looking view of shared responsibility, it is my hope that we can reduce 
the harm caused by ideologically-driven terrorist groups in the future. If many individuals and 
members of the international community feel a collective obligation to intervene, instead of 
looking on as helpless bystanders, the future may hold fewer instances of mass sexual slavery. 
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